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ABSTRACT

Author: Shelby, William, P. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: December 2017
Title: Prone to Drone: The Effect of Unmanned Aircraft Systems on Public Support for the Use of
Force
Major Professor: Aaron Hoffman
Unmanned aircraft systems (drones) have seen widespread use by the United States in the “War
on Terror.” Drones keep soldiers out of harm’s way and they reduce the financial cost of military
operations, all while maintaining high levels of precision like regular soldiers. Because they
provide the benefits of using force without the risks, drones could make the public more willing to
support the use of force. If true, the public may be more prone to support using force rather than
seek out other alternatives to solve a foreign policy crisis because they perceive less risk involved
in using force. I tested this hypothesis with a series of experiments with varying amounts and types
of risk. I find that individuals see drones as less risky than using ground forces, which led to a
higher support for military force, meaning drones make it easier to engage in conflict. These results
suggest that policymakers could utilize drones in some cases where they want to increase support
for a military operation by highlighting the low risk involved in using drones, but it is important
to highlight the double-edged nature of drones. The rest of the world is developing their own
drones, and if the United States can carry out an action, soon, the rest of the world will be able to
do the same. To ensure that the rest of the world does not indiscriminately use drones, the United
States could take steps to establish social and institutional norms that govern actor behavior for
drones.
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past 25 years, unmanned aircraft system (drone) technology rapidly improved
from fringe technology to mainstream force multiplier. Military interventions in the Middle East
showed that drone technology is not only cheaper than conventional weaponry, but also just as, if
not more, proficient in addressing security threats like terrorism. President George W. Bush
summarizes these sentiments in an address to military cadets graduating from the Citadel,
“Before the war, the Predator (drone) had skeptics, because it did not fit the old ways.
Now it is clear the military does not have enough unmanned vehicles. We're entering an
era in which unmanned vehicles of all kinds will take on greater importance -- in space,
on land, in the air, and at sea.” (Citadel Newsroom 2001)
Since this speech, President Bush’s prediction has come true, particularly for aerial
drones. Drones have enjoyed a success rate that few other technologies can replicate (Plaw,
Fricker, and Colon 2016). For this reason, drones have been a critical piece of the United States’
counterterrorism strategy and President Obama’s “Obama Doctrine,”
“So it is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al
Qa’ida and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly
referred to as drones… our actions are effective… Dozens of highly skilled al Qa’ida
commanders, trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield.
Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit
systems, European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have
saved lives.” (Obama 2013a).
Drones are a major part of U.S. counterterrorism policy, and their use abroad has received
consistently positive support from most the U.S. population (Pew Research Center 2015, Plaw,
Fricker, and Colon 2016).
Yet, researchers worry that drones can make using military force too easy. Drones
developed to reduce the risk associated with using force by reducing the risk to soldiers, reducing
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the financial cost of war, reducing the risk of civilian casualties and damage, and reducing the
political costs for leaders (Kakaes 2015, Singer 2009, Whittle 2014). Yet, their use may have the
perverse effect of making it easier to resort to using military force before giving other options a
chance to work because the risks of using force are drastically lower. Without these risks, the
U.S. public could become cavalier about how the United States uses military force (Davis et al
2014, Kaag and Kreps 2014, Singer 2009). If true, drones could change how the public thinks
about military operations and potentially make the public more willing to support, or less likely
to oppose, using military force.
This dissertation focuses on how drones can change the way individuals think about
conflict. Drones drastically reduce the risk involved in using military force for the U.S.
government and those in charge by insulating the public from incurring costs associated with
conventional conflict. If drones reduce concerns about the risks involved with military force, it
could make states with access to the technology “prone to drone.” Across three experiments, I
find that subjects think drones are more appealing to use than soldiers to solve a foreign policy
issue because there is a lower perceived risk, in a general sense, associated with their use than
with using soldiers. Since the risks associated with using force are lower, the benefits of
engaging in a military operation look more appealing, which could explain the higher level of
support.
This creates a problem: if drones receive more support because they are less risky, does
that mean the public is more likely to support the use of force more often than it has in the past?
Drones circumvent many of the traditional constraints on using force found in democratic states.
Could this lead to a scenario, known as moral hazard, where the public is willing to use force
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because the risk is significantly lower with drones? If so, how does one mitigate these potentially
game-changing effects?
This chapter will outline the dissertation. I begin with a definition of drones. I then turn to
the history of drone development. Third, I discuss the importance of studying drones in
international relations. Fourth, I briefly summarize the results of this project. I conclude the
chapter with an overview of the rest of the dissertation.

1.1

Drones: A Definition

Before discussing how drones can change the way the public perceives the concept of
war in the next chapter, understanding what a drone is and how drone technology developed will
elicit why drones are so important for the U.S. military today. Most people are familiar with the
concept of a drone, but the concept is not limited to airborne vehicles. There are land and water
vehicles that operate in much the same ways as aerial drones (other than they operate on land or
in water).
Drones are also not just vehicles; they are systems of vehicles, pilots, analysts,
computers, and maintenance crews. The most obvious part of the system is the pilot who controls
the movement of the vehicle and, when the vehicle has weapons, will also fire the weapons. The
pilot is not the one responsible for ensuring the weapon hits the target. That job belongs to
another individual known as the sensor operator. The sensor operator is the one who “guides”
laser- and missile-guided explosives to their target. This is like a two-man fighter squad that uses
this strategy so the pilot does not need to focus attention on both flying and trying to use a
weapon simultaneously. These individuals sit in “cock pits” that provide information about the
status of the drone. There are also 15-20 analysts monitoring the various data of the unmanned
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system. This information includes live video feed, temperature changes, and any other data the
vehicle collects, such as electronic signals (Brannen 2014, Whittle 2014). Finally, a maintenance
crew fixes the vehicle and ensures that it is properly stocked and maintained.
Because drones are systems, I define them as such. I use the definition established by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies: a platform vehicle controlled from a distance that
includes a pilot crew, sensor operators, analysts, and maintenance crews (Brannen 2014). I focus
here exclusively on airborne vehicles, since they are the most well-known forms of drones. I add
one additional descriptive, borrowing from the definition of the United States Air Force to
describe systems with the ability to kinetically engage enemy targets: a platform vehicle
controlled from a distance that includes a pilot, sensor operators, analysts, and a maintenance
crew, with the ability to use weapons to attack an enemy combatant or target (Gertler 2012, US
Air Force 2009). The definition excludes fully autonomous systems because they are not
currently operational. This definition is crucial to understand what sets drones apart from other
military technology: those operating the drone do not incur the physical risks of conflict. Why
this is important is best understood through learning about why drones developed as they did.

1.2

The Evolution of Drone Technology

Drone technology has been around for over a century, in concept form, with the explicit
goal to reduce risk to soldiers while maintaining or surpassing their capabilities. Many argue that
drones started as unmanned balloons that carried explosives over a battlefield, but I begin with
the well-known scientist and inventor Nikola Tesla. Tesla is the first person to patent the idea of
drone technology:
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“In a broad sense, then, my invention differs from all of those systems which provide for
the control of the mechanism carried by a moving object and governing its motion in that
I require no intermediate wires, cables, or other form of electrical or mechanical
connection with the object save the natural modia in space. I accomplish, nevertheless,
similar results and in a much more practicable manner by producing waves, impulses, or
radiations which are received through the earth, water, or atmosphere by suitable
apparatus‘ on the moving body and cause the desired actions so long as the body remains
within the active region or effective range of such on currents, waves, impulses, or
radiations.” (Tesla 1898)
Tesla believed his idea would revolutionize warfare, but there were two major impediments to
using the technology when first conceptualized. Drones, at first conception, were unmanned
vehicles with fewer capabilities than a similar, manned vehicle. In addition, Tesla’s concepts
were simply that: concepts. There were no mechanisms that allowed operators to control drones
from afar.
This did not stop people from trying to create a weaponized drone with a pre-set flight.
The first drones were giant wind-up toys packed with explosives. Known as Kettering Bugs,
these drones spun their propellers a certain number of rotations before crashing (falling) down on
a target. The slightest miscalculation meant the weapon missed its target (Keane and Carr 2013,
Zaloga 2011). Remote controls did little to enhance capabilities. The pilots had to be within line
of sight contact with the drone and stay close enough to control it. This meant that the pilots
were still at risk, so the technology did not improve the situation for the soldier.
Drone projects were largely ignored until the Second World War. Three projects sought
to utilize drones in ways that would mitigate risk to soldiers. The first project involved loading a
B-17 Bomber with explosives and controlling it remotely via another bomber miles behind it
using radar to find targets. The only issue with this technology was the ability of the bomber to
take off. There was no way for the remote control to assist with takeoff. Pilots had to manually
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steer the plane for takeoff and then jump out of the aircraft as soon as it was airborne. There were
a few successful test runs, but the project ended in disaster. Joseph Kennedy Jr., John F.
Kennedy’s older brother, was a B-17 pilot doing test runs for this project when the B-17 he was
testing blew up before Joseph and his co-pilot could get out. The project ended shortly after this
incident (Whittle 2014).
The second project was more successful. The military built a drone called the TDR-1 and
used it in Japan. Pilots controlled this drone via radio signal and a video camera from up to 30
miles away (Budge 2014, Keane and Carr 2013). Initially, it was a primitive guided missile, but
it was capable of more. On October 19, 1944, the TDR-1 dropped bombs on Japanese gun posts
on an island in the Pacific. This mission is the first “drone strike,” and succeeded in hitting the
target. However, the program ended soon after the first strike to open funds for other programs
(Newcome 2004).
While these early projects to weaponize drones did not bear much fruit, drones found
another use during the Second World War: target practice. The war in the Pacific was largely an
ocean battle; the United States needed air superiority, but they faced a huge deficit of capable
pilots. The military could not create a realistic training scenario without using real ammunition to
train the pilots. Pitting pilot vs. pilot in training was not an option, so the military came up with a
different solution: use remote-controlled planes as targets for pilots to shoot (Keane and Carr
2013, Western Museum of Flight 2010). These drones could maneuver in ways that provided
more realistic training for pilots.
Drones attracted more attention again in the early 1960s when the Russians shot down a
U.S. U-2 Spy Plane over Russia. The United States worried about Russia’s nuclear capabilities,
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but Russia could house military facilities deep in Russian territory away from civilization and
from any spies that the West could use to gather information. President Eisenhower wanted to
know more about the “bomber gap” (disparity in nuclear capabilities of bombers) between the
United States and Russia, and he wanted a better method to gather intelligence on Russian
capabilities. At the time, spy planes flew over restricted airspace, but they risked exposure to
anti-aircraft defenses. The United States needed a high-altitude plane that could operate high
above restricted airspace and avoid surface-to-air missiles (Office of the Historian 2016).
Their solution was the U-2 Spy Plane. This plane flew at high altitudes to reduce the risk
of exposure to anti-aircraft defenses. However, reducing the risk did not eliminate it. In 1960, the
Russians shot down a U-2 plane carrying Gary Powers, a CIA pilot, during routine surveillance
over restricted Russian airspace. The resulting incident caused an international firestorm of
rhetoric and fears of nuclear war during a tense time in the Cold War between the United States
and the Russia (Office of the Historian 2016). Then-presidential candidate John F. Kennedy took
notice of this incident and pushed for more research into drone technology (likely being aware of
the project from his family tragedy with Joe Jr.) when he took office to ensure this did not
happen again (Ehrhard 2010).
This was not the only experience that shaped President Kennedy’s desire to further drone
research. The Cuban Missile Crisis also exacerbated the issues with manned spy planes. During
the 10-day standoff, Kennedy wanted better intelligence on the number of warheads that Cuba
had, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not provide this information. The U-2 planes collected
imagery of Cuban military sites but remained at a high altitude to avoid air defenses. Higher
altitude meant lower risk, but the resulting intelligence was not as useful as a lower altitude
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surveillance would have been. Another U-2 incident would only have made the situation worse.
One solution to this problem was to use a drone over Cuba to get better photos without concern
over the surveillance plane getting shot down. The U.S. military possessed working drone
prototypes and almost used them to gather intelligence. At the last minute however, military
officials called off their use because they did not want the Russians to know that the United
States had this technology. After this incident concluded, President Kennedy ordered more
research on drones for future use (Ehrhard 2010).
The benefits of drones were clear by 1964. While flying a routine mission over China, the
Chinese military shot down a U.S. drone. However, China had only a heap of indistinguishable
machine parts. Plaw, Fricker, and Colon (2016) explain,
"Despite the loss of the aircraft, the incident illustrated one of the key advantages of
drones. In contrast with the situation that arose with the Soviets in 1960, when they put
captured U-2 pilot Gary Powers on trial after they shot down his aircraft, the Chinese
government had to celebrate its 'major victory' without a pilot in captivity." (14)
Soon thereafter, the U.S. military was employing drones in active combat zones,
including Vietnam to track prisoner of war camps. These camps were far behind enemy lines. To
gather intelligence on their whereabouts, planes flew at low altitudes to see the camps, again a
problem for U-2 spy planes. Since the planes had to fly low to obtain good information, using
drones made the mission less risky. There was also a noticeable psychological impact on the
enemy. The drones, known as “Firebees,” were frequently shot down, but that did not deter the
United States (Whittle 2014). The North Vietnamese lauded these takedowns, but there was no
risk to the pilot, and the technology was so cheaply constructed that the drones often became
unrecognizable when they crashed, so there was no concern the enemy could reverse engineer
the technology (Plaw, Fricker, and Colon 2016). The fact that the U.S. military did not care if
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these planes crashed scared the North Vietnamese Army and gave the United States a small
advantage. Ultimately, this advantage did not help the United States win the conflict, but it
showed how drones could benefit the United States.
Drones were also critical to helping the United States figure out countermeasures to antiaircraft weapons that saved millions of dollars and countless lives of pilots during the Cold War.
The U.S. military used drones to figure out how to outsmart anti-aircraft defenses. Russian and
Chinese surface-to-air missiles used a specific frequency to target aircraft. The United States
knew that if they could determine the frequency, they could make U.S. spy planes more difficult
to shoot down with anti-aircraft missiles. However, the plane needed to be close enough to the
missile to detect the frequency, meaning the missile would destroy the plane in the process. This
was too risky for a manned aircraft, but not so for a drone. The United States sent a drone with
recording equipment over Soviet airspace and allowed it to get shot down. The U.S. military
received the intelligence it sought. They figured out the frequency the Soviets used to track
aircraft. With this information, the United States developed countermeasures to anti-aircraft
missiles by creating a counter-frequency to the one the missiles used. When the United States
tested these new countermeasures with a second drone, it took multiple missiles to shoot the
drone down (Ehrhard 2010). The United States repeated the process in China and Vietnam,
where the frequency not only allowed drones to escape anti-aircraft systems but also caused
Vietnamese fighters to get shot down by their own missiles (Whittle 2014, Zaloga 2011). For a
few million dollars, the United States rendered enemy anti-aircraft missile capability much less
effective and decreased risk to the pilots tasked with flying manned missions over these hostile
territories.
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The United States was not the only country that saw drones as a technology that reduced
risk to the military. Israel showed interest in the early development of drones and the United
States supplied them with the technology. Drones proved useful to the Israelis during the Yom
Kippur War. In 1973, a coalition force led by Egypt attacked Israel on all sides (Encyclopedia
Britannica 2017b). They quickly had Israel on the ropes, as multiple fronts forced the Israeli
military to split their forces to defend more territory.
Israel knew that it needed to disable Lebanon’s air defenses, but they could not engage in
an air assault with manned aircraft because of Lebanon’s air-defense capabilities; Israel risked
losing too many planes and pilots. However, if they could send in bomber planes while the antiaircraft weapons were vulnerable, they could wipe out the threat. To do this, Israel launched a
decoy fleet using their drone arsenal. The drone fleet was large enough it would appear as though
Israel sent in their Air Force to attack Lebanon on radar. After the drone fleet took the brunt of
the assault, the Israeli bombers would follow and take out Lebanon’s air defense capabilities
(Longino 1994).
Sure enough, when Israel sent a large drone force into Lebanon, the Lebanese military
thought they were under attack by Israeli bombers. They responded to the threat by using antiaircraft defenses to shoot down any aircraft flying in their airspace. Lebanon destroyed the drone
fleet, but Israel caught Lebanon with their pants down. As the Lebanese military reloaded their
anti-aircraft guns, Israeli bombers decimated the Lebanese Air Force and their anti-aircraft
defenses (Longino 1994). The tactic was so successful that Israel used the same tactic against
Egypt to the same result (Kakaes 2015). Israel took command of the skies and repelled all
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invading forces in a matter of weeks. This strategy resurfaced when the United States employed
similar tactics twenty years later in the Persian Gulf War (Ehrhard 2010).
By this time, drones filled a niche, but the technology was still not as useful as
policymakers hoped. Drones reduced risks to military personnel, but technological constraints
limited their capabilities. Whittle (2014) explains why drone use remained low. First, drones
were not as fast as conventional surveillance planes. Drones were built for persistent surveillance
while surveillance planes were meant to gather intelligence while safely avoiding anti-aircraft
defenses. Second, drones could only stay airborne for a few hours like normal planes. While
drones are lighter than conventional aircraft, they are also smaller. Smaller aircraft have less
room to store fuel. Cameras on early drones were also heavy, meaning that the drones needed to
expend more fuel to stay aloft. Third, drone operators had to stay close to control the drone.
While these control ships could stay out of harm’s way, the pilots controlling the drones were
still at risk. Because the technology was not advancing as much as other platforms like satellite
imagery, drone research did not receive enough funding to advance the technology.
To keep drones cheap, developers couldn’t do much to improve the airspeed,1 but they
could focus on increasing time in the air and extending the distance between pilot and drone. To
make them more marketable, they needed to have a longer flight time. In the late 1970s and into
the early 1980s, a man by the name Abe Karem figured out how to increase flight. Karem used a
specific wing to body ratio that allowed the drone to use minimal fuel and remain airborne for
more than a day, a model that served as the prototype to drones familiar today. This model,
known as the Albatross (forerunner to the Predator and Reaper drones of today), set a record

1

There were attempts to create a supersonic drone, known as the D-21, but the program was canceled after a major
accident and cost failures. See Whittle 2014.
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flight time of nearly 40 hours on a little more than 15 gallons of fuel (Whittle 2014). If the
military could figure out a way to use drones for longer intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions, the technology would become a great asset. Still, competition for
limited money put drone research on the backburner.
In the 1990s, advances in endurance technology and control capabilities reignited interest
in drone technology. Some drone programs had problems with cost overruns and delays (such as
the Dark Star Program (Whittle 2014), but others proved their worth. The United State used
drones during the Persian Gulf War to conduct high-risk surveillance missions in combat zones
and flush out anti-air defenses (Kakaes 2015). Longino (1994) praised the new capability of
U.S. drones, quoting Napoleon,
“the ability to know the enemy's location and his movement on the battlefield is
paramount to victory. In today's environment, and even more so in tomorrow's, the ability
to know more about the enemy than he knows about you may determine the outcome,
regardless of other numerical imbalances or technological offsets.” (xiii).
Using drones in the Persian Gulf created positive benefits for the United States and gave drone
advocates a strong argument to continue their research.
Drone use expanded further during the intervention in Kosovo. The United States knew
that they needed to intervene in Kosovo, but President Bill Clinton was wary of sending troops to
the area. The United States issued a “zero-casualty” strategy to ensure no U.S. (or coalition)
casualties. Drones were pivotal in carrying out this goal. Drones provided invaluable insight to
surveillance missions during the military operation for allied forces (Israel 1996, Haulmann
2003). Drones could fly at low altitudes at which manned aircraft had a high probability of
getting shot down.
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What sparked further interest was the culmination of other technologies that, when
combined with drones, would give them capabilities similar to manned fighter planes. The first
of this technology was laser-guided munitions. Laser-guided munitions allowed pilots to target
with pinpoint accuracy, but for the targeting to work, a pilot must point a laser at a target for an
extended period of time. This is when the pilot is most vulnerable to air defenses. To mitigate
this risk, the U.S. Air Force put laser guiders on drones to guide munitions (Dixon 2000). The
strategy used drones to find and target buildings or enemies and linger over a target at a high
altitude out of range of anti-aircraft weaponry while pointing a laser at a target for a fighter jet.
Piloted aircraft would use the laser guiders from the drones for targeting information. Pilots only
needed to fly close enough to fire their missiles or drop their bombs and then leave. This strategy
decreased the time pilots were at risk and allowed the U.S. military to keep their promise of zero
casualties.
A second important technology was the ability to control drones via satellite. Until the
late 1990s and early 2000s, drone operators had to remain relatively close to the drones they
were piloting and had to maintain line-of-sight with them (Blom 2010, Whittle 2014). The radio
signals used by drone controls had to be set up so nothing would block the signal, meaning drone
operators had to stay within roughly 115 miles of where the drone operated.
This changed when the United States began utilizing satellite communications. There are
hundreds of satellites, both commercial and governmental, orbiting the earth. These satellites
allow near instantaneous communication from one part of the world to another with relative ease,
and it also allows individuals to use the global positioning system, or GPS. This system would
allow drone pilots to fly drones from a continent away (Blom 2010). If pilots did not have to
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maintain line-of-sight, then they could be anywhere in the world and control the drone. While the
United States still utilized pilots close to where drones would take off and land, the operators for
the main parts of the mission could stay in the continental United States, away from harm.
Two years later, drones received their final transformation into what they are today. After
the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States wanted to take the fight to al Qa’ida, but
sending ground forces into hostile territory is a dangerous game. Al Qa’ida had no issues hiding
in hard-to-reach areas in the Middle East. Even if soldiers could reach the areas, they would be at
a severe disadvantage due to lack of knowledge of the terrain (Braun 2015). Al Qa'ida could
ambush the U.S. military on their home turf (U.S. Air Force 2009). The situation was too risky.
To address these issues, the United States came up with a solution: send in a drone to find al
Qa’ida operatives. The drone could locate a target and guide soldiers or an airstrike to its target.
This was a low-risk strategy, but it was also low benefit. The lag time between
identifying a target and attacking it meant that terrorists had time to escape. The solution then,
was to arm the drone. It was a short step to go from guiding missiles to guiding and shooting
them. This efficiency meant that drones could act on actionable intelligence much faster than
previous technology allowed (Whittle 2014). Previously, if the United States wanted to act on
actionable intelligence, it was difficult to get that information to the right individual to get
approval. Since the drones communicated via satellite, anyone in the military could view the
drone feed. If a drone operator needed a general’s approval prior to engaging an enemy, they
could call the general, wait for the general to bring up the feed, receive approval, and engage in
an instant. No more trying to explain to a general what was going on; he or she could see for
themselves.
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This was a major problem for U.S. forces when hunting Osama bin Laden prior to and
immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Intelligence suggested bin Laden was in a
specific area, but it was not confirmable. Leaders waited too long to act on it, and bin Laden
went into hiding. Now however, a drone could not only fly without the danger associated with
putting forces on the ground, but when there was strong evidence there was a terror target in
sight, it was immediately presentable to leaders who could give the order to kill. McKelvey
(2012) summarizes the importance of this technological improvement, “Before the creation of
the weaponized drone, the kill chain, or the amount of time it takes to identify an enemy and then
‘neutralize’ him, could take three days, but drones can do that in five minutes.” (10). With these
capabilities, the United States was now in the modern drone age.

1.3

Drones as a Cost-Saving Measure

The importance of the historical development of drones comes down to solving one
problem: reducing the risk of using military resources by creating a technology that allows
operators to stay out of harm’s way while maintaining similar precision capabilities. Drones
present no direct risk to soldiers who use them (meaning no potential for casualties), they are
cheaper to produce and maintain than conventional military vehicles (thus not affecting the
economy), they have the potential to be precise and discriminatory in their attacks (meaning little
or no unnecessary destruction), and they provide political cover for leaders in charge (Davis et al
2014). In essence, drones take the risk out of military force.
Without drones, military operations are risky for policymakers. In military operations, the
public absorbs the costs of war such as casualties or financial burden. Based on previous
experiences with conflict, the public is aware of the risks associated with military force (Risse-
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Kappen 1991), so they prefer alternatives to using force unless it is necessary to their security
(Gartzke 2007). In democratic states, the public chooses its leader. If the leader engages in a
military operation that the public deems unnecessary, they will vote the leader out of office for a
new leader with similar beliefs to themselves (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003, Kant 1983,
Luttwak 1994, 1995). Therefore, leaders have an incentive to listen to public opinion because
they would otherwise lose power.
For this reason, it is difficult for leaders to engage in conflicts to help other states in need;
democratic publics only want to help if tangible benefits help the public. This means that the
public prefers intervening with military force to increase their security rather than assist other
states (Jentleson 1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998, Page and Bouton 2006). Operations that do
not increase security can be beneficial, but they are risky and could hurt the ability of the state to
address a real security concern.
However, if there were a way to engage in conflict with little resource allocation,
democratic publics may be more willing to support military force in situations they previously
would not have supported (Kaag and Kreps 2014, Singer 2009, Sauer and Schornig 2012).
Imagine that there are two approaches to solve a problem that provide the same benefit. One
option costs $100 and the other approach costs $200. If the outcome is the same or similar in
either case, the cheaper option appears more appealing, all things being equal. Using more
resources than are necessary is wasteful. The savings could be utilized somewhere else,
therefore, the cheaper option should be more appealing.
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Cost-Benefit Analysis Of Using Force

Using Soldiers

Using Drones
Benefit

Cost

Figure 1-A Risk Analysis of Military Operations
By insulating civilians from the costs of conflict, policymakers could have greater leeway
in how they use force abroad. This is, according to scholars, what drones do, leading to the
question, how do drones influence public opinion on military force? Drones, according to
scholars, reduce the risk associated with using force to where the public may be more supportive
of, or at least less opposed to using force (Singer 2009). If this is true, then policymakers could
feel as though they can play fast and loose with the military to intervene in conflicts from which
a state may have otherwise stayed away (Kaag and Kreps 2014). Drone technology is not
currently riskless in what it can do (Davis et al 2014, Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016), but
the perception of drones as a panacea for security issues creates a possibility that the public will
prefer military intervention rather than diplomatic alternatives (Kaag and Kreps 2014, Schneider
and MacDonald 2016).

1.4

Using Experiments to Establish Causality

Scholars have turned their attention towards drones and the possible issues they may
create (Singer 2009, Kaag and Kreps 2014, Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016, Bergen and

18
Rothenberg 2015, Plaw, Fricker, and Colon 2016) and they have all discussed the role of risk
reduction. Some researchers have even conducted experiments to understand causal relationships
with drones (Horowitz 2016, Kreps 2014, Kreps and Wallace 2016, Schneider and MacDonald
2016, Walsh 2015, Walsh and Schulzke 2015), but no one has as of this dissertation established a
causal relationship between drones and risk reduction (Shelby 2017). I ran a series of
experiments to fill this gap in the literature.
Using a hypothetical military intervention in Yemen that uses different types of force
(drones vs. manned aircraft2 vs. soldiers) and either different political goals (assisting Yemen in
fighting rebels in their civil war or a counterterrorism campaign) or likelihood of success of the
mission (90%, 50%, or 30%), I show that individuals perceive drones as less risky than other
types of force. In the experiments that manipulate the likelihood of success, subjects in the drone
groups with small chances of success saw as much risk as the soldier group with the highest
likelihood of success. Subjects provided information about drones also showed more support for
military force than subjects given information about soldiers.
This does not mean that drones make people willing to support any military force. There
were limitations. Some subjects thought there was still risk involved in using drones. For
example, some subjects concerned themselves with the risk to civilians or the risk of excess
destruction more when given information about drones than subjects given information about
soldiers. Still, this was not the norm: the perceived risk of using drones was lower than the
perceived risk of using soldiers.

2

Only in study 1
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It is also unclear what makes subjects perceive fewer risks. Subjects given information do
not become more willing to take risks, suggesting that drones do not change risk attitudes
surrounding military force, meaning subjects do not see drones are so riskless they perceive zero
costs associated with drone use. Nor do subjects perceive drones as overly capable of
accomplishing a mission. Subjects given information about drones did not perceive the
likelihood of success as higher than subjects given information about soldiers. However, subjects
given information about drones less frequently mentioned concerns about the likelihood of
success in some of the experiments when asked to explain their rational behind their perception
of risk surrounding military force or their support for military force. This may suggest that
individuals do not see drones as more capable; rather, they may simply care less about success
because drones are perceived as “cheap.”
This lower perceived risk and increased support suggest that drones may have a moral
hazard problem associated with their use. Moral hazard refers to situations in which a party acts
in a certain risky way because they do not incur any negative impacts from the action (Stone
2011). Results from these experiments suggests that may be true, as some of the results
suggested that drones receive just as much support as soldiers, even if the drone operation is
likely to fail and the soldier operation is likely to succeed. This has major implications for
leaders who may want to engage in military action but are constrained from doing so. Or, on the
other side, it may inhibit leaders looking for a way to limit unnecessary military force from other
states.
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1.5

Outline for the Dissertation

This dissertation seeks to explain how drones change the way people think about conflict.
Chapter 2 lays out the foundation on which I draw my conclusions about drones. The public
weighs the costs and benefits of a conflict in order to determine whether or not they support
military force, usually preferring to avoid conflict because the costs are too high compared to the
benefits gained. I show how the perception of drones as a game-changing technology, even when
they are not, could affect how the public supports the use of force.
Chapter 3 discusses the hypotheses and method I use to answer my research question. I
use the experimental method to test my hypotheses because experiments allow me to create data
where it is lacking. I also discuss the overarching scenario used in the experiment to gauge how
public perceptions change when the type of force changes.
Chapters 4 begins the first of three experiments in which I manipulate information about
the type of force. I also manipulate the political goal of the military operation. I find that subjects
prefer the use of drones over soldiers or manned aircraft, and also find that the perceived risk of
using drones is lower than using soldiers or manned aircraft.
Chapter 5 looks at the type of force and the likelihood of success. If drones reduce risk
perceptions, what happens if I raise the risk of an operation in another way? I manipulate the
likelihood of success of the military operation across drone and soldier scenarios and find that
drones are consistently seen as less risky, or just as risky, as the soldier scenario with the highest
likelihood of success. Even as the likelihood of success decreases, drones are always seen as less
risky.
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Chapter 6 takes another look at the likelihood of success. Study 3 seeks to understand
why drones appear less risky than other military operations. I replicate the experiment 2, but
move a key variable to post-stimulus assessment to measure risk attitudes and determine if
drones make individuals more risk acceptant, and also looks at whether or not there is an
optimism bias associated with drones. The results suggest drones do not make individuals more
risk acceptant, nor is there an optimism bias associated with their use, but the experiment
confirms that drones do have a lower perceived riskiness than soldiers.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by summarizing findings, discussing policy
implications, and suggesting alternatives that policymakers could follow to mitigate the effects
of a more drone-prone world. Drones have the potential to change the way we conceptualize
military force. However, drones are not yet at a place where they could have this effect. Their
current limits and future capabilities will likely have a major effect on how leaders choose to use
them (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016). Further complicating the problem is the fact that
everyone wants drones. A number of countries either have or are pursuing drone capabilities
(Bergen et al 2016). Understanding how drones change perceptions about using force allows
scholars and policymakers to understand how to de-escalate sensitive regions to larger
conflicts. In order to mitigate some of these effects, I then suggest how policymakers could put
checks in place to make drone use costlier. If drones are seen as riskless, then it is important to
increase that risk to deter individuals from using drones. Finally, I conclude with future research
questions. This dissertation found interesting results, but it opened the door to more questions. I
discuss the next step for research projects here.
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Over the past decade, scholars and policymakers have debated the implications of a
riskless technology in drones. Yet, no one has adequately crossed from the theoretical to the
practical reasons that drones are a technology that can change the way the public thinks about
military force. This dissertation will address this shortcoming and create an understanding of the
potential causal mechanisms that create this problem, and possibly ways to mitigate it.
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CHAPTER 2.

LOW RISK, HIGH REWARD? PUBLIC OPINION AND
DRONE USE

Drones are revolutionizing the way the United States fights wars, according to former
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy (Ramirez 2012). Drones are relatively
cheap to produce and operate, their strikes are precise, and they involve no risk to the pilots who
operate them from U.S. bases thousands of kilometers from their targets (Singer 2009, Whittle
2014). For these reasons, drones have been the weapon of choice for the War on Terror.
Yet, not everyone is enthusiastic about the technological revolution. Several scholars
argue that increased reliance on drones may affect the public’s willingness to support the use of
force in surprising ways. By insulating pilots from injury, drones may make the public cavalier
about initiating the use of force because they no longer have to calculate the cost of war on their
society. For example, the public may support uses of force with drones where they would show
little support for using conventional strategies because there is less risk involved in doing so
(Kaag and Kreps 2014, Kreps and Zenko 2014, Benjamin 2013).
This chapter will explain the importance of drones to public support for the use of force.
The first section discusses research on the role of public opinion on military force. The second
section will synthesize this research into a coherent framework on which I base my research
approach. The third section will discuss how drone capabilities could make them a gamechanging technology. Section four will discuss how drones could affect public perceptions of
military force and change the way actors think about military intervention. I conclude with gaps
in the literature.
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2.1

Public Opinion and the Use of Force

The idea that public opinion affects military decisions is not a new concept, though it is
continually questioned (Jacobs and Page 2005, Kingdon 2012 Chapter 2). Immanuel Kant first
suggested the importance of public opinion in the late 18th century, “the consent of the citizenry
is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider
all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game.” (Kant 1983 113). While
Kant accepted this as true, American political scientists have always been skeptical of public
opinion. Post-World War II analysis, for example, concluded that the public was either apathetic
or ignorant of international issues (Bailey 1948, Kriesberg 1949).
Gabriel Almond’s (1950) book, The American People and Foreign Policy, the first indepth analysis of public opinion on American foreign policy, concluded that the American public
knows little about international events. Almond called his findings “mood theory.” The theory
claimed that most of the American public was ignorant of foreign policy issues (except a small
minority of the population involved in foreign policy). The public only showed interest when
there was an emotional or “mood” shift in foreign policy in one direction. For example,
Americans only cared about World War II after the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.
Almond was not the only individual that came to this conclusion, Lipmann (1955) did as
well. Known as the Almond-Lippmann Consensus, this school of thought had three beliefs about
public opinion:
1. Public opinion is unstable and does not produce coherent foreign policy positions.
2. Public opinion attitudes are so moody they should be considered indifference
3. Public opinion has a small impact on foreign policy. (Holsti 1992 442)

25
Converse (1964) found more evidence for this conclusion. In his study, Converse asked
participants to discuss their views on foreign policy and then asked them to return a few months
later for a follow up interview. When survey participants returned in a follow up study, Converse
found that many participants had different opinions on a given foreign policy issue. At the same
time, subjects had more consistent opinions about domestic policy issues, leading Converse to
conclude the mass public does not have coherent, stable opinions on foreign policy issues
because they are disinterested in international events.
The Almond-Lipmann consensus was not challenged much until the Vietnam War.
Contrary to the previous research findings, the public had a consistent, coherent opinion about
the military operation in Southeast Asia. Large costs of war, in terms of casualties and finances,
coupled with the operation having little strategic value persuaded the public to oppose the
conflict (Morgenthau 1965, Sobel 2001). These factors led researchers to a revised conclusion:
public support for military force is neither apathetic nor ignorant. The context of the conflict
affects public support (Knopf 1998, Page and Shapiro 2010). The public prefers military
operations where the state benefits from the engagements through enhancing its security. If the
public does not see this benefit, they are less likely to support the use of force.
Post-Vietnam findings led researchers to ask why the results stood in such stark contrast
to the Almond-Lipmann Consensus. Part of the issue was that Almond and Lipman were asking
the wrong questions to understand individual opinions on foreign policy issues. Typical
questions used by Almond, for example, included whether respondents thought domestic or
international issues were more important3 or how much a person followed a specific international

3

If a subject answered that a domestic issue was more important than an international one, Almond interpreted that
as an individual not thinking international issues were of concern.
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issue (Caspary 1970). While these questions are beneficial to determine how the public follows
specific foreign policy issues, they do not show that the public is inattentive (Page and Shapiro
2010). Rather, the public simply did not have enough exposure to an issue to understand the
implications of foreign policy actions.
The problem then, was a lack of exposure to information about a foreign policy issue, not
apathy towards these issues. When given information, the public can better understand the issue
at hand and make better decisions on possible alternatives. If provided this information,
individuals can form more coherent opinions on a topic (Burstein 2002, Livingston 1997, Manza
and Cook 2002, Soroka 2003, Zaller 1992). In cases of military force, the longer a conflict
continues, the more likely it is that media will cover the issue, even from less common sources of
news (such as entertainment shows or social media) because the event becomes pervasive in
society (Baum 2011). Extended military operations look much less appealing to the average
person than operations like Desert Storm and Desert Shield that concluded in a matter of weeks
(Encyclopedia Britannica 2017a). As a conflict continues the public will change their opinions
about supporting the use of force because they will learn that more appealing alternatives like
negotiation or sanctions are available or that the costs of conflict outweigh the proposed benefits
(Mueller 1973, Sobel 2001, Holsti 2004, 2011).
Still, the public cannot know everything even with greater access to news and
information. To fill in gaps, people use the context of previous experiences, combined with
cognitive shortcuts to fill gaps in their knowledge base (Entman 2003, Hermann, Tetlock, and
Visser 1999, Herwitz and Peffley 1987, Page and Bouton 2006, Page and Shapiro 2010, Zaller
and Feldman 1992). These cognitive shortcuts include values include such as promoting
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democracy, ensuring security, and isolationism. These values help individuals fill in gaps where
they may not understand the intricacies of a major event (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). For
example, people may not understand the current Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, but combining
context with their values can help them form an opinion about the crisis (Albert 2017). If a
person believes that minority populations should not be persecuted, they would likely believe
that the Rohingya need assistance.
Researchers have found these schema/values connections in multiple studies. Page and
Bouton (2006) used Chicago Council on Foreign Relations data to show that the public puts
more weight on issues that they perceive to be vital to U.S. security. Russett and Nincic (1976)
used public opinion polls to show that the public is more willing to support partners and allies
that share common values, whether they be cultural or economic, with military force. Kertzer et
al (2014) used data from youmorals.org to show a relationship between morals and support for
certain types of foreign policy objectives. Peffley and Hurwitz (1993), following the design of
Converse (1964), conducted a survey and a follow-up survey that showed that subjects may not
understand every foreign policy issue, but they showed consistent support for underlying values
over time. Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) also showed through a series of experiments a
relationship between subject dispositions and international event context. Ceccoli and Bing
(2014) extend this to a specific policy issue using drone strike policies. The authors argue that
drone policy is a low-salience issue; therefore, the public relies on their core values to make
decisions.
With an understanding of what influences individual opinions, I now move into how
these opinions affect change. How public opinion influences policymakers’ decision to use
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military force is intuitive. War is costly. Individuals must ration resources and make sacrifices in
the name of the state. These sacrifices include funding the military with state resources rather
than spending them on domestic issues or making the ultimate sacrifice, dying for one’s country.
As a conflict continues, the public incurs more costs in American lives lost and funds to the
military. The benefits of engaging in a conflict become marginal: as casualties and financial
costs mount and benefits remain constant, using force becomes less appealing (Morgan and
Campbell 1991 187). Past a certain threshold, the public will no longer support the use of force
because the cost of conflict exceeds any perceived benefit of military force (Luttwak 1994).
They will question why the state is using force if there is little or no tangible benefit to the
public. Because the public has absorbed these costs, they value a tempered response and are
wary of engaging in new conflicts that may create similar outcomes. The public thinks conflict is
costly unless the security of the state is at risk and vote for leaders who share these opinions
(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003, Risse-Kappen 1991, Russett 1993). For this reason, Louis
Klarevas has described the public opinion as the "Essential Domino of Military Operations"
(2002, 417).
Many authors have concluded that the specific causal mechanism that constrains leaders
from using military force is a public’s casualty shyness, meaning that military casualties can
negatively affect the public’s support for the use of force (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009 8).
The public has seen the atrocities of war through experience in various conflicts. These
experiences with conflict have made the public reluctant to support military force because they
know that the effects of the fighting are often more costly than beneficial in terms of lives lost
(Eikenberry 1996, Luttwak 1994). Since the public directly absorbs the casualties of conflict, the
public prefers to support policies that do not require as many resources (Luttwak 1995, Doyle
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1997). The public has been shaped by their experience with military force, and their experiences
tell them conflict is a costly option.
Many researchers argue that casualty shyness affects public attitudes towards military
force. Mueller's (1973) study on casualties and support for conflict in Vietnam found that the log
of casualties correlated with war support; as casualty numbers increased, public support for the
conflict decreased. Luttwak (1996) called casualty concerns the "key political constraint when
decisions must be made on which forces to deploy in a crisis, and at what levels." (36). Gartner
(2008) found that casualty trajectories (increasing or decreasing) affect how people interpret
whether an operation is a success, and Gartner and Segura (1998) found that marginal casualty
numbers affect public attitude if given at a critical juncture in a military operation. The direct
effect of casualties on elections has also received attention. Karol and Miguel (2007) estimate
that President George W. Bush would have won reelection by a greater margin (~2%) had there
been fewer casualties in the Iraq Conflict. Kriner and Shen (2007) found similar effects in Senate
elections. When casualty numbers increased in a state, Republican senators were likely to see a
decline in their support.
What this literature fails to recognize is that casualty costs are only a contributing factor
to the public’s support for military action. Commitment to military action is a large undertaking,
and the number of American casualties does not determine whether the public will support a
conflict on its own. The public is willing to incur casualties if they perceive an operation as
successful (Burk 1999, Gartner 2008, Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009). They are more concerned
with the payoffs from the investment in conflict: how much more secure, either physically or
financially does the state become by using force? The public wants to make sure that they are not
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wasting resources on unimportant military operations (Jentleson 1992, Page and Bouton 2006,
Perla Jr. 2011) and that they can minimize costs (Eichenberg 2005, Larson 1996). The public
will show greater support for conflict if the alternatives are costlier than the conflict itself (Bueno
de Mesquita et al 2003, Hoffman et al 2015, Russett 1993). When conceptualizing the decision to
use force, it is better to think about the conflict in terms of the investment that an actor must
make to a conflict. Rather than simple casualty calculation, a more appropriate approach would
be to describe conflict avoidance as a risk concern using cost-benefit analysis.

2.2

The Role of Risk in Public Decisions to Use Force

When the public makes decisions about whether they support the use of force, they are
making a risk assessment using a cost-benefit analysis to determine if the use of force provides
benefits that outweigh the costs of engaging in a conflict (Larson 1996). Rather than classifying
this as casualties versus benefits, I classify public considerations in two categories: costs and
benefits.
2.2.1 Costs
Costs are both tangible (soldiers, money, equipment) and intangible (time, analysis,
negotiation) resources (Hoffman et al 2009, Rusbult, Martz, and Agnew 1998). These are
resources that an actor must utilize in order to attain some benefit. These resources are used up in
the process of engaging in the conflict and cannot be recovered post-conflict.
Costs serve influence public support for military operations in different ways at distinct
points in a conflict. After the onset of a military operation, costs anchor the public to a conflict.
The longer an actor is involved in a conflict, the more invested they become. An invested public
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will not want to lose their investment and they will want to ensure there is some benefit from
using force.
Costs have multiple effects during a conflict. As stated previously, increasing costs will
lead to decreased satisfaction with the outcome of a conflict, suggesting that increasing costs
should lower support for the use of force (Mueller 1970, Luttwak 1994, 1995, 1996). Yet, costs
can have a perverse effect of actually increasing support because individuals do not want to lose
their investment in a conflict. Schott, Scherer, and Lambert (2011) for example found that
subjects in their study that supported the Iraq conflict had a higher commitment to a conflict
when presented with information on the cost of the conflict. Subjects who felt the U.S. had
reason to engage in Iraq and Afghanistan felt more invested in the conflict. Agnew et al (2007)
found similar evidence suggesting that subjects who felt the U.S. was heavily invested in the
“War on Terror” were more likely to feel committed to it than subjects who did not feel
invested.
Costs, or perceived costs, have the opposite effect before a conflict starts. Steep costs can
inhibit public support for initiating a conflict. Before a conflict begins, the public may look at the
required investment for a military conflict and decide that the costs are too high. This dissertation
focuses on this second scenario: how perceived costs affect the public support to begin a
conflict.4
The reason costs affect support makes sense: the public wants to minimize costs to
maximize the amount of benefit from an action. Incurring large costs for a marginal benefit or

4

There will be a brief discussion of how drones could affect commitment of a conflict after it has already started in
the conclusion.
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for nothing is problematic. This is why some military conflicts receive more support than others.
For example, the public is more willing to support the use of force where they can understand
how conflict directly increases their security, such as when an aggressive actor encroaches on
territory or an actor engages in counterterrorism operations (Jentleson 1992, Gelpi, Feaver and
Reifler 2009). Other types of missions with more altruistic goals can appear more costly by
comparison because it may appear as though the benefits of that type of action is more costly
than any perceived benefit (Perla Jr. 2011).
However, if there is a way to minimize these costs, the public is more willing to support
the use of force. Scholars have identified ways to minimize costs. One way the public can
minimize one of the primary costs of concern, American casualties, is by putting more distance
between them and the enemy. For example, Larson (1996) and Eichenberg (2005) showed that
the public prefers bombing campaigns to sending in soldiers on the ground. Another way to
mitigate risk is to spread the costs among more parties via multilateral coalitions. The public
overwhelmingly prefers to go into a military campaign with allies (Grieco et al 2011, Holsti
2004, Kull and Clay 2006, Page and Barabas 2000, Page and Bouton 2006). In either case, if the
public can reduce costs (by reducing the risk to the military or through involving more allies),
they are more likely to support the use of military force. The public then, is not averse to costs;
they simply want to minimize costs.
2.2.2 Benefits
The public expects that engaging in a conflict will provide some benefit, such as
increased security. Yet, it is not always easy for the public to understand what those benefits are,
and how individuals understand these goals will affect whether they support the use of force
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(Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999, Hinckley 1988). The public reaches these conclusions in
various ways. One of the main methods the public uses as a shortcut is the principle policy
objective (PPO). A PPO is a goal that will further the interests of state. These include
humanitarian interventions (preventing genocide), foreign policy restraint (stopping an actor
from invading another territory/reducing an actor’s ability to exert influence), internal political
change (supporting/preventing a regime change), or more recently, counterterrorism. Researchers
such as Eichenberg (2005), Jentleson (1992), Jentleson and Britton (1998), and Gelpi, Feaver,
and Reifler (2009) show that the public will invest in certain conflicts if they feel as though the
PPO is worthy of military force.
The public places different levels of importance on military force depending on the PPO
used to justify the operation (Page and Bouton 2006). The public prefers to engage in military
operations where the benefits are clear and positive. The reason the public uses PPOs is to
understand how the United States benefits from the action. With security scenarios (foreign
policy restraint and counterterrorism), the benefits are clear: the United States is safer from
security threats. With more altruistic goals (humanitarian intervention and internal political
change), it is not always clear to the public why they should care (Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996,
Perla Jr. 2011). Thus, the public sees more benefit from security scenarios than altruistic ones.
PPO categories are beneficial for generalizing when the public will likely support the use
of force, but they are merely shortcuts that the public can use when they do not have all relevant
information. Contextual information can increase support for scenarios with less preferable PPOs
(Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999, Holsti 2004, Knopf 1998, Page and Shapiro 2010, Stimson
2015). The public cares about a lot of factors and may consider other public interests, such as
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whether military action benefits an ally or protects vital norms, increases wealth, or is likely to
succeed. Page and Bouton (2006) and Russett and Nincic (1976), for example, show that the
public is willing to support military force to protect an ally or certain international norms.
Fordham (2008) found that regions of the United States with a heavier presence of military
suppliers were more likely to support military force, because it would increase individual wealth
in that region. Eichenberg (2005) showed that the public prefers successful missions and are
willing to support operations that they know the United States can win. It is not just PPOs that
influence public opinion, but rather the perceived benefit from engaging in military operations.
One way to highlight these other benefits is through framing. Framing is a way to argue
that an issue results from a specific problem, and that the problem should be addressed with a
specific policy (Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987). The public does not always understand
foreign policy, yet they want to know whether the use of force has utility. Instead of attempting
to become an expert on foreign policy, individuals who are experts on a topic try to guide public
opinion. The experts frame situations differently depending on what they perceive to be the best
course of action to address the problem.
Framing allows policymakers to further a specific agenda by emphasizing certain
information about an issue (Berinsky 2007, Entman 2003, Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997,
Page and Shapiro 2010). Holsti (2011) uses the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as an example of
framing. Political regime change historically receives less public support compared to other
military objectives (Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996). The administration in office had a policy
goal to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein by invading Iraq. If the administration could
frame the situation in a way to highlight the necessity of invasion for American security, then the
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public would be more likely to support it. By linking Saddam to terrorists who carried out 9/11,
the administration changed the conversation about the situation in Iraq to one of great importance
to the U.S. public : terrorism (Harmon and Muenchen 2009). The administration successfully
framed their policy goal to emphasis the threat of terrorism, and in 2003 invaded Iraq with a
largely supportive U.S. population (Lucas 2010).
Framing effects have been replicated in laboratory settings. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
(2009), for example, show that “Success Matters” using experiments to create a perception of
success in a military operation. They found the public is willing to absorb casualties and
financial costs if they believe that the military will be successful in achieving their goal. The
results suggest that public opinion is not concerned with simple costs of conflict but weighs costs
against the success of the mission. Gartner (2008) found similar results in his experiments
measuring the context of casualty costs. When subjects read a scenario where the number of
casualties decreased compared to the previous month, they perceived the operation as more
successful. Although the number of casualties increased overall, subjects viewed the lower rate
as military progress. After being exposed to lower casualty rates, the support for the use of
military force increased among the subjects. Boetcher and Cobb (2006) also found that framing
casualties in terms of ratios (X Americans dead: Y enemies dead) could frame a military
operation as successful and increase support for it. Even in the face of mounting costs for a
conflict, a frame suggesting that the public will receive benefit from a conflict compared to the
adversary bolsters the public’s support of the use of force.
Still, frames do not have unlimited power to influence public opinion (Baum 2004). It is
possible that the public will reject a frame. This may happen when an issue becomes more
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salient, and the public has access to a fuller picture is able to judge whether experts are stretching
the truth on a foreign policy issue (Druckman 2004, Zaller 1992). How the issue was originally
framed may also impact whether the public adopts a new frame. If the original frame omitted
information or gave bad information, public opinion can shift from support to opposition
(Druckman 2001). The classic case for this is Vietnam. Policymakers framed Vietnam as an
American security issue: if Vietnam falls to communism, the rest of Asia will fall (Morgenthau
1965, Sobel 2001). Yet, as the conflict continued, the public questioned American involvement.
Even experts such as George Kennan, who initially supported the military operation backed
down (Hixson 1988). Despite a narrative preaching satisfaction (Sobel 2001), the public thought
differently and chose not to support the use of force. The longer the conflict continued, the more
the public became aware of the situation and came to the conclusion that the fight was not
important to maintaining American security. Policymakers can attempt to frame the military
operation as a success, but a long-term military commitment with little tangible benefit is hard to
support.
This all suggests that the public is happy to engage in actions if they perceive a benefit
from the military action. Despite less preferable PPOs, the public has shown on multiple
occasions that it is willing to support military force if there is a perceived benefit. Based on these
findings, it is more informative to understand the effect of public opinion on military force as a
cost-benefit analysis than casualty aversion. People expect to see a payoff if they take the time to
invest in a military operation. The public is willing to use resources to achieve an objective if the
outcome is beneficial (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009). The public simply prefer to minimize
risk to their investment (Larson 1996, Page and Bouton 2006).
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The public is wary of investing in conflicts that may not have adequate payoffs because
they could lose a lot because the investment is risky. The public is risk averse, not casualty shy.
By risk averse, I mean the public prefers to use military force where the positive benefits of
doing so outweigh the negative costs associated with warfare and the likelihood of a payoff is
high enough to take a chance using resources. If the public perceives military force as too risky,
they prefer to avoid using force (Doyle 1997, Risse-Kappen 1991). The public seeks to utilize
resources for the state effectively by ensuring that they incur minimal risk in military operations.
While there are ways to reduce risk through coalition building, until recently, there was
no way to guarantee zero American casualties in a military operation, meaning there was still a
cost that constrained military force. Military operations are also financially costly. It cost $2.1
million per year5 to maintain the average soldier in the military in 2014 (Harrison 2013). For this
reason, the public has an interest in military operations: how much must the public invest for this
mission to succeed? Because of the risk of casualties and financial burden, conventional military
technology cannot guarantee that the benefits will outweigh the costs, meaning the public must
decide whether a conflict is worth the investment to them. However, if a technology could
drastically reduce these risks, then the public may be more willing to support the use of force. In
the next section, I address this technology, known as drones.

2.3

Drones: A “Riskless” Form of Warfare

While the prospect of loss impedes conflict, what if a technology lowered the
required investment to enter a conflict? As Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) have stated,
“casualties are a human cost of war; we would prefer the same benefit, the goals of the war, at
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lower cost if possible.” (8). If the public does not have to incur a large cost in a conflict, the
conflict appears less risky, making the benefits of engaging in that conflict look more appealing.
Even if support for military force does not increase, the public may simply be less likely to
oppose the use of force when the costs are lower. Drones reduce costs associated with engaging
in conflict by reducing financial cost and lives lost while maintaining the high level of precision
of soldiers. If the public incurs fewer costs in a conflict while still seeing similar results, they
may be more willing to engage in conflicts they may otherwise prefer to avoid.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the United States developed drones with one goal in
mind: reduce the risk to soldiers in military operations without degrading their ability to
accomplish their objectives. The most important characteristic of drones is that they take soldiers
off the battlefield. The United States uses drones all over the world, but the pilots controlling
these platforms are at minimum outside the combat zone and typically reside within the borders
of the United States (Singer 2009, Whittle 2014). At no point is there potential for a drone pilot
to die in combat. If a drone goes down, the pilot can take control of another drone and continue
the mission as if nothing happened. Because there is no risk to the pilot, drones go where soldiers
would have great difficulty going (U.S. Air Force 2009). Many areas where drones operate are
too dangerous for a large military force because enemy combatants have too many advantages
(knowledge of terrain, climate, etc.); drones negate these advantages.
Drone pilots also require less training to be proficient in their task. Manned aircraft pilots
require 200 or more hours of flight training before they are ready for combat. Drone pilots need
120 (Singer 2009). From a pilot’s perspective, drones also have a friendly user interface that
facilitates learning how to control them. Older models require individuals with pilot training to
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operate a drone, but newer models are taking advantage of modern video game platforms to
simplify controls. Many of the new recruits in the U.S. military grew up playing video games
centered on warfare. Warfare games developed in the past few years have added the ability of
players to control drones for various levels in such realistic ways that it is difficult to tell whether
footage gamers see is real or fake (Rhodan 2015). Because of this, researchers have simplified
drone controls; making some drone interfaces look like video games. When new recruits go
through training, many are already somewhat proficient in drone piloting, and can understand the
controls much faster (U.S. Air Force 2009). The cost-savings in training alone save the military
billions of dollars in man-hour training (Martinez 2012, Scharre and Burg 2014).
In addition, the U.S. military is working on a way for one pilot to control an entire
squadron of drones (Osborn 2015, U.S. Air Force 2009). While this seemed like science fiction
in the 1980s with books like Ender’s Game, this technology is now real. This contributes to costeffectiveness in efficiency of movement. An entire squadron can operate in sync with little
training since they are all “thinking” the same way.
Drones are also cost effective in terms of direct costs . In 2015, a MQ-9 Reaper, the
larger, better-armed brother of the well-known Predator drone, cost about $14 million (Zegart
2015). The cost per flight hour is around $2500-$3500 (Friends Committee on Legislation 2017).
The new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, in contrast, costs about $85-$130 million to produce
(Mizokami 2016b) and $67,550 per flight hour (Bender and Nudelman 2016). Not only do
drones cost significantly less to produce, but they also cost less to use. These costs have less of
an impact on the U.S. economy than conventional military operations. If the literal costs of war
are lower, then there are fewer concerns that a conflict will spend the United States into debt.
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While production and maintenance costs are lower, critics argue that the operational costs
(in terms of intelligence analysis) for drones are higher than the average manned aircraft. The
number of people, for example, that analyze the data that a drone collects, is vastly larger than
the number of people that analyze data from fighter jets. Some, such as Benjamin (2013) have
argued this makes drones more cost-prohibitive than traditional fighter planes because it requires
more man-power to understand the data that the drone gathers. Because of all the information
drones gather from live video feed, it is difficult have enough analysts to interpret the data.
Others, such as Boyle (2012), say that drones are more cost-effective. In terms of data
analysis, there are more people required to interpret data, but that is because this is new data that
other aircraft have not collected in the past. Data analysis is not related to the technology -- if
manned aircraft collected this much data, there would be many individuals required to interpret
the data here as well. Additionally, the technology exists in the civilian sector to identify strange
behavior and other patterns (Brokaw 2016), meaning that the technology could exist in more
advanced forms in the military (Singer 2009). Using this technology to assist analysts in
identifying targets and information will reduce time and cost by allowing one person to view
more relevant information than before. Over the long-term, this will reduce costs and increase
efficiency (Byman 2013, Rothenberg 2015).
To understand how much the costs of conflict decrease with drones, consider the cost of a
Reaper drone. To have an effective around-the-clock surveillance and “hunting” program,
assume that the United States assembles a large contingent of 100 Reapers. This would cost the
United States government approximately $1.4 billion dollars to produce and approximately $31
million per drone to maintain 24-hour surveillance for a year, totaling maintenance cost of about
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$4.5 billion. Let us also assume that each Reaper conducts one airstrike per day using two
hellfire missiles (~$112,000 each) (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief
Financial Officer 2017).6 The missiles would be the costliest part of the drone, coming in at
about $8.2 billion for enough missiles for a year of daily drone strikes carried out by 100 drones.
The total cost of this campaign would be approximately $12.7 billion.7 This is still lower than the
cost of stationing nearly 10,000 troops in Afghanistan for a year (Harrison 2013). The number of
Reaper drone platforms in this scenario is absurdly high, but it illustrates how the United States
could decrease the cost of military operations.
Drones are also precise. There is some concern that drones are cheaper but not as precise
as soldiers. Drone use has inadvertently killed civilians (Savage and Shane 2016), but
conventional weapons also kill civilians (Sparrow 2013). Civilian casualty numbers for drone
strikes are lower than using other, less-discriminating weapons (Brooks 2015). Carpet bombing
during the Second World War led to thousands of civilian deaths. Even more recent technology
is not above scrutiny. Long-range missiles are accurate, but they also take time to get to their
target. An enemy could be at the target location when the military launches a missile, but by the
time the missile hits the target, the enemy could be long gone and civilians could have taken up
residence in the building (Whittle 2014). Drones are right above their targets and can ensure that
the enemy combatant is present when striking.
In terms of matching piloted aircraft for air-to-surface strikes, drones tend to be a better
option. Manned planes are often called in to destroy a target without seeing the target

6

This would make for a total of 36,500 drone strikes in one year. This is an over exaggeration, but it is used to illustrate
that drones are cheaper than soldiers.
7
Assumes $3500 per flight hour and literal 24/7/365 use of drones

42
beforehand. Fighters typically fly in, shoot a missile or drop a bomb, and leave. They could miss,
have the wrong coordinates, or be unaware that there are civilians in the area. Drones “hunt”
their targets for long periods of time prior to engaging their targets, meaning they can wait for
the best time to strike and minimize casualties.
When comparing drones to boots on the ground, the numbers are even more staggering.
In a typical conflict, civilian casualties make up around two-thirds of all casualties in the conflict
(Plaw, Fricker, and Colon 2016). In 2006 for example, there were more than 34,000 civilian
casualties from the fighting in Iraq (Brunsetter and Braun 2013). An analysis by Plaw, Flicker
and Colon (2016) of multiple organizations tracking civilian casualties from drone strikes found
that the number of civilian deaths over a decade is about 10 percent of the number of civilian
casualties from one year of conventional fighting in Iraq.8
Two characteristics decrease civilian casualties when using drones. First, because drones
are aircraft, they do not have to stay in the area in which they operate, meaning there are fewer
chances for engagements that can lead to potential civilian casualties. Second, because there is
no risk to drone pilots, the pilots can make rational decisions about using force without being in
the “heat of battle.” When not under the stress of a life-threatening situation, pilots can make
better decisions about when they should or should not engage an enemy combatant (Strawser
2010). They are able to step back from the situation and think things through before using force.
To further illustrate this point, it is important to understand the technical aspects of
drones that give them the ability to discriminate. Drones have facial recognition software that
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allows the pilots to confirm a person’s identity before engaging them (Dillow 2011, Singer
2009). If drone operators find they have targeted the wrong person or group, drones can abort a
missile strike (assuming the missile has not already hit the target) (Zenko 2013). Because of
these technical capabilities, drones can discriminate just like soldiers. If drones can discriminate
and reduce the death and destruction of conflict, they could make military operations more just
and compliant with international law (Strawser 2010). The U.N. has come to a similar
conclusion. Their report on drones concluded,
“If used in strict compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law,
remotely piloted aircraft [drones] are capable of reducing the risk of civilian casualties in
armed conflict by significantly improving the situational awareness of military
commanders.” (Emmerson, 2013 23).
These characteristics suggest that actors possessing drones may even have an obligation to use
them because they are more discriminating that other technologies cannot replicate.
While drones may be more accurate than other aircraft, critics often point out that when
drones misfire, it is costly, and thus, the military should limit drone use. However, the drone
itself does not kill civilians; it is simply the vessel through with the action took place. It is no
more at fault than a manned aircraft would be in this scenario. If there is a mistake from an
airstrike, it is due to a failure of information and not because the technology used (Kaag and
Kreps 2014). The intelligence policies of the United States may be open for debate, but they are
beyond the scope of this dissertation. This is simply to say that how drones could make military
operations more just differs from how the military uses drones.
Another argument centers on comparing a drone to a group of soldiers. Many critics
argue that, when comparing the goals of the use of force of each, comparing drones and soldiers
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is like comparing apples and oranges: they are so different it is impossible to compare them.
While it is true that soldiers may have a vastly different mission goal than drones, it is only
within the context of engaging in similar activities that I seek to compare drones to soldiers.
Specifically, I look at how drones compare to soldiers in kinetic engagements. Whether through
soldiers or drones, military force has the same goal of eliminating or disabling an enemy force so
it is no longer a threat. Drones are better suited because of the fewer costs and risk associated
with their use. Given the option to incur a small cost or a large one, the small one is the
preferable option.
In sum, drone use “has brought with it all the advantages of lower cost and reduced
political risk.” (Kurth 2014) This has important implications for the way the United States
conducts military operations. While there is a debate on whether current drone technology will
revolutionize warfare (Davis et al 2014, Singer 2009), eventually, experts agree, drone
technology will be revolutionary (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016, Boyle 2014). What
matters now is how the public perceives drones. Drones are frequently marketed as a technology
that will reduce the costs of war for those who incur them: the public. If the public sees a
technology as able to reduce the burden of conflict to them, they are more likely to support it.
This is the case I make about drones. If the public perceives the risks as lower (even if they
are not), it alters how the public will think about conflict.

2.4

Drones: Politically Riskless?

The risk-reducing characteristics of drones mean “drone policy makes for good domestic
politics.” (Kaag and Kreps 2014 Kindle Location 178). There are foreign policy scenarios in
which the United States or other major powers find themselves that require a military response,
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and that leaders may have difficulty selling to the public. Scholars suggests that drones provide
political cover for military force because they provide an adequate response to both the public
and allied actors, (Boyle 2014, Sayler 2014). The public will support the use of force because of
reduced U.S. military casualties, and the international community understands that the state that
uses drones will use force if provoked. For example, the U.S. public’s support for the war on
terror decreased after nearly a decade of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continued.9 President
Obama recognized the decreased public support and adopted a strategy but targeted strikes rather
than overwhelming force. In areas where a boots on the ground operation was deemed too high
risk, the military employed drones to execute the targeted strikes(Kaufman 2014, Obama 2013a).
The public would not support a large-scale incursion of U.S. troops, but they have
overwhelmingly supported the use of drones to kill terrorists.10
Some argue that there is little political risk associated with drones because of the lack of
risk of American casualties and little in wasted resources. Former Secretary of Defense and
former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John Brennan (2012) even explicitly stated
that the Department of Defense used drones, “because they dramatically reduce the danger to
U.S. personnel, even eliminating the danger altogether.” Even when shot down, the cost of a
drone is miniscule compared to the cost of manned planes. The ability to discriminate also
reduces the animosity towards using military force since innocent civilians are not caught in the
crosshairs during a firefight with enemy combatants. Because drones can be more appealing to
the public, drones drastically lower the political cost of engaging in conflict for political leaders.
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If leaders are making these calculations, it is likely there is a perception that drones reduce risk
and therefore will create a better outcome for leaders.
Consistent with the idea that people prefer lower cost military operations to higher ones,
the use of drones should make the public more willing to support the onset of military
operations. The reason is straightforward: military operations using drones place fewer soldiers
at risk than operations involving “boots on the ground.” The public prefers to avoid conflict
commitments when the perceived benefits do not outweigh the costs (Bueno de Mesquita et al
2003, Perla Jr. 2011), but when the price is right (free or less costly), it is possible the public may
change their minds and choose to support military force.
This creates a moral hazard problem. Moral hazard is a situation in which individuals can
receive a positive payoff of an action without experiencing the negative consequences of an
action (Stone 2011). Gamblers call this “playing with house money” (Clark 2002, Thaler and
Johnson 1990). Imagine a gambler in Las Vegas who has won money in a casino. He then
chooses to bet only the amount of money that he has won. If he wins, he increases his winnings.
If he loses, he still has his own money. There are no negative consequences in this scenario;
either a person wins, or they do not lose.
Since drones lack many of the conventional costs associated with conflict, scholars worry
that the public will consider drone use as “playing with house money,” making the public more
likely to support military operations involving drones, because they do not incur the negative
consequences of using force (Brunsetter and Braun 2011, Kaag and Kreps 2014, Kreps and
Zenko 2014). Drone use is largely limited to engaging non-state actors, but there is concern
drone use will expand. Scholars believe drones will make the public more cavalier about military
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operations that would otherwise receive minimal public support if the operation required human
soldiers. One example is internal political change. The United States has in the past intervened
on behalf of a government to create stability (Eichenberg 2005, Jentleson and Britton 1998).
Where U.S. national security was at stake, the public supported the use of force because the
benefits outweighed the costs. Where U.S. intervention is not perceived as justifiable on grounds
of security, the public is much less likely to support the use of force because the costs are not
justifiable based on the potential benefits (Larson 1996, Sobel 2001). If the United States could
create benefits with little risk of failure, however, the public may see the operation as more
appealing and support the use of force.
In conventional conflict, the steep investment of time, resources, and potential casualties
makes conflict look largely unappealing unless the perceived benefits outweigh the costs (Perla
Jr. 2011). Sacrifice has always been an integral part of conflict. It is the way people can
differentiate worthy causes from less worthy causes. But if the public worries about using force
due to concern over investing in conflict, mitigating these concerns would suggest that the public
could support more bellicose policies if the price is right (Baggiarini 2015, Sauer and Schornig
2012, Singer 2009). If states can engage in military operations with drones instead of humans,
the psychological consequence of such technology could lead to facilitated conflict; it could
make the public “prone to drone.”
There is evidence for this behavior. President Obama emphasized precision military
strikes, using drones as the center of his precision strike policy. His unmanned strike policies are
not without its critics (Hudson, Owen, and Flannes 2011, Benjamin 2013, Sterio 2012), but the
results have led to the deaths of thousands of terrorists with an efficiency beating that of human
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soldiers for a fraction of the financial cost, fewer civilian casualties, and no direct American
casualties (Brannen 2014, Rosa 2015). As stated previously, support for drone strikes remained
high throughout President Obama’s presidency, with most the public across party lines
supporting his use of drones to kill terrorists (Pew Research Center 2015, Plaw, Fricker, and
Colon 2016).
This behavior is likely a result of the perception that drones are a less risky form of
warfare. MacDonald and Schneider (2015) argue that President Obama, compared to President
Bush, is more risk averse and calculating in his actions, so President Obama preferred using
drones. Using data from speeches throughout both presidencies, the authors show that President
Obama shows more risk avoidant behavior, an approach that the authors suggest would mean
that the president should prefer the use of drones over manned aircraft for air strikes. President
Obama’s Doctrine emphasizes his response to what he perceives as a public preference for
avoiding risky military incursions. President Bush on the other hand, preferred manned strikes
because he is more risk acceptant in military action.11
There is not much experimental evidence, but what little exists suggests that public
opinion supports drone use if there are fewer risks involved in a military operation. Walsh (2015)
and Horowitz (2016) both find that support for drones increases if a scenario also mentions
drones reduce American casualties. Walsh and Schulzke (2015) show that, compared to other
types of force, drones receive higher support, even when the PPO is not something the public
normally supports.
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Being “prone to drone” is not a certainty however. Davis et al (2014), Zayler (2014), and
Stohl, Brooks, and Abizaid (2015), suggest that drones may change the specific considerations of
using military force, but that does not mean that the perceived risks cannot shift to other areas.
Kahn (2002), for example, argues that when one side can engage in military force without risk, it
is no longer a conflict but rather a police action. This does not mean that lethal force is
unjustifiable, but it does mean that the rules of engagement may change. When one side
possesses overwhelming advantage, many scholars have argued this fact obligates the more
powerful actor to exercise more discrimination in using force (Beier 2003, Gross 2014,
Issacharoff and Pildes 2015, True 2015). Actors that use drones must ensure more discrimination
because drones allow this discrimination to reduce destruction from conflict.
If actors do not take measures to mitigate damage, drone use could highlight issues that
arise in conflict that may not receive as much attention, such as civilian casualties, destruction,
and issues with an actor’s image (Gross 2014, Kahn 2002, Sayler 2014, True 2015). In conflict,
civilian casualties and destruction are an inevitable part of military intervention. However, if
military force is legitimate, then the collateral damage is, at least on some levels, acceptable. If
soldiers are in the heat of battle, they cannot ensure zero excess casualties or destruction
(Issacharoff and Pildes 2015). If an actor uses drones instead, the operators can assess the
situation without the pressures of a firefight, meaning they can be more discriminating. Because
drones can minimize civilian casualties and destruction, any collateral damage caused by drones
receives more attention. If drones cannot discriminate to a level accepted by thepublic, the public
may be less likely to support the use of force because they are now thinking about civilian
casualties and excess destruction.
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Experimental evidence suggests drones elicit concerns about excess destruction. Walsh
(2015) found that subjects were more supportive of force if the scenario mentioned drones, but
subjects in that same scenario were also more likely to concern themselves with civilian
casualties than subjects who got a scenario with human soldiers. Kreps (2014) and Kreps and
Wallace (2016) similarly suggest that people worry about civilian casualties. In their
experiments, they found that arguments relating to international humanitarian law or excessive
damage persuaded people to change their minds about using drones more than arguments about
the efficacy of drones. Further, Schneider and MacDonald (2016) showed that individuals
overestimate the capabilities of drones, but that different types of risk, including civilian
casualties, escalation, and failure affect the way subjects support the use of force. My pilot study
(Shelby 2013) also suggested that individuals expressed concern about civilian casualties or
escalation in the scenarios that mentioned drones.
While some studies have looked at how drones affect policy, research on the relationship
between drone use and risk perception needs further study. The study by Macdonald and
Schneider (2015), for example, assumes there is a relationship between risk aversion and
preference for using drones for individuals making policy decisions, but it does not establish this
causality. On an individual level, the study argues that President Obama is more risk averse to
using military force, so he chose a force posture that reflected his preferences for low-risk
military operations. He is reacting to a perceived preference by the public to avoid risk, but this
study was not designed to determinations about public risk attitudes. If this causality exists, then
this study could show that leaders are responsive to a public who prefers less risk.
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Experiment-based evidence for risk perception and drones suggests this causal link may
exist, but the designs mentioned previously lacked risk measurement variables. Kreps (2014) and
Kreps and Wallace’s (2016) studies focused more on frames than at risk and did not compare
drones to other types of force. Horowitz (2016) looked at the importance of reducing American
casualties, but in relation to autonomous capability, and did not address whether the public
thought drones reduce risk. Walsh (2015) and Walsh and Schulzke (2015) did not have direct
risk measurements, nor were they equal across scenarios. The authors did not determine if
subjects who supported the use of force at greater levels were more risk acceptant or risk averse.
They simply showed those who supported the use of force at higher levels were more likely to
support bellicose policies than those who did not support the use of force.12 Since they did not
take these measurements, it is difficult to say that a risk-drone relationship exists.
Finally, the study by Schneider and MacDonald (2016) shows that the public can
overestimate the proficiency of drones, but the study did not measure risk perceptions. Instead,
the authors just controlled risk by controlling the scenario like Walsh and Walsh and Schulzke.
They also gave individuals the choice of drones or manned aircraft to carry out a military
operation, rather than measuring how individuals react to the decision to use one type of force or
the other. Ceteris paribus, people should prefer drones because they are less risky, and given that
subjects already overestimated the capabilities of drones, not surprisingly, they received more
support. The authors established that subjects preferred drones to manned aircraft, but they did
not establish that subjects perceived drones as less risky. Theresults appeared to show that
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Personal correspondence with the authors.
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subjects made decisions based on false optimism rather than because they thought drones had
less risk associated with using them.
The problem then, is a lack of research to date that effectively establishes a causal link
between risk perception and drone use (Shelby 2017). Some studies show that leaders are receptive
to these public concerns, but these studies do not show the underlying logic of public opinion
(Macdonald and Schneider 2015). Other experiementa studies could show a causal link, but they
do not compare drones to other types of force (Kreps 2014, Kreps and Wallace 2016) or lack a risk
measurement mechanism (Horowitz 2016, Schneider and MacDonald 2016, Walsh 2015, Walsh
and Schulzke 2015).

2.5

Conclusion

Drones allow actors to engage in “riskless warfare” (Kahn 2002, Singer 2009 322) by
allowing actors the precision and discrimination of soldiers without many costs of conflict.
Because of these characteristics, there is concern that leaders will no longer be subject to
traditional constraints of warfare. If the public absorbs the cost of conflicts, but the costs are low,
the public may support conflicts with fewer benefits because the marginal payout is better. If
true, this has major implications for foreign policy decision-making discussed in a later chapter.
Few experiments have tested these hypotheses, and none to date have been able to show
the drone-risk perception casual mechanism in action. The lack of information about risk
perceptions has limited what we, as researchers, can gain from studies on drones. To remedy this
deficiency, I propose three experiments to test the causal relationship between risk and drone
use. The next chapter discusses hypotheses and the methodological approach to answering these
questions, including what to measure and how.
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CHAPTER 3.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In the last chapter, I discussed how the public constrains leaders from using military force
indiscriminately and how drone technology potentially circumvents this constraining mechanism.
Based on the conclusions from the previous chapter, there are variables of interest and testable
hypotheses using these variables that emerge to determine the veracity of these claims. This
chapter discusses the methodological approach of this dissertation. The first section will cover
hypotheses. The second section will explain why I use the experimental method. The third
section will cover the general outline of the experiments. The fourth section will cover
experiment population. The fifth section will discuss the variables of interest in the experiments.
I conclude with where the next few chapters will go.

3.1

Hypotheses

The hypotheses that emerge from the literature paint a picture of a future in which the
United States could engage in more military operations with less opposition from the public
when the United States employs certain types of force (drones). All hypotheses have to do with
cost-benefit decisions: do drones reduce the perceived risk in a military conflict? How does
that impact support for the use of force? Together, these hypotheses look to explain whether
drone use makes the public less uncomfortable with military force and intervention where they
would otherwise not engage.
Prior to discussing the hypotheses, it is important to note that I do not include hypotheses
unrelated to the primary research question: how do drones affect public opinions surrounding
military force? I do not include hypotheses related to principle policy objectives, nor the
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likelihood of success of a military operation, except in the context of drone use. This is to
streamline this dissertation and ensure the primary focus remains on individual perceptions of
drones.
First, scholars have called drones potentially “riskless” (Kaag and Kreps 2014, Kahn
2013, Singer 2009). Because drones could reduce the risk of using military force, individuals in
these studies could view drones as less risky than conventional types of force. Other scholars
argue that the costs are still there, just that they shift to other concerns (Davis et al 2014, Sayler
2014, and Stohl, Brooks, and Abizaid 2015). I hypothesize the former will occur.
H1: Subjects will perceive drones as less risky than other types of force.
Second, scholars suggest moving soldiers further from harm’s way makes the public
more likely to support military action, (i.e., strategic bombing vs. boots on the ground) due to the
decreased risk (Eichenberg 2005, Larson 1996, Page and Barabas 2000). Singer (2009), Sauer
and Schornig (2012), Kaag and Kreps (2014), and Schneider and MacDonald (2016) extend this
logic to drone use because the operators are so far removed from the battlefield that there is zero
risk to them. If there is zero risk to the drone operator, the public should be more willing to
support the use of force. Therefore, I hypothesize a hierarchy in which subjects should support
an action more as soldiers get further from the battlefield. Boots on the ground have a high risk
because they are in the heart of an active combat zone. Manned planes that carry out airstrikes
have a lower chance of casualties, but the pilot could still die. Drones have zero potential for
American casualties; thus, missions that use them should receive the most support, all other
things beings equal (Walsh and Schulzke 2015).
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H2: Ceteris paribus, subjects will show greater support for military operations that use
force in ways that minimize risk to soldiers more than those that risk high numbers of
casualties. The hierarchy is:
•
•
•

Drones
Manned Airplanes
Boots on the ground

Third, subjects should perceive a military operation as less risky if the likelihood of
success is higher. I hypothesize that because drones are potentially considered less risky, subjects
will perceive drones as less risky, even as the likelihood of success decreases (Kaag and Kreps
2014, Singer 2009). Conversely, costs associated with using force could shift to other concerns
(Davis et al 2014, Sayler 2014, and Stohl, Brooks, and Abizaid 2015). These costs could negate
the perception that drones are riskless and constrain subjects from seeing drones differently.
H3: Subjects in the drone groups will perceive the use of force as less risky, even as the
likelihood of success declines, than subjects in the soldier groups.
Fourth, the public wants a successful mission (Eichenberg 2005, Gelpi, Feaver, and
Reifler 2009, Press, Sagan, and Valentino 2013, Sauer and Schornig 2012). If the public believes
that a military operation has a high chance for success, then they will be more likely to support
the use of force. Kaag and Kreps (2014) mention there is a chance that individuals can fall prey
to the moral hazard problem because drones do not have many costs associated with using
military force. One consequence of such hazard would be that individuals may be more willing
to support the use of military force even if the likelihood of success was low. I hypothesize that
subjects will support the use of force, even at lower likelihoods of success in the drone group.
H4: Subjects in the drone groups will support the use of force at higher levels, even as the
likelihood of success declines, than subjects in the soldier groups.
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The next set of hypotheses come from results from study 1 and study 2. I used these
studies to inform the direction of a third study for this dissertation. Results from study 1 and 2
show that subjects could be falling prey to the moral hazard question. The next logical question
is, what is making these individuals more willing to accept risky operations? One potential
answer is a false optimism (Schneider and MacDonald 2016). When asked to gauge the
likelihood of success of a military operation, do not change their opinions based on the type of
force used. If individuals perceive drones as a panacea for counterterrorism operations, it is
possible that subjects will perceive their use as more likely to succeed than other uses of force
due to an optimism bias. I test this against the null hypothesis.
H5: Subjects in the drone group will perceive the likelihood of success as higher than
subjects in the soldier group.
Alternatively, what if drones make individuals more willing to engage in risky behavior?
Kaag and Kreps (2014), Singer (2009), and Sauer and Schornig (2012) argue that individuals are
more willing to take risks because drones do not have the traditional constraints of military
operations, but does this mean people become more willing to take risks? Stohl, Brooks, and
Abizaid (2015) and Sayler (2014) argue indirectly that drones, at least in their current form, will
not change people’s conceptions because they still have risk, just different risk. Thus, do drones
make individuals more willing to take risks than soldiers, or does the type of force change
individual risk attitudes at all?
H6: Subjects will be more risk acceptant after viewing the drone scenario.
3.2

Method

For this dissertation, I utilize the experimental method to establish a causal link between
risk perception and using drones in ways that previous studies have failed to do. Researchers
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have utilized many methods to study drones with varying success. Plaw, Fricker, and Colon
(2016) used survey data for in-depth case studies on the United States’ use of drones. However,
this analysis does not address how drone technology itself affects public opinion. These authors
focus on the policies of the United States rather than the behavior associated with drone use.
Another study by MacDonald and Schneider (2015) uses speech-tracking software to
show the risk tendencies of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. Through
their speeches, the authors show that each president has different risk tendencies that the authors
correlate with each president’s use of drones; President Obama is more risk averse and therefore
uses drones with more frequency than President George W. Bush, who the authors argue is risk
acceptant. The authors argue that President Obama utilizes drones explicitly because they lower
the risk of military force. However, the authors are not showing that drones affect public opinion.
They show that President Obama has responded to a perceived problem for military support by
using drones, but they do not show that the public perceives drones as a riskless technology.
While these studies mentioned above show correlation, this does not equal causation
(Schrodt 2010). The experimental method solves this issues by establishing causation through
random assignment and through establishing causality. Experiments establish causality in two
ways. First, individuals are randomly assigned to a treatment, preventing a selection bias that
may occur in qualitative research for case studies. Second, experiments allow researchers to
create a controlled environment to solve the issue of endogeneity. Researchers make sure
subjects experience a specific stimuli to show that X is a condition for Y (Campbell and Stanley
1963, McDermott 2002, 2004). Experiments provide confirmation in a way that both quantitative
and qualitative approaches cannot (Ragin 1987).
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Scholars have already used the experimental method to understand how drones affect
public opinion. Kreps (2014) showed that changing the frames of the drone debate (from civilian
casualties to international law and sovereignty) affect the support for drone strikes. Kreps and
Wallace (2016) further showed that expert opinions can also influence the level of support.
Walsh (2015) found that precision weapons increased subjects’ concern over civilian casualties
when presented information about the possibility of casualties since they did not have to concern
themselves with American casualties.
Experiments also allow researchers to look at scenarios that have not yet occurred in a
controlled environment (Croson 2002; Druckman, Green, Kuklinkski and Lupia 2006). While the
United States uses drones in various interventions, they have yet to be the sole method of using
force against an actor, meaning experiments can provide data before an event like this occurs.
For example, autonomous drones have not yet seen use, but Horowitz (2016) showed that
individuals prefer autonomous drones for military action if it means the United States does not
have to send human soldiers to address a threat. Walsh and Schulzke’s (2015) experiment
created hypothetical scenarios, including scenarios where drones were the only type of force
employed, to show that drones receive higher levels of support for military force than other
conventional strategies. Schneider and MacDonald (2016) similarly set up hypothetical scenarios
that have not yet occurred that gave subjects a choice about what type of force they preferred to
determine how much of a preference they had for drones vs. manned aircraft.
Creating experiments to test my hypotheses is the most appropriate method because I
seek to establish causality using scenarios that have not yet occurred in the real world. Large-N
studies do not show individual-level risk perceptions of the use of military force, nor do case
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studies. Experiments will allow me to determine an explicit relationship between risk perception
and drone use that has not been fully tested (Shelby 2017).
3.2.1 Creating a New Experiment by Modifying Previous Experiments
This dissertation consists of three experiments that look at how varying factors of costbenefit analysis affect public support for military force. I use Walsh’s (2015), Walsh and
Schulzke’s (2015), Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s (2009), and Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s (2013)
experiments as a base, but improve the experiments where there are flaws or shortcomings. I
present here a brief critique of how I improved on the experiments.
Walsh (2015) compared type of force in a military operation and Walsh and Schulzke’s
(2015) experiment combined the type of force with the political objective completed when using
force. I use these experiments as a template to create experiments for this dissertation. While the
experiments are useful, they have weaknesses. First, they do not directly measure risk attitudes.
The authors argue that their experiment shows that the public could perceive drones (their
variable for “low risk”) as less risky, but they do not have any measure for risk perceptions nor
risk attitudes, elements that are critical to this study.
Additionally, both Walsh and Walsh and Schulzke’s experimental scenarios are not
equal, a fundamental requirement for the experimental method (Croson 2002; Druckman, Green,
Kuklinkski and Lupia 2006). The drone scenario in their study indicated there is no risk of
American casualties, but there is no similar statement made in the conventional military
operation groups (manned aircraft and soldiers on the ground). If one group receives a stimulus
that says there is no risk but the others do not, it makes sense that the riskless group will support
military operations at higher levels, but that does not mean it was an appropriate experiment.
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I also use Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s (2009) experiments that looked at the likelihood of
success for two of the three experiments. I used very similar language to the authors’ study, but
their study did not include different types of force. I modify things slightly using information
from Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013): rather than mention vague examples of likelihood of
success (high, medium, low), I use concrete numbers associated with the likelihood of success,
though I modify the numbers slightly. I combine their discussion on the likelihood of success
with types of force (from Walsh 2015 and Walsh and Schulzke 2015) to create an original
experiment concerned with how drones affect risk perception and support for the use of force.
In addition, I add pre- and post-stimulus questions to measure risk attitudes and risk
perceptions of individuals that are missing from these studies. As stated previously, no
experiment has established causality between drone use and risk perception (Shelby 2017).
These experiments will remedy this.
3.2.2 Overview of Experimental Design
To administer the experiments, I used the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment
(DPTE) software developed by Redlawsk and Lau.13 This website runs through the Political
Science Department at the University of Iowa. It allows social science researchers to create
online experiments that are accessible to anyone with an internet connection.
Subjects first agreed to consent to these IRB approved studies. They were then asked pretest questions beginning with standard demographic questions such as gender, age, political
affiliation, education, etc.14 Next, there were two possible scenarios. The first possibility was that

13
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http://dpte.polisci.uiowa.edu/dpte/DPTE.html
See Appendix B for full list of pre-test questions.
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subjects answered questions relating to their risk orientations using Blais and Weber’s (2006)
domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT) scale,15 read a stimulus, and then answered poststimulus questions. The other possibility was that subjects read the stimulus, answered the poststimulus questions, and finished with DOSPERT Scale questions.16
The hypothetical scenario presented to subjects discusses an event in which the U.S.
President is authorizing the use of military force in Yemen at the request of the Yemeni
government.17 The request by Yemen was specifically added based on findings from my pilot
study on drones (Shelby 2013). In the pilot study, I framed the experiment as unilateral action.
Many of the subjects indicated that they worried about the unilateral action and would have
preferred cooperation. To reduce these concerns, I add a sentence about the Yemeni government
requesting assistance. After reading the scenario, subjects answered questions about their
perceptions of military force. Some questions include support/opposition to military force,
confidence in the success of the military operation, and the perceived risk involved in engaging in
such an action.18 Subjects were also asked to answer questions that served as manipulation checks
to make sure they paid attention to the survey, such as the type of force used in the scenario or to
answer a question with a certain response. Last, subjects learned the purpose of the experiment,
were debriefed, and received a code to get paid for their participation.

15

See Appendix A for DOSPERT Scale
See Chapter 6 for an explanation of this alternative presentation of the study.
17
Specific information about the scenarios is in later chapters. The explanation here serves to give an overview of the
research method.
18
See Appendices D and F for scenarios.
16
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3.3

Subjects

The subject pool from which I draw for these experiments is from Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (mTurk). MTurk is a survey service that matches experimenters with subjects willing to
participate in online surveys for small sums of money, usually less than one dollar. For this
study, subjects received 60 cents for about ten minutes of their time. Many social science studies
have used MTurk to conduct survey research (Arceneaux 2012, Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012,
Kreps 2015, Miller and Barber 2016) and specifically for drone experiments (Horowitz 2016,
Kreps 2014, Kreps and Wallace 2016, Shelby 2013, Walsh 2015, Walsh and Schulzke 2015). I
can also gather a large number of subjects in a relatively short period of time. For example, in
my pilot study, I recruited 700 subjects in about ten days.19 When collecting subjects for the
experiments in this dissertation, I recruited the subjects for each experiment in 3-10 days.
Some question the validity of mTurk, raising concerns about how representative the
sample population is or how well those who take the survey pay attention to their tasks (Rouse
2015). MTurk “workers” (those who participate in studies) are younger, more liberal, and more
tech-savvy than the population in general. However, Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011)
and Casler, Bickel, and Hackett (2013) found that workers produce results at least as
representative as other online survey strategies. Paolacci and Chandler (2014) highlight that
whether the population is representative, workers are at least more diverse than student
populations, meaning they provide a better convenience sample if ample resources are available
to use mTurk.

19

I removed some of these subjects from the final study due to incomplete data, but that number was relatively low.
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If there are concerns about whether workers pay close attention, Buhrmester, Kwang, and
Gosling (2011) also found that workers pay just as much attention to their work as other
“convenience” sample populations. There is also a set of best practices to follow to make sure
subjects will pay attention to the survey and give good data (Goodman, Cryder, and Cheemer
2012, Mason and Suri 2012). These practices include adding questions with strange answers20 or
asking subjects about the experiment scenario they just read. I follow these practices and include
manipulation checks. At the end of the study, subjects from mTurk also saw a code phrase on the
DPTE website that they had to enter on mTurk to receive payment.21
While mTurk workers are not statistically representative of the U.S. population, they are
acceptable for my studies because I am not showing that drones will change the way the public
thinks about military force; I am trying to show that drones could change the way people think
about military force. Showing an effect is enough to satisfy this requirement (Mook 1983).
Future research can determine if this behavior is extendable to the entire population, but the goal
here is to show there is the possibility of an effect. By showing that different types of force can
affect the way people consider supporting military operations, I show that drones can change the
way people think about the use of force.

3.4

Variables of Interest

3.4.1 Independent Variables
There are three independent variables for these studies: type of force, principle policy
objective, and likelihood of success. These variables relate to risk by altering calculations within
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The manipulation check in my study asked subjects to answer a question with the word "yellow."
This is a "best practice" to ensure subjects are paying attention to the study.
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a cost-benefit analysis. The literature on cost-benefit analysis suggests that individuals likely do
not want to invest in conflicts that could create more costs than benefits. By manipulating parts
of the cost-benefit calculation, I show how individuals consider their decision to support using
force.
The first variable is type of force. Eichenberg (2005) and Larson (1996) show that the
type of force used can affect public support for force. In other experiments, type of force served
as a proxy variable to indicate different levels of risk to soldiers (Horowitz 2016, Press, Sagan,
and Valentino2013, Schneider and MacDonald 2016, Walsh 2015, Walsh and Schulzke 2015).
Soldiers on the ground and in-country have a high risk associated with their use; manned
aircraft22 have a medium risk associated with them because the pilots are further away from the
likelihood of harm but are still put at some risk; drones have low risk because there is no
likelihood of a U.S. soldier dying if the drone gets shot down. I continue to use type of force as a
way to distinguish costs associated with using force.
The second variable is the principle policy objective (PPO) of the proposed mission,
measured via the hypothetical scenario in study 1. As stated in the previous chapter, a PPO is a
general goal that an actor seeks to accomplish through using force (Jentleson 1992). For my
studies, the PPO manipulations are counterterrorism and internal political change (supporting or
changing a foreign government in power). Evidence suggests that individuals use principle
policy objectives to assess the goals of military operations (Eichenberg 2005, Larson 1996, Perla
Jr. 2011). Uses of force that further a strategic national security interest are most likely to win
support from the public because the goal of the operation is clear: the United States must engage
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Manned aircraft only appear in study 1. Other studies use drones and boots on the ground.
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in X action to secure U.S. interests. If a PPO has a more abstract goal, such as using force to
promote international justice, the public is less likely to support military force unless the United
States spreads risks in other ways (Page and Bouton 2006). This variable should therefore elicit
different responses depending on the situation in which a participant finds him or herself.
Third, I use the likelihood of success.23 If an operation has a low chance of success,
people likely will perceive it as riskier because failure means wasting resources. Therefore,
lower likelihood of success means the public should be less likely to support the use of force
(Perla Jr. 2011, Press, Sagan, and Valentino 2013, Walsh 2015). I create scenarios with varying
odds of success using findings from Holt and Laury (2002). In their study, they offered subjects a
90% chance to win a small amount of money, or a 10% chance to win a large amount of money
in the first scenario. In the second scenario, the numbers were 80% and 20% respectively, then
70% and 30% until the odds flipped: 90% to win a large amount of money and 10% chance to
win a small amount of money. They found that most subjects would take a chance on the larger
sum of money when the odds of winning got to 50%. They also found that at 30% (and below)
chance of winning the large sum of money meant that subjects were much less likely to accept
the risk of winning the money.
Likelihood of success appears in study 2 and study 3. In these studies, I use three
different likelihoods of success, high, medium, and low. I choose 90% as my high likelihood of
success, 50% as the middle, and 30% as the low likelihood of success. I base this on two things.
First, Holt and Laury (2002) found these were important points for subjects. Second, they are
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Success is mentioned in studies 2 and 3.
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natural points when people can clearly distinguish between a sure thing, a possibility, and a
moonshot: 90% is nearly certain, 50% could go either way, and 30% is most likely a failure.
3.4.2 Dependent Variables
There are three dependent variables in this study: support for/opposition to using military
force, perceived riskiness of using military force, and, in study 3, risk orientations, which will be
discussed in a separate section. I also examine open-ended responses to each of the scenarios
people read to gain more insight into the effects of drones on risk perception of and support for
military operations. First, individuals who perceive military operations as riskier are more likely
to oppose the use of force (Perla Jr. 2011). I measure risk perception to determine whether or not
individuals in fact perceive drones as less risky than other types of military force. There are
many ways to measure risk, but for this study, I use the most direct method by simply asking
individuals to tell me how risky they think the military operation is because it is the most
appropriate measure for this study (Charness, Gneezy, and Imas 2013, Lönnqvist et al 2014).
Support for an operation comes from a few different calculations. The public may support
a military operation more if they think that it is a worthy cause (Page and Bouton 2006, Schott,
Scherer, and Lambert 2011), if there is a low level of perceived risk (Eichenberg 2005, Perla Jr.
2011), or if the likelihood of success is high (Eichenberg 2005, Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
2009). This variable gauges how much the public is willing to incur cost in order to achieve an
objective.
After questions about risk perception and support, subjects were asked open-ended follow
up questions about individual risk perception and individual support for military force associated
with the use of force The follow-up questions asked subjects to explain why they felt the way
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they did. The goal from asking these questions is to collect qualitative data on whether subjects
were making the connection between drones and risk or if they had other considerations in mind
when answering questions. I grouped these answers into various categories across each study and
attempted to determine if the type of force was a significant factor in their decisions.
Perceived likelihood of success is the third variable of interest. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
(2009) and Gartner (2008) show that perceived success is critical to maintaining high levels of
support for military operations. In addition, in a pilot study I ran (Shelby 2013), I found evidence
from my scenario that one of the independent variables listed above, type of force, affected the
perceived likelihood of success. I therefore include it here as a dependent variable for
understanding how type of force and actual likelihood of success affect the perceptions of
success in experiment participants.
It is important to clarify the difference between the independent variable, likelihood of
success, and the dependent variable, perceived likelihood of success. In studies 2 and 3, I provide
subjects with an estimate for the likelihood of success of the hypothetical scenario. As a
dependent variable across all studies, I ask individuals what they perceive the likelihood of
success to be, given the scenario presented to them. The likelihood of success variable (IV) will
probably influence the perceived likelihood of success variable (DV), but they are two different
variables.
3.4.3 Domain Specific Risk Attitude Score
Finally, I measure individual risk attitudes to determine if there is a relationship between
risk attitudes and differences in support the use of force. In these three studies, I use a scale that
measures risk attitudes, the domain specific risk taking (DOSPERT) scale to develop an
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understanding of individual risk willingness to engage in risky behavior as a control variable
and, in study 3, as a dependent variable.
Measuring an individual’s propensity towards risk is difficult (Lönnqvist et al 2014).
Many researchers have sought to accurately measure risk attitudes in individuals. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), the most well-known researchers on this topic, set up differing frames of
reference to show whether a person was more risk acceptant or averse. Many authors such as
Holt and Laury (2002) created similar experiments with multiple scenarios depicting differing
levels of risk associated with choices for monetary gain. Others have used a risk propensity scale
(Meertens and Lion 2008), personality traits (Deck et al 2008, Lauiola and Levin 2001),
demographics such as age, height, and gender (Dohmen et al 2011, Eckel and Grossman 2008,
2011) and money or questionnaires (Charness, Gneezy, and Imas 2013).
One problem that many of these studies have is that they assume that risk is the same
across all domains in life. For example, researchers may assume a person who likes to gamble is
also more likely to make risky social decisions. However, this is not the case; risk is contextspecific (Deck et al 2008, Weber, Blais, and Betz 2002). Many studies also lack a gradation of
risk. To accurately understand the relationship between risk and the other variables associated
with the use of military force, it is important to have gradations for risk to understand how an
increase in risk acceptance may affect individual behavior, not just whether someone is riskaverse or risk acceptant.
This is best accomplished by using a questionnaire that directly asks individuals to selfassess their behaviors (Lönnqvist et al 2014). A good model for this is in Kam (2012) and Kam
and Simas (2010). In these studies, the researchers use the same scaled risk questionnaire in their
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study of political participation and policy choices, respectively to show that risk attitudes affect
subjects’ preferences for political participation or their policy preferences. However, the
questions are not comprehensive enough. Their scale does not include multiple domains of risk
(social, ethical, health, financial, and recreational (Weber, Blais, and Betz 2002)), and the
authors only ask one question per domain (of the domains included), failing to give a
comprehensive look at each domain of risk.
Therefore, I instead use the domain-specific risk attitude (DOSPERT) scale created by
Blais and Weber (2006) as my risk measurement. This scale measures risk across five categories
and is for an adult population, compared to the original scale used by Weber, Blais, and Betz
(2002) made for undergraduates.24 The updated scale is more appropriate, according to the
authors, because it addresses everyday occurrences that adults would expect to experience.
I use this scale in its entirety to determine if one or multiple types of risk (such as ethical
risk or investment risk) affects the dependent variables. I also take a comprehensive risk score (to
find a general risk tendency if one exists) to determine whether individuals who are simply more
risk averse in general are less likely to support the use of force. The drawback of this scale is that
there is no explicit measurement for military risk, but there is little, if any research on how risk
attitudes affect individual opinions on military force. I choose the DOSPERT scale because it is a
comprehensive scale looking across multiple domains with more than one question.
In studies 1 and 2, the DOSPERT scale is used as a control variable that serves to determine
if the DOSPERT scale is beneficial for measuring risk attitudes surrounding military force. If
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When the authors revised the scale, they made note of the idea that their original scale was for undergraduates and
therefore not as relatable to the public at large. The revised scale is more generalizable for the public.
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subjects in the pretest claim to be risk-acceptant, but they see operations as very risky, there may
be a problem with the results. Looking for this relationship will ensure that the DOSPERT scale
serves its purpose.
In study 3, risk attitude changes from a control variable to a dependent variable. After
seeing results from study 1 and study 2, I concluded that I could not determine what was leading
subjects to fall prey to the moral hazard problem. However, if I could show that individuals in
the drone group were more risk acceptant after reading the hypothetical scenario compared to the
other group, I could show that drones could change risk attitudes, thus increase their support for
military operations. This would show a possible way in which drones change people’s behaviors.
Risk attitude is therefore used as a dependent variable to determine if drones changing risk
attitudes is the reason people perceive drones as less risky.

3.5

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the research approach I use. It covers
hypotheses, general research design, subject pool and variables of interest. While some
hypotheses are not novel, they have never been adequately tested. I seek to solve this problem by
directly measuring variables researchers have not measured previously. The next three chapters
will cover the series of experiments I use to test my hypotheses. The first study will look at how
different political goals (PPOs) and type of force affect public perceptions and support for
military force. The second study will look at the likelihood of success and type of force used.
These two studies look at how subjects calculate whether they will support a military operation.
Study 3 uses the results of the first two studies to replicate results from study 2 and mitigate
outstanding concerns not addressed in the previous studies.
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CHAPTER 4.

DO DRONES MAKE MORE PRINCIPLE POLICY
OBJECTIVES PALATABLE?

In previous chapters, I established the theory from which I draw and described the
general research design. In the next few chapters, I will describe the experiments I use to test my
hypotheses and analyze the results of the experiments. I begin here with Study 1, an experiment
testing individual preferences for PPOs and types of force. Conventional wisdom suggests that
subjects should prefer less risky forms of force and that they should also be picky about PPOs
they support. The results support these findings, but also indicate that drones can reduce the
perceived risk of military operations. The risk finding was somewhat limited, however, by posthoc analyses that showed individuals shifted some of their risk concerns from the potential loss
of American life to concerns of other types of risk and costs associated with conflict. This
suggests that drones can influence public support, but other cost mechanisms may constrain
drone use.
This chapter consists of four parts. I will first describe the scenario subjects read. Second,
I will describe the experimental method and subject demographics. Third, I report the results
from the experiment. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the results.

4.1

Study 1

This experiment, the first in a series, examines how PPOs and different types of force
affect how the public thinks about the use of force. PPOs, as Perla Jr. (2011) describes them, are
a way that the public can conceptualize military operations in terms of benefits gained for the
United States. Some PPOs are necessary, as they ensure the security of state. Using force in these
PPOs is acceptable because they ensure the survival of the state. Other PPOs that focus on
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international justice without directly benefitting the United States seem riskier (Page and Bouton
2006, Perla Jr. 2011). If the United States utilizes resources for a PPO that is “unnecessary,”
failure would be a complete waste of time, and success would bring few tangible benefits. These
non-security PPOs are therefore seen as riskier because there is no sure benefit to the public.
This is not the first study of PPOs. Jentleson (1992), Larson (1996), and Jentleson and
Britton (1998) conducted early research on the importance of PPOs. Hermann, Tetlock and,
Visser (1999) ran one of the first experiments providing evidence of PPOs when they showed the
importance of strategic interests in a public’s decision to go to war. The German Marshall Fund
(2003) funded a survey similar to Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser asking subjects about
hypothetical military scenarios in which the United States involves itself. The most well-known
experiment on PPOs by Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) showed that subjects have preferences
among PPOs similar to those laid out by qualitative work on the subject, but also showed the
support for counterterrorism operations received higher support than other PPOs due to the
prominence of terrorism in the minds of the public (Holsti 2004, 2011).
Some studies also concluded that the type of force had a major impact on public support
for the use of force. These studies found that public support was higher for operations in which
American soldiers had limited exposure to risk. Using case studies and polls, Larson (1996) and
Eichenberg (2005) found that public support was higher for uses of military force focused on a
strategic air campaign rather than sending in boots on the ground. The authors concluded this
was because the likelihood of American casualties is drastically reduced when American planes
are far overhead over an enemy they are targeting (though it is still possible to incur casualties).
These studies were correlational, not experimental, but an experiment by Walsh (2015) found
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subjects support the use of force with drones more than boots on the ground when made aware
that the likelihood of American casualties is zero, but there may be other concerns once there is
no risk to Americans.
The culmination of these two research areas occurs in Walsh and Schulzke’s (2015)
experiment that combines PPOs (using Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s (2009) scenarios) and type of
force (drones vs. manned aircraft vs. boots on the ground). Their study found results similar to
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) that the public has preferences for certain PPOs, but they had
another important finding. The authors showed that as the likelihood of casualties decreased (by
using different types of military force), support increased, even in PPOs that the public did not
support at high levels. Their study concluded that certain types of force may be more likely to
persuade individuals that using force is acceptable in more situations.
While the Walsh and Schulzke study combined the previous results of studies into one, it
neglected to show a causal link between drones and risk perception. As I discussed previously,
this study did not measure risk attitudes in individuals. The authors believed that the type of
force was a proxy for level of risk involved in military force, but they did not measure whether
subjects in the experiment thought in this way.25 There is no direct evidence that the perceived
lower risk of drones increases support for military force because the authors did not create a
causal chain showing that the public is thinking in a certain way that makes them more likely to
support force if presented information about drones.
To address these issues, I replicated parts of the experiment by Walsh and Schulzke
(2015), but I updated their scenarios to fill gaps in their experiment. I use their post-stimulus
25

Personal correspondence with the authors.
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questions, but I deviate from the authors by including questions in the pretest and posttest about
risk attitudes and risk perception, respectively. I measured risk attitudes using the DOSPERT
scale. Subjects answered 30 questions about their risk attitudes for various issues on a scale from
1 to 7. Since there were 30 questions, the lowest score possible was a 30, the middle score
(neutral) was 120, and the highest score possible was 210. I also separated the different types of
risk into groups and created a combined score for each one. There were five types of risk
discussed in the DOSPERT questions: social risk, health risk, recreational risk, ethical risk, and
financial risk. There were six questions per type of risk. Examples of questions include how
likely individuals were to take various risks, such as disagreeing with a friend on a social issue
(social risk), engaging in unprotected sex (health risk), gambling their earnings on a race
(financial risk), going skydiving (recreational risk), or taking credit for someone else’s work
(ethical risk).26 In terms of overall risk aversion, the vast majority of subjects were either risk
neutral or risk averse (88%).27
I also included more post-test questions such as a question about perception of riskiness
of military force and open-ended follow-up questions. Lönnqvist et al (2014) suggest simply
asking individuals about whether subjects perceive an action as risky because it is a more
efficient measure to determine how people feel about an issue. For my purposes, it is better to
outright ask subjects about their risk perceptions so I understand how their risk perception affects
their decision to support force.

26

See appendix for full list of questions.
Individuals were risk averse if their overall score was less than the risk neutral score of 120. If subjects answered
every question with a score of 4 (don’t know; in this case meant to be the risk neutral option between likely and
unlikeliness to engage in a risky activity), they would have a cumulative score of 120 out of 210. I considered subjects
with a score less than 120 as risk averse.
27
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In addition, I include open-ended questions for risk perception of and support for military
force. The open-ended responses help determine whether subjects are specifically considering
the importance of the type of force when making their responses. If subjects answer these
questions with specific mentions about concern over risks of a military operations (such as
concern over American or civilian casualties), I can determine that the public prefers (or does not
prefer) a specific type of force because they reduce (or increase) these risks.
Finally, I only used two of the scenarios created by Walsh and Schulzke rather than all
four. The authors found a hierarchy for PPOs and this hierarchy is well-established in the
literature, so it is evident which scenario garners the most support (counterterrorism) and the
least (internal political change). Since this is well established, I am not retesting all four
scenarios but just the two that are most extreme in their differences to confirm the effect found
by the authors. I take the authors scenarios and make them equal in every capacity other than the
type of force and PPO.28

4.2

Subjects

I recruited 520 subjects using Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). I posted an
advertisement on the mTurk website and on an mTurk blog for individuals who take the
surveys.29 The advertisement requested individuals to take a survey about attitudes on military
force. Subjects received $0.60 for their time. This is slightly more than what a typical experiment
pays. All subjects reside in the United States. Just over half of the subjects were male (53%).
Most subjects had some education beyond high school (87%). Just over three quarters of the pool

28

For example, in the drone groups, the authors added a sentence about the likelihood of American casualties, but
they did not add a line about American casualties to the other groups. I deleted this line to make the scenarios equal.
29
See http://www.turkernation.com/
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was white (77%), with African Americans (8%), Asian Americans (6.5%), and Hispanic
Americans (4%) making up the next largest portion of subject pools. The remaining subjects
considered themselves Native American, Pacific Islander, or other/multiple races (4%). Just over
half of subjects (52%) identified as Democrats, slightly less than one quarter (23%) of subjects
identified as Republican, and the rest identified as Independent (22%), other (2%), or didn’t
know (less than 1%). About one quarter of respondents identified as conservative (25%), onefifth identified as moderate (20%), and the rest identified as liberal (54%) or did not know (1%).
Prior to running regressions, I removed all subjects that did not show they were paying
adequate attention to the survey. I did this by asking questions at the end of the survey about the
specific PPO and type of force subjects read about in their groups. In addition, I had a question
where I told subjects to choose a specific answer (“Answer the following question with yellow”).
If subjects answered any of these three questions wrong, I dropped them from the study. While
scholars debate whether this is a necessary step to take with mTurk because this population
likely pays just as much attention as a college student population (Paolacci and Chandler 2014),
they suggest it as an extra precaution to make sure researchers gather good data (Goodman,
Cryder, and Cheema 2012). Manipulation checks ensure that I am observing the effects of my
independent variables. If subjects are paying attention, I know that they understand the scenario
and will make decisions based on the scenario rather than individual opinions on the use of force.
If they do not answer these questions correctly, I do not know if the variables had the appropriate
effect on subjects or if they simply answered a certain way by chance.
After removing 87 subjects (17%) who did not answer all three manipulation checks
correctly, the subject pool was still diverse and virtually unchanged. Slightly more than half
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(53%) of the subjects were male and 47% were female. Whites made up most the subject pool
(77%), followed by African Americans (7%), Hispanic Americans (4.5%), Asian Americans
(6.5%), Native Americans (1%), Pacific Islanders (less than 1%), and those that said they were
multiracial or identified with another race (3%). Half of the respondents identified as democrats
(51%), one-quarter of the respondents identified as republicans (24%), one-fifth identified as
independents (22%), and a small portion identified with another party or did not know (3%).
There was a similar breakdown on the liberal-conservative scale, with the majority identifying as
liberal (53%), one-quarter of respondents identifying as conservative (26%), one-fifth identifying
as moderate (21%), and a few people who did not know (less than one percent). The number of
subjects with advanced education also remained close to the original number (86%).

4.3

Experimental Design30

Group 1 R O1 Y1 X1 O2
Group 3 R O1 Y1 X2 O2
Group 5 R O1 Y1 X3 O2
Group 2 R O1 Y2 X1 O2
Group 4 R O1 Y2 X2 O2
Group 6 R O1 Y2 X3 O2
R: Random noise
O: Observations (1-Pretest; 2-Posttest)
X: Type of Force (1-Drone; 2-Manned Aircraft; 3- Soldiers)
Y: Principle Policy Objective (1-Internal Political Change; 2-Counterterrorism)
Table 1-Experimental Manipulations for Study
The experiment is a 3 x 2 between-subjects study that looks at two variables: the strategic
goal of the military operation (PPO) (internal political change vs. counterterrorism) and the type
of force (drones vs. manned aircraft vs. boots on the ground) that the military employs to achieve
that goal. Subjects were randomly separated into six groups. Figure 1 displays the different
groups.

30

This study is on Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/q3a4z/.
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This experiment ran from October 5, 2016 to October 10, 2016. Subjects began the
experiment by answering a call for subjects on an mTurk blog that took them to the survey link.
When they agreed to participate, they went to an external website known as the Dynamic Process
Tracing Environment (DPTE) housed by the University of Iowa.31 After consenting to
participate, subjects answered demographic questions such as gender, age, political party
affiliation, political tendencies (liberal vs. conservative), and education level. Subjects then
answered questions from the DOSPERT scale. Following the DOSPERT scale, subjects read a
hypothetical scenario about the United States intervening in a conflict in Yemen. One scenario
appears below:32
“Washington (AP) — The president of the United States announced intentions to carry
out military operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the
Middle East. The government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist
organizations established bases in the North of the country. American intelligence
agencies have identified the location of the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States
plans to strike these bases with missiles fired from drone aircraft to kill terrorist leaders
and cripple their operations.”
Subjects then answered questions about their perceived risk involved in using force,
support for the use of force, and perceived likelihood of success. Additionally, there were openended follow up questions for subjects to explain why they did or did not think the military
operation was risky and why they did or did not support the use of force. Subjects were then
debriefed and thanked before they received a code to enter on mTurk to receive payment.

31
32

dpte.polisci.uiowa.edu/
See appendix for full list of scenarios.
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4.4
# of group
that is

Results

Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment
1
2
3
4
5
6

X2

PR

Male

32

23

36

50

34

57

7.72

.17

Republican

14

15

17

21

13

24

1.03

.96

Democrat

28

31

29

50

39

43

5.14

.40

Independent

12

14

15

17

12

25

1.96

.86

At least
some postsecondary
education

48

54

53

79

60

84

2.04

.84

Table 2- Study 1 Balance Checks
I ran balance checks to ensure there was randomization across all groups. There are
debates about whether balance checks are a necessary step in experiments, due to how the
experimental method already randomizes subject pools (Mutz and Pemantle 2011), but that same
randomization could create a random imbalance in groups. To ensure that did not occur, I ran
balance checks on each of the demographic variables and on the DOSPERT scale.33 Only one of
the DOSPERT results suggested there was imbalance, so I ran all regressions controlling for risk
aversion. I found no difference in the results when controlling for risk aversion.

33

I ran balance checks using a dummy variable for risk aversion. The dummy variable looked at whether or not an
individual had a score greater than 120 (the halfway mark between the most risk avoidant and risk acceptant score).
If the score was less than 120, that subject was considered risk averse. However, these scores do not take the different
types of risk into consideration; it is just a blanket score.
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Figure 2-Average Support for the Use of Force and Risk Perception for Study 1
The variables of interest in this study are risk perception and support for military force.34
I ran ordinary least squares, ANOVA, logit, and ordered logit regressions, as well as pairwise
comparisons on the two dependent variables. Across all models, the results were the same in
statistical significance. I only report on ANOVA and pairwise comparison results here. Type of
force and PPO affected whether subjects supported the use of force and whether subjects
perceived the military operation as risky. Risk attitudes affected perceived risk of the military
operation but not support for military force.

34

See previous chapter for an in-depth description of these variables.
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4.4.1 Risk Perception

Figure 3-Pairwise Comparisons for Risk Perception in Study 1
When asked how risky subjects perceived the military operation to be, the average
perception of risk was between somewhat risky and very risky (2.78 out of 4). Subjects exposed
to the drone scenario had the lowest risk perception on average. Subjects given information
about a counterterrorism operation saw it as slightly riskier on average than subjects given
information about assisting Yemen with a civil war. There was no statistical difference between
the interaction of type of force and PPO [F (1, 2)=.25, p>.1]. In other models, I tested whether
risk attitude would be an accurate predictor of perceived risk. General risk attitude was not
significant [F (1, 95)=1.2, p>.1], but ethical risk was [F (1,26)=1.68, p<.1].
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I also ran post-estimation comparisons to compare each group against the other. This is
appropriate because it allows me to compare different PPOs and types of force explicitly rather
than relying on a general model that shows relationships. The post-estimation test takes variables
categorized as categorical variables and compares them to each other (Abdi and Williams 2010).
For example, when running an analysis of variance test, if one were to use race as one of the
independent variables, it would not make sense to see statistical significance if each numerical
value represents a different race because increasing or decreasing the numerical value does
nothing in terms of appropriately addressing what race means. Post-estimation breaks out the
categorical variable and then compares the results of each variable against the others for
comparison. Pairwise comparison compares values by looking at the difference in results by
comparing variable values one on one (X variable for individuals who are African American vs.
X variable for individuals who are Asian American; X variable for individuals who are white vs.
X variable for individuals who are African American, etc.).
Here, I use pairwise comparison to look at how each group perceived risk compared to
each other group (how did individuals given information about drones and a counterterrorism
scenario differ from manned aircraft and counterterrorism? How did they differ from subjects
given information about soldiers and internal political change?). Unsurprisingly, drones were
consistently perceived as less risky than other types of military force. When comparing within
the drone groups across PPOs, there was no difference in risk perception whether subjects
received information about a counterterrorism operation or an internal political change scenario.
The most interesting finding here is that subjects in the drone group that mentioned the internal
political change scenario perceived the use of force as less risky than subjects in the soldier
group or manned aircraft group with a counterterrorism scenario.
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I also asked subjects for an open-ended response on why they thought that an action was
or was not risky. I grouped responses into several categories. Subjects who thought the action
was risky said there may be American casualties, collateral damage, that military force would
escalate the situation, or there was a general risk involved in engaging in a military campaign. I
coded variables to reflect these categories. For example, one subject in the internal political
change group using drones stated, “I think innocent people may get injured or killed.” This
person would be coded as being concerned with collateral damage. If subjects gave multiple
answers, I took the first answer as the most salient unless they began with a general risk and then
gave a more specific answer. Another subject stated, “It is always risky in [the] military. Even
[if] there is a small chance, they can shoot our plane down.” Here, the subject began with a
general statement of risk and then listed concern about American casualties (this was for the
manned aircraft scenario) so I list this individual as mentioning concern over American
casualties.
Within the drone groups, about one-third of the subjects responded directly to this
question with a response that indicated that they believed that using drones would be less risky
than using manned aircraft or boots on the ground. For example, one subject stated, “I have no
problem with military action as long as it does not involve ground troops.”35 Slightly more than
another third of the subjects in the drone groups mentioned that they worried that drones will
create collateral damage. One subject stated their concern that drones would not work, “We may
not get the target and there could be civilian casualties.”36

35
36

This subject received information about a counterterrorism campaign using drones.
This subject was in the counterterrorism scenario with drones.
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Finally, as a control to determine if the DOSPERT scale is useful for capturing data on
risk attitudes, I ran ANOVA regressions on each risk attitude variable to determine if they are
accurate predictors of risk perceptions. Overall risk attitude was not significant [F (1,96) p>.1],
but ethical risk [F(1,27) p<.05] was.
4.4.2 Support for Military Force
Subjects overall supported the use of force at least somewhat; the average support for
military force hovered around a 3.4 (between “neither support nor oppose” and somewhat
support) on a scale of zero to five, showing that overall subjects supported the use of force
slightly more than they opposed it. Subjects in the counterterrorism scenario that mentioned
drones had the highest level of support while subjects in the internal political change scenario
that mentioned manned aircraft scenario supported the operation the least. Risk attitudes did not
affect support for military force.
When asked how much subjects support the use of force in their respective scenario,
subjects supported the use of force more as soldiers moved further from harm’s way. Subjects in
the manned aircraft and drone groups supported the use of force at higher levels than subjects in
groups that mentioned boots on the ground. Subjects in the drone groups, on average, had the
highest support for the use of force. Those in the counterterrorism group on average supported
the use of force more than subjects in the internal political change scenario. However, when
interacting, the variables were not statistically significant [F(1, 2)=1.15, p>.1]. Additionally,
there was no significant effect of overall risk attitude [F(1,96)=.87, p>.1)], nor the specific types
of risk on support for military force.
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I also ran pairwise comparisons for each group. Subjects in the counterterrorism scenario
using drones received more support than all other groups. Compared to the group that received
information on a counterterrorism scenario that used soldiers, the group that received
information about a counterterrorism scenario with drones received more support (b=.51, p<.01).
Subjects in the group that read a counterterrorism scenario using drones also supported the use of
force more than the group that read an internal political change scenario using drones (b=.58,
p<.01) and an internal political change scenario using soldiers (b=.75, p<.001). There was no
statistical difference in support for the use of force between the group that read the internal
political change scenario using drones and the counterterrorism scenario using soldiers, nor
between the internal political change scenario using drones or using soldiers. There was a
marginally significant difference in support between the counterterrorism scenario using soldiers
and the internal political change scenario using soldiers (b=.24, p<.1).
Just like the follow-up risk question, I did post-hoc analysis on the open-ended responses
to support for military force (please tell me why you do or do not support the use of force). The
responses fall into various categories (security of U.S., no American casualties, collateral
damage, etc.).37 Thirteen percent of respondents in the drone group said that they supported the
use of force explicitly because drones were the medium for using force (“As long as we don't put
any boots on the ground, I don't see the harm.”).38 Some subjects in the non-drone groups even
suggested using drones instead (“I would rather drone use than men on the ground.”39 “I am
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While I did group responses for all groups, the goal of this exercise was to look specifically at how subjects in the
drone groups justified their support for or opposition to military force.
38
Subject presented an internal political change scenario using drones.
39
Subject presented an internal political change scenario using drones.
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undecided. It'd be dependent on direct threat level to US & risk to ground troops. Prefer
drones.”).40

Figure 4-Pairwise Comparisons for Support for Military Force in Study 1
Another smaller proportion of subjects (8.5%) said they did not support the use of force
because they thought collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties, escalation, or failure (“I
don't have enough information to really justify drone strikes that could potentially kill civilians.”
“Because there is the potential to have civilian casaulties [casualties].” “I need more information.

40

Subject presented a counterterrorism scenario using soldiers.
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If this is going to kill innocent civilians, then the terrorism will spread.”)41 was too high. Yet, this
was not exclusive to the drone groups (p>.1).

4.5

Discussion

The results appear to show that drones receive more support than conventional military
force, but this does not mean that risk to Americans is the only concern. Some subjects
concerned themselves with other risks associated with warfare such as making things worse in
the region by increasing terrorist recruitment (escalation), incurring civilian casualties,
destabilizing the region, or through hurting the image of U.S. foreign policy. This section will
interpret the results of the experiment.
The most important result was that subjects perceived drones as less risky than other
types of force, confirming hypothesis 1. Scholars assumed this causal relationship existed (Kaag
and Kreps 2014, MacDonald and Schneider 2015, Schneider and MacDonald 2016, Singer 2009,
Walsh and Schulzke 2015), but to this point, no one had measured it (Shelby 2017). This study
showed that individuals given information about a military incursion with drones thought the
military operation was less risky than using soldiers or manned aircraft. Additionally, a not
insignificant portion of subjects presented information about a drone scenario directly stated that
they thought that the military operation was less risky because the type of force for the military
operation have fewer risks associated with their use. This confirms the previous findings of
Eichenberg (2005), Larson (1996), and Walsh and Schulzke (2015) that reducing the risk of
harm to American soldiers can affect how the public perceives the use military force.

41

Subjects were in the internal political change scenario using drones.
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Results for the support for military force are not surprising when considering the risk
perception results above. Subjects presented information about drones (perceived as less risky)
had higher levels of support than uses of force that were riskier than drones, confirming
hypothesis 2. The results for support for military force further strengthen the arguments of
Eichenberg (2005), Larson (1996), Walsh (2015), and Walsh and Schulzke (2015) that moving
American soldiers further from harm’s way increases public support for the use of force and that
drones are a step in this direction (Kaag and Kreps 2014, Singer 2009).
This is not the only feeling elicited by subjects. A portion of subjects also felt like the
operation would create some sort of collateral damage or escalation of violence when using
drones. As stated in previous chapters, drones reduce collateral damage compared to other
conventional weapons,42 but it nonetheless has greatly concerned individuals in this study. This
is an interesting finding and highlights concern from researchers about the current trends in
warfare. This was significant for risk perception but not support for the use of force. One
subject’s response explains this sentiment well: “I think it is not risky to soldiers but it is risky
for civilians.” This subject said that the scenario was “not very risky,” but they still showed
concern for collateral damage. It suggests that drones can make people perceive military force as
less risky, but there also may be a threshold for their perception of risk because they think about
other concerns. It is also similar to findings in my pilot study (Shelby 2013) and Walsh (2015)
that found individuals think about collateral damage (civilian casualties) more when using
drones.
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However, it is important to caveat these results. Even though subjects thought that an
operation using drones was risky because of collateral damage, this did not appear to have an
effect on individual willingness to support military force. This could suggest that drones may
make people think about collateral damage more, but that does not necessarily mean they are any
less willing to support their use. Only a small portion of individuals expressed this concern in the
follow-up responses.
Taken together, these results suggest drones make people think differently about military
operations. Subjects in the drone group supported the use of force at higher levels and saw their
use as less risky. This suggests that drones could make it easier for leaders to gain support for
military operations (Singer 2009), even less preferable scenarios (Kaag and Kreps 2014). Similar
to results from Walsh and Schulzke (2015), subjects given information about drones consistently
saw military operations as less risky than subjects in other groups, regardless of principle policy
objective. This did not necessarily translate into an increase for support, but it is interesting to note
that drones did in fact mitigate some of the impact of different PPOs. This suggests that drones
could lead to a moral hazard problem: if people see drone operations as less risky, even when PPOs
are less appealing, it could mean increased support, or at least indifference to military force,
allowing leaders to conduct operations with less scrutiny.
Finally, the relationship between perceived riskiness and risk aversion is not a surprising
one though it shows the DOSPERT scale is at least semi-functional in achieving the objective I
seek to achieve. Subjects who are more risk acceptant in terms of ethical risk saw the scenario as
less risky. These results suggest that the DOSPERT scale somewhat measured what is was
support to measure, so I will continue using in other experiments in this dissertation. Again, the
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DOSPERT scale is the most comprehensive risk scale available, and no other scales for
measuring risk attitudes towards military force exist, so my options for alternatives are limited.

4.6

Gaps and Further Study

The results of study 1 indicate that drones affect how people think about the use of force.
This shows an important relationship between perceived capabilities of a technology and
considerations for military operations. However, there are two important questions to answer
based on these findings. First, what does it mean when subjects perceive drone use as less risky?
Does this mean that subjects become more optimistic about their use because there are fewer
costs, or does it mean that exposure to the drone stimuli makes subjects less concerned about
using force in general? Are these mutually exclusive results, or could an individual believe both
are true? Study 1 appeared to show mixed results for this question. In the drone group with the
internal political change scenario, subjects perceived the operation as less risky than the
counterterrorism scenarios that put soldiers at risk, yet conventional wisdom would suggest this
does not make sense. These are questions to answer with future experiments.
Second, is it possible to establish a threshold for individual perceived risk of drone use?
Drones received more support than soldiers, but this is assuming equal conditions. What if the
likelihood of success is higher for soldiers than drones? Looking to future experiments, since
subjects thought drones were more likely to succeed, the next step would be to create an
experiment that not only reduces the risk to American soldiers but attempts to counterweigh this
reduction of risk to soldiers with a decrease in the likelihood of success. Experiment 2 will
answer this question.
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4.7

Conclusion

Drone use can affect how the public thinks about warfare. Subjects showed more support
for drones than other types of force and thought that using drones was less risky. This is a useful
finding because until this point it was an assumption made by policymakers and researchers.
However, there were limits to these effects. Because the risk of U.S. military casualties was
nonexistent with drones, some subjects shifted concerns of risk towards minimizing the damage
to enemy combatants. If subjects have these thoughts, is there a way to further isolate these
effects through minimizing collateral damage?
More pressing than collateral damage concerns is how the likelihood of success affects
support for the use of force. In the next chapter, study 2 will look at how the likelihood of
success and the type of force can affect the way subjects perceive military force.
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CHAPTER 5.

DRONES AND MISSION FAILURE: HOW MUCH DOES
“SUCCESS MATTER”?

In the previous chapter, I showed how political goals and the type of force influenced the
way individuals perceive the use of military force by the United States. While these results are
interesting, there are other factors that can also affect public perception for military force. In this
study, I look specifically at likelihood of success and how the type of force and the likelihood of
success interact to affect people’s support for the use of force and risk perception surrounding
the use of force.
I find that participants provided information about a drone operation saw fewer risks
involved in using force and were more supportive of military force. I find this relationship even
as the likelihood of success declines: subjects given information about a drone operation saw the
military operation as less risky or were statistically indistinguishable from individuals who were
told that soldiers would carry out the military operation with a 90% chance for success. I find
similar results for support for the use of force. Individuals given information about a drone
operation, regardless of the likelihood of success, were largely more supportive of the use of
force or statistically indistinguishable from the group of individuals given information about
soldiers with the highest likelihood of success. In other words, despite a greater chance of failure,
participants perceived less risk associated with, and supported the use of force more with
drones.
This chapter discusses study 2. I will first discuss what I seek to accomplish with this
experiment. I will then turn to the demographic makeup of participants. Third, I will discuss the
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experimental procedure. Fourth, I will give the results of the experiment. I conclude the chapter
with a discussion of the results and questions for potential future study.

5.1

Study 2

The previous experiment looked at how political goals of a military operation and drones
affect the way people think about the use of force. If drones change the way people think about
military force, how strong is this effect? Can mentioning drones reduce other concerns, like the
chance for success? If the likelihood of success is low, then there is a greater chance that
engaging in that action will result in a waste of resources. If the likelihood of success is high,
then the odds of wasting resources is lower. The public prefers conflicts where success will
ensure a positive payoff from an investment (Eichenberg 2005, Nincic and Nincic 1995). If the
goal is legitimate, it may appear less risky, but what if the odds of success are nearly
nonexistent? If a mission is not likely to succeed, the risk of wasting resources increases.
Because likelihood of success affects risk perception, something drone use is said to mitigate, it
is included in this study.
Scholars have discussed the importance of the likelihood of success of a military
operation for years. Larson (1996) argues that for a military operation to receive backing, leaders
must not only minimize costs but also ensure a high likelihood of success. If an operation is
unsuccessful, it is still a waste of resources. However, if one can change those perceptions and
convince the public that a military operation is successful, then public support will remain high.
Feaver and Gelpi (1999) argue the public is willing to tolerate casualties if there is a high
likelihood of success. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) showed that even in long-term conflicts,
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those that thought the United States succeeded were more willing to incur costs. This leads to the
conclusion that perception of success is important to the public.
While these results point to the importance of success, much of this research deals with
conflicts already taking place. Less research exists on how the likelihood of success affects
individual willingness to support the onset of conflict. Despite this gap, one would expect a
similar effect when considering whether to begin a military operation. If the odds of success are
low, cetaris paribus, the public should prefer an alternative (Eichenberg 2005).
This calculation may differ with the addition of drones. Since drones lower the risk in
investment, how will that interact with the likelihood of success? Is the public willing to support
a mission that is less likely to succeed if they can invest less in the operation? Walsh (2015)
found that subjects were willing to take a chance on a scenario with a lower likelihood of success
if the operation mentioned the use of drones. Kreps and Wallace (2016) found different, but
related results. Arguments about the effectiveness of drones (their likelihood of achieving their
objective) were not as influential as other arguments, such as international law, for manipulating
support for the use of force. Study 1 also showed that individuals perceive fewer risks with
drones than soldiers, suggesting drones could offset some of the risk concerns associated with a
lower likelihood of success. These studies suggest that individuals may be more willing to use
force with drones because there is not as much risk involved.
Thus, type of force and likelihood of success are the two variables of interest in this
study. Unlike the previous study, I only use drones and soldiers to represent type of force in this
scenario. Study 1 confirmed previous findings by Eichenberg (2005), Larson (1996), Schneider
and MacDonald (2016), and Walsh and Schulzke (2015) that public support increases as the
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likelihood of incurring American casualties decreases by moving from soldiers further from the
battlefield. I therefore remove manned aircraft from this study because it is already understood
that drones and soldiers are the lowest and highest risk military options, respectively.
As stated in chapter 3, one would expect individuals given information about a military
operation with a low chance of success to support the operation less than individuals told that the
operation is likely to succeed, and that they will also see the operation as riskier than subjects
told that the operation will succeed. One would also expect to see individuals exposed to drone
stimuli perceive less risk involved in using force and support the use of force more than subjects
who receive information about soldiers (hypotheses 3 and 4).

5.2

Subjects

For this study, I recruited 600 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk).
About 50 individuals did not finish the survey, so I exclude their data. Contrary to most mTurk
data (Paolacci and Chandler 2014), my subject pool is two-thirds male. The youngest participant
is 19 while the oldest was 78; the average age was 38 (s.d.=11.5). Nearly four out of five (79%)
of subjects are white; 7% are African American; 5% are Hispanic American; 6% are Asian
American; less than 1% are Native American; and about 3% are Pacific Islander. Nearly three
quarters of the respondents (71%) had at least some post-secondary education. One-quarter of
respondents identified as Republicans; nearly half (49%) identified as Democrats; and the other
quarter of respondents identified as independents (23%) or other (2%). Just under half (44%) of
participants identified as liberal; one-fifth of respondents (19%) identified as moderate, and just
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over one-quarter (26%) identified as conservative. In terms of risk perception, subjects are
overwhelmingly risk averse (82%), measured by their total risk attitude score.43
Like the previous study, subjects had questions that determined whether they were paying
attention in the study. Unlike the previous experiment, only 16 subjects failed to pass both
manipulation checks. There are no significant changes in the demographic data, so I do not
repeat it here.

5.3

Experimental Design44

This study is a two (drones vs. soldiers) by three (90% success, 50% success, 30%
success) experimental design. This study is similar to the previous study, but there are three main
differences. First, study 2 has only one principle policy objective. I use only the counterterrorism
scenario here. I do not include a second principle policy objective because it is not a variable of
interest in this study. I use the counterterrorism scenario because it is the most realistic scenario
for drone use and a security scenario which most the public supports (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
2009). Second, I include information on the likelihood of success. Third I use only drones and
soldiers for type of force because I have already established that individuals perceive risk
differently whether they receive information on drones (low risk) or soldiers (high risk).
This experiment ran from February 1, 2017 to February 4, 2017. Subjects began this IRB
approved study by consenting to participate. They were then asked standard demographic
questions such as gender, age, political affiliation, race, and education level. Subjects were also
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The DOSPERT scale ranges in a total score from 30 (completely risk averse) to 210 (completely risk acceptant),
with a score of 120 being risk neutral. I coded subjects with a score of less than 120 as risk averse.
44
This study is on Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/54acf/.
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given the DOSPERT assessment developed by Blais and Weber (2006). After completing the
pre-test questionnaires, subjects read a scenario about a military operation in Yemen. The
scenario draws from Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009), Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013),
Walsh (2015), and Walsh and Schulzke (2015). I include information on the likelihood of
success based on the results of an experiment by Holt and Laury (2002).45

90% Likelihood of success

50% likelihood of success

Drones

Group 1 R O1 Y1 X1 O2

Group 3 R O1 Y1 X2 O2

Soldiers

Group 2 R O1 Y2 X1 O2

Group 4 R O1 Y2 X2 O2

30% likelihood of
success
Group 5 R O1 Y1
X3 O2
Group 6 R O1 Y2
X3 O2

R: Random noise
O: Observations (1-Pretest; 2-Posttest)
X: Likelihood of success (1-90%; 2-50%; 3-30%)
Y: Type of force (1-drones; 2-soldiers)
Table 3-Experimental Manipulations for Study 2
The scenario manipulates type of force and likelihood of success. I use the counterterrorism
scenario from study 1 but also includes information on success. The scenario is as follows:46
“Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out
military operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle
East. The government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist
organizations established bases in the North of the country. American intelligence
agencies have identified the location of the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States
plans to strike these bases with (missiles fired from drone aircraft/ground forces) to
kill terrorist leaders and cripple their operations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff has analyzed this plan. They estimate that there is a
(90%/50%/30%) chance that this attack will successfully degrade the terrorist group's
capabilities to continue operations against the United States.”

45
46

See chapter 3 for explanation on why I use Holt and Laury.
See appendix for full list of scenarios.
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After subjects read the scenario, subjected responded to the same posttest questions as the
previous study such as their support for the military operation, risk perception, perceived
likelihood of success, the importance of the action, and expected casualties.47 When subjects
finished the survey, subjects received information on the goal of the experiment and received a
code to enter on mTurk to receive payment for the survey. They were then thanked for their
time.

5.4
# of
Subjects
who were:

Results

Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment
1
2
3
4
5
6

X2

PR

Male

55

60

51

65

54

53

1.70

.89

Democrat

42

39

32

43

49

49

6.81

.24

Republican

27

16

25

23

20

25

6.99

.22

Independent

17

24

20

29

21

13

7.19

.21

At least
some postsecondary
education

57

71

53

68

73

64

8.77

.12

Table 4-Balance Checks for Study 2
The primary variables of interest in study 2 are again risk perception and support for the
use of force. I ran balance checks on all demographic variables to ensure that the data was not
skewed and found no evidence of unbalanced data. To test the robustness of the results, I ran
ANOVA, OLS, logit (where applicable), ordered logit, and pairwise comparison models. Results

47

See appendix for full list of questions.
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across all models were consistent; I therefore only report the ANOVA and pairwise comparison
results. The results follow the literature and previous findings on support for the use of force.
Subjects perceived drones as less risky. The likelihood of success also affected how subjects
perceived risk. Subjects exposed to the drone stimulus also supported the use of force at higher
levels than subjects in the soldier groups. Subjects provided information about a higher
likelihood of success were also more supportive of the use of force, but only to a point in the
groups exposed to the drone stimulus. Subjects expressed concerned about the possibility of
collateral damage more if presented information about drones. The likelihood of success affected
the perceived likelihood of success of military operations, but drone use did not. In addition,
individuals discussed concerns about the likelihood of success more in the soldier groups than
the drone groups in the support and risk perception follow-up questions.
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Figure 5-Average Support for the Use of Force and Risk Perception for Military Force
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5.4.1 Risk Perception

Figure 6-Pairwise Comparisons for Risk Perception for Study 2
The average response to this question was a 2.97 out of 4, meaning most subjects thought
this action was “somewhat risky.” Subjects exposed to the drone stimulus perceived the use of
force as less risky than subjects exposed to the soldier stimulus. In terms of an interaction
however, there is no statistical significance [F(1,2)=.95, p>.1]
When using pairwise comparison, the contrasts are noticeably different. Subjects given
information about a drone operation with a 90% chance for success saw the operation as slightly
less risky than a drone operation with a 50% chance for success (b=.24, p<.05). Subjects given
information on a drone operation with a 30% likelihood of success showed a statistical difference
compared with subjects in the drone group with a 90% likelihood of success (b=.31, p<.01).
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More important, there was no statistical difference between any of the drone groups and the
soldier group with a 90% likelihood of success: subjects given information on a drone
operation, no matter how likely it was that the operation would succeed, perceived as much
risk in a military operation as subjects given information about a ground invasion with a
90% chance for success. However, there were statistical differences between all three soldier
groups with varying likelihoods of success. Subjects given information about a drone operations
with a 90% chance for success perceived less risk than subjects told about a ground invasion that
had either a likelihood of success of 50% or 30%. Below a 90% chance for success, subjects
perceived less risk involved in sending drones than sending soldiers.
As stated in chapter 3, I also include open-ended follow-up questions to understand how
risk perceptions connect to support for military force. Just like study 1, subjects had follow-up
questions asking why they perceived the operation as risky or not risky. I grouped their responses
into 7 categories: no American casualties, too many American casualties, collateral damage
(civilian casualties), the likelihood of success (either positive or negative), general risk,
isolationism, or exceptionalism. I coded each answer based on what the primary concern of the
individual was, mostly what they mention first. For example, if an individual mentioned they
perceived low risk because there would be no American casualties, but there may be civilian
casualties, I marked their response as their greatest concern was American casualties. The only
time a subject’s first response was not coded was if they mention general risk first and then a
more specific concern second (if a subject said “all war is risky, and I am worried about
American casualties,” I would mark their concern about American casualties).
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Nearly one-quarter (24%) of subjects given information about drones described their
response as being directly related to the mentioning of drones. One subject in the drone group
with the highest likelihood of success stated, “We would be sending drones there anyway, so no
troops would be at risk.” Even in the scenarios with the lowest chance of success, subjects were
still not concerned with risk. Another subject in the drone group with the lowest likelihood of
success who rated the riskiness of this operation with the lowest possible rating stated that,
“Since drones were to be used, I don't think it would be very risky at all, (like using soldiers).”
Subjects in the soldier groups even suggested drones as an alternative. One individual in the
soldier group with the lowest chance of success who rated the mission as very risky stated, “they
shouldn’t use ground forces, just use drones then it would be less risky.”
Also like in study 1, there were concerns over collateral damage that increased the
perceived riskiness of the operation. Just over one quarter of subjects exposed to the drone
stimulus (28%) had reservations about drone use because of the risk of collateral damage. One
subject in the drone group with the lowest likelihood of success stated they thought the operation
was somewhat risky, “Because of the high probability of killing civilians.”48 Even subjects in the
drone group with the highest likelihood of success concerned themselves with this risk. One
subject in the drone group with the highest likelihood of success answered that the operation was
very risky because, “It might imperil civilians.” I created a dummy variable for those who
mentioned concern over collateral damage and ran a logit analysis testing the effect of
information about drones on whether or not subjects mentioned civilian casualties or other

48

The scenario did not mention likelihood of civilian casualties, just that the likelihood of success was 30%. This
subject appears to have equated the two.
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collateral damage. Subjects in the drone group were more concerned about the possibility of
collateral damage than subjects in the soldier groups (See appendix b=.75, p<.01).
Subjects given information about drones also mentioned the likelihood of success less
frequently than subjects given information about a ground force operation in the risk and support
follow-up questions. Nearly a third (31%) of all participants and a quarter (25%) of subjects in
presented information about drones concerned themselves with the likelihood of success as a
factor when considering the risk from using force. I created a second dummy variable for when
subjects mentioned the odds for success in the military operation and ran a logit regression.
There was an inverse relationship between subjects expressing concern about the likelihood of
success and exposure to the drone stimulus (see appendix, p<.05) in the risk follow-up study:
subjects voiced concern about the chance for success more often if provided information about a
military operation using soldiers.
Finally, there is a relationship between risk attitudes and risk perception. Across different
models, financial risk [F(1, 35], p<.01], health risk [F(1, 35), p<.05], and social risk [F(1,29)
p<.1]. None of the other categories, nor the overall risk score were significant in this study. This
last result about the relationship between risk attitudes and risk perceptions simply serves to
show that the DOSPERT scale is at least partially measuring what it is supposed to measure and
will not be discussed further in this chapter.
5.4.2 Support for Military Force
The average response was 3.2 out of 5, meaning that subjects on average supported the
use of force slightly more than opposed it. Subjects exposed to the drone stimulus supported the
use of force at higher levels than subjects exposed to the soldier stimulus. Likelihood of success
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also affected support. Support for military force decreased as the likelihood of success decreased.
However, there was no interactive effect overall between type of force and likelihood of success
[F(1,2)=.25, p>.1].
The results are interesting when using pairwise comparison. Subjects exposed to the
drone stimulus were less affected by the likelihood of success. Individuals told about a military
operation using drones with a 90% likelihood of success had the highest numbers for support.
Subjects exposed to the drone stimulus with a 50% chance of success and 30% chance of success
were statistically indistinguishable from each other. Subjects in the 50% likelihood of success
group who read about drones were also indistinguishable from the group told there was a 90%
chance for success using soldiers. Support for the use of force in the drone group with the lowest
success rate (30%) was indistinguishable from the soldier group with a 50% success rate and
only marginally different from the soldier group with the highest success rate (90%) (b=-.32,
p<.1).
Subjects were also asked to provide follow up responses on why they supported or
opposed the use of force. I grouped these answers into categories to make them easier to
understand: the operation uses drones/there will be no American casualties, concern there would
be too many American casualties, concern over collateral damage (civilian casualties,
destruction, escalation of conflict), concern about the likelihood of success (either positive or
negative), American exceptionalism (“our military is the strongest” type answers), isolationism,
or general risk associated with the use of force.
A small portion of the individuals who received the drone stimulus (9%) indicated that
they supported the use of force explicitly because the military was using drones. These
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individuals supported the use of force at the highest levels. One subject in the drone group with
50% likelihood of success summarized it as, “No obvious downside. Take out the terrorists and
reduce US exposure to attack.” Another individual in the drone group with the highest success
rate stated, “If there is little chance that our army [soldiers] will not be hurt I am for helping
other countries.”

Figure 7-Pairwise Comparisons for Support for Military Force for Study 2
Like study 1, a similar percentage (11%) of individuals exposed to the drone stimulus
said that they worried about collateral damage. Interestingly, some of these individuals still
supported the use of force, but most were neutral (neither support nor oppose) or did not support
the use of force. One individual in the drone group with the lowest success rate stated, “Drones
of death from the skies are bad and immoral...” another individual in the drone group with the
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highest success rate stated, “It will antagonize a group that is presently of little threat.” When
running a logit regression on the concern over collateral damage, subjects exposed to the drone
stimulus voiced this concern more than subjects told that soldiers would carry out the operation
(b=.93, p<.001) (see appendix).
There were also findings for the support follow-up question similar to the risk perception
result where subjects mentioned the chance for success. One-sixth of the entire participant pool
and 13% of subjects provided information about drones worried about the likelihood of success
as a reason for their support or opposition to using force. These subjects’ first considerations
were how likely it was that the operation would succeed. Similar to the risk perception followup, I created a dummy variable for when subjects mentions concerns over the likelihood of
success and ran a logit regression on this variable as a dependent variable and the type of force as
an independent variable. Again, there was an inverse relationship between expressing concern
about the likelihood of success and getting information about drones (see appendix, p<.05): the
primary concern of subjects exposed to the drone stimulus was not whether the operation would
succeed.

5.5

Discussion

The results provide evidence of the moral hazard problem. The most interesting finding
of this study is the effect of type of force on risk perception and support for using force despite
declining success: the likelihood of success appears to matter less when subjects read
information about drones. There was no difference in perceived riskiness for the use of force in
any of the groups where individuals received information about drones and the group that
received information about soldiers and a high likelihood of success. One subject summarized

108
this feeling, “It uses a drone so whether it succeeds or fails, nothing is lost;” another subject
stated “It's a drone stroke [strike] against an organization that already dislikes us. What do we
have to lose?” This suggests that hypothesis 3 (drones are perceived as less risky even when the
likelihood of success declined) is correct.
There were similar results in terms of support for the use of force. The fact that subjects
in the drone group with a 50% chance of success were indistinguishable from subjects in the
drone group with a 30% likelihood of success and also the soldier group with the highest
likelihood of success suggests that subjects care less about the likelihood of success and more
about what type of force the military used. This is further strengthened by this relationship being
found in the drone group with a 30% likelihood of success and that it was statistically
indistinguishable from the soldier group with 50% success and only marginally distinguishable
from the soldier group with a 90% success rate. This provides support for hypothesis 4.
This is in line with Walsh’s (2015) study on drones that showed similar findings when
subjects received information about the likelihood of success and drones. It is also similar to the
study by Kreps and Wallace (2016) which showed that military efficacy is not an effective
argument for reigning in actors who may be considering the use of military force using drones.
This is also in line with the theories of Singer (2009), Sauer and Schornig (2012), and Kaag and
Kreps (2014) that drones could lower the threshold for conflict because they worry less about the
outcome.
The results suggest that mentioning drones could partially mitigate concerns that could
arise from military operations. For example, subjects presented information about drones
mentioned concerns about collateral damage more than subjects given information about soldiers

109
in the follow-up questions, but it was for a small group of individuals. Subjects mostly supported
the use of force in general, regardless of the risks. This result appear to be in line with Kreps and
Wallace’s (2016) findings that civilian casualties (or in my case, collateral damage) could be
slightly more concerning when provided information about drones, but it is not something that
will stop an operation dead in its tracks.
This is further evidenced by the fact that subjects given information about drones
expressed concerns over the likelihood of success of the military operation less than subjects
given information about soldiers in follow-up responses to both perceived riskiness and support.
While this does not show that subjects are indifferent to military operations using drones, it
suggests that individuals could be less likely to concern themselves with whether the operation is
a success. In other words, it is possible that individuals provided information about drones do not
care about the operation as much as subjects told about a military operation using ground forces.
This could suggest that drones create a cavalier behavior concerning the use of force.
This might lead to the moral hazard problem discussed previously: if people do not incur costs
but reap the benefits of an action, are they more willing to use force, or at the very least, less
opposed to using force? Failure may no longer be a deterrent, and collateral damage does not
appear to be an intervening factor, meaning leaders could get away with engaging in multiple
failed military operations without repercussions from the public.
The results combine to paint an interesting picture about the moral hazard. First, subjects
perceive drones to be less risky than using soldiers, meaning they may see the use of force using
drones as more acceptable because the costs are so much lower. Second, subjects provided
information about drones less frequently mentioned concerns about the likelihood of success in
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follow-up responses, suggesting it was not as much of a concern for subjects given information
about drones. Only after asking directly about the likelihood of success did subjects express their
views about the chance for success in ways that one would expect to find based on the likelihood
of success provided to subjects in. Third, subjects supported the use of force more with drones
than soldiers, again, even as the likelihood of success declined. So, drones are less risky and
subjects are less concerned with the likelihood of success, leading them to support military force
more than using soldiers. It appears as though Kaag and Kreps’s (2014) argument that drones
could lead to a moral hazard problem is a strong possibility.
This could suggest to policymakers that highlighting the absence of risks with drone
warfare could make it easier to sell a military operation to the public. Since subjects provided
information about drones less frequently mentioned the likelihood of success in this study,
mentioning drone use in a military operation could reduce anxieties that the public has when
beginning a new military operation. However, this is just one study that looks at very specific
variables. A more comprehensive study that looks at other variables, such as civilian casualties,
may be of use to determine just how beneficial mentioning the type of force would be.

5.6

Gaps and Further Study

There are two primary gaps this study elicits. First, across studies 1 and 2, collateral
damage has been a concern for subjects presented information about drones. It appears
individuals are more concerned with this risk with drones. This is an interesting finding
considering that drones are likely more precise than other types of force.49 This finding deserves

49

See chapter 2
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further study, especially to determine how drone use is influenced by these other risks in conflict,
but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
More important, this study shows possible evidence of moral hazard, but it does not why
subjects think in this way. Do people become more risk acceptant when given information about
drones? Is there some sort of optimism bias that Schneider and MacDonald (2016) found? One
way to determine the answer is to determine if drones make individuals more risk acceptant, but
this study is not set up to determine if people are more risk acceptant when presented information
about drones. But with one simple change, it could be. If I moved the DOSPERT risk attitude
scale to measure attitudes post-stimulus, I could show that drones make people more risk
acceptant. This could provide additional evidence for the moral hazard problem by showing that
drones make individuals seek out riskier situations. I will explore this idea in the final
experiment.

5.7

Conclusion

Overall, this study provides more evidence that mentioning drones affects how
individuals perceive the use of force. Subjects supported the use of force more in drone groups
and saw the military operation as less risky. The likelihood of success affected subjects’
willingness to support military force, but that effect was considerably dampened in the drone
groups. Subjects in the drone group saw the risks associated with force as so low that they were
indistinguishable from subjects presented information about soldiers with a higher chance for
success. These results suggest moral hazard may be at play here, but it would also be helpful to
show why drones can make individuals more willing to engage in risky behavior. The next study
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seeks to answer this question by replicating this experiment with one major change to try to why
subjects behave differently when mentioning drones.
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CHAPTER 6.

RISK ACCEPTANCE AND OPTIMISM BIAS WITH
DRONES

The goal of this dissertation is to determine if drones can change the way people think
about military force. If so, the public could support a military operation using drones they would
not support using soldiers. Across two studies, I find that drones appear to make people think
differently about drones. Study 1 showed that subjects preferred drones to soldiers, and study 2
furthered this idea by showing that subjects prefer drones as much as, or more than soldiers, even
when the likelihood of success is lower for drones. The results suggest traditional constraints on
military force were less of a concern for individuals given information about drones, in line with
the theories of Sauer and Schornig (2012) and Singer (2009) that drones reduce the constraints
on using military force. Kaag and Kreps (2014) go further to say that drones create a moral
hazard problem. Because drones could appear less risky, people’s risk orientations shift in favor
of using force because they do not incur the consequences of a military strike.
However, the studies of this dissertation have not shown why this phenomenon occurs.
Do people become more risk acceptant? Do people overestimate the capabilities of drones? To
test these ideas about why individuals support military operations involving drones more, I
replicate and extend the results of Study 2 by moving the DOSPERT scale after exposure to the
stimulus. This strategy will allow me to look at two potential causes for the moral hazard: 1)
drones make individuals more risk acceptant (measured by using the DOSPERT scale poststimulus) or 2) people overestimate the capabilities of drones (measured using the perceived
likliehood of success dependent variable). I find that subjects consistently prefer drones and view
them as less risky, but exposure to the drone scenario does not make individuals more risk
acceptant, nor are the more confident that drones will succeed in their mission. Still, drones
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appear as less risky and receive more support than soldiers like in study 2, suggesting there is a
moral hazard issue. Rather than make people more risk acceptant or perceive drones as a surefire
way to use force, subjects may simply be willing to accept that drones lower risk involved with
using force.
This chapter discusses study 3. First, I discuss the rationale behind replicating experiment
2. Second, I summarize the research design and subject pool. Third, I report the results. I
conclude with a discussion of the results.

6.1

Study 3

Subjects in studies 1 and 2 showed a preference for using drones because they thought
that using drones was less risky than using soldiers.50 This effect was strong enough that
individuals in drone groups in study 2 supported the use of force as much as subjects in the
soldier group with the highest likelihood of success, or just slightly less. These studies show that
drones affect the way people perceive risk in conflict.
Specifically, these studies suggest that moral hazard may be at play. In both experiments,
subjects were more willing to support military force with drones because they saw the use of
drones as less risky. This is what one would expect to find in a case of moral hazard. Since the
risks associated with the use of force seem lower, subjects are not concerned with the costs of
military force (Kaag and Kreps 2014). Indeed, some individuals gave follow-up responses
indicating such perceptions with responses similar to, “what do we have to lose?”
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The main question left unanswered is why there is a moral hazard problem with drones.
Do drones change risk attitudes as Kaag and Kreps (2014) argue? Is it because drones appear
more likely to succeed? Schneider and MacDonald (2016) argue that individuals put too much
confidence in drones’ ability to successfully complete a military operation because they are less
risky, suggesting individuals may be more willing to engage in risky behavior because they
overestimate the capabilities of drones. Or, is there another factor affecting the way individuals
perceive risk associated with drone use? Rather than changing risk attitudes, are drones just
lowering the perceived risk involved in a military operation to levels considered acceptable?
Since there are fewer costs, is the public willing to support this specific operation only if there
are not additional costs?
To answer these questions, I replicate study 2 with one major change to get
measurements related to individuals’ willingness to take risks. If drones change risk attitudes,
this could be indicative that, when presented a situation that uses drones, the public may be more
willing to support riskier uses of force. I use the domain specific risk taking (DOSPERT) scale to
get pretest indications of risk tendencies in studies 1 and 2, but this data does not tell me if
drones change those behaviors. To determine if drones change risk perceptions, I rerun study 2,
but move the DOSPERT scale post-manipulation so that subjects take it after exposure to the
stimulus rather than before. Comparing these results between groups (drones vs. soldiers) will
tell me if drones change risk perceptions associated with using military force.
Study 3 replicates study 2 in every way except that subjects take the risk assessment after
the hypothetical military scenario and answering questions related to it. By moving the risk
assessment after the post-stimulus questions, I can test my hypothesis about whether drones
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change risk attitudes about military force. Since experiments allow me to randomize who is part
of each group, subjects should vary in risk attitudes across all groups. If I find a noticeable
difference in risk attitude in individuals in the drone groups compared to the soldier groups, it is
likely that drones changed the risk attitudes of subjects.
The other new variable I look at here is the likelihood of success. Unreported results from
studies 1 and 251 showed individuals provided information about drones did not perceive the
likelihood of success differently based on the type of force, but in study 2, subjects less
frequently mentioned concerns over the likelihood of success. This suggests that there may be
some link to a difference in concern about success when using drones. The scenarios in study 2
lend themselves better to testing this variable than study 1 scenarios since study 2 discussed the
likelihood of success. If drones have an associated optimism bias, then the likelihood of success
provided in the scenario should matter less for drones than for soldiers. I test this as a competing
hypothesis against the DOSPERT hypothesis.
In addition to these new tests, I will also retest the variables from study 2 to provide
robustness to the previous results. Replicating study 2 will strengthen my argument that drones
influence support for the use of force. By increasing the number of subjects, I can determine if
these effects were random error or if drones influence individual perceptions.

6.2

Subjects

I recruited 600 individuals to take part in this study. After dropping incomplete tests, there
were 568 individuals. Over half (52%) of subjects were male, the rest female. Slightly more than
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one-quarter (27%) considered themselves Republican; about half (49%) considered themselves
Democrats; a little more than one-fifth (21%) considered themselves independent; the rest did
not know or considered themselves as other (3%). Half (50%) considered themselves liberal;
one-fifth (22%) considered themselves moderate; and the rest (28%) considered themselves
conservative. Almost three-quarters (75%) of subjects had at least some college education. Fourfifths of the subject population (81%) were white; the next highest numbers were African
American (6%), Hispanic American (5%), Asian American (5%), Native American or Pacific
Islander (1%), or other/ multiple races (1%). Like the previous studies, I removed individuals
who did not pass the manipulation check questions, which left me with 543 subjects. The
demographic makeup did not change, so I do not report the new demographics here.

6.3

Experimental Design

The scenarios for study 3 are the same as the scenarios from study 2,52 so I do not discuss
the scenarios again here. The difference lies in in the structure of the study. Subjects began by
consenting to participate before answering standard demographic questions (political affiliation,
gender, age, etc.). Subjects were then presented the scenario from study 2 about a
counterterrorism operation in Yemen with soldiers or drones, with varying levels of success
(90%, 50%, or 30%). Following the scenario, subjects were asked the same follow up questions
asked in studies 1 and 2 about their support for the use of force, perceived risk, perceived chance
of success, etc. After answering these questions, subjects took the DOSPERT test to determine
risk attitudes towards various types of risk. Since some of the DOSPERT measurements captured
the relationship between risk aversion and risk perception in the first two studies, it is likely that
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it will at least partially capture attitudes in study 3. In addition, if drones make individuals more
willing to take risks in military operations, it could make them more willing to make risky
decisions in their personal lives, something the DOSPERT scale would capture. At the end of the
study, subjects learned of the true intention of the experiment and received a code for mTurk.

6.4
# of group
that is

Results

Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment
1
2
3
4
5
6

X2

PR

Male

51

57

49

37

42

45

10.56

.06

Republican

20

31

24

22

29

25

3.40

.64

Democrat

43

49

47

45

42

56

1.01

.96

Independent

22

29

24

26

19

28

2.03

.85

At least
some postsecondary
education

70

89

77

72

78

89

2.07

.84

Table 5-Balance Checks for Study 3
I first ran balance checks and found there was balance across all groups, though gender
was significant at the .1 level. To ensure that gender did not influence the results, I ran
regressions both with and without controlling gender and found it did not make a difference.
Therefore, I do not include the models that controlled for gender in the results discussed here.
Like previous experiments, I ran OLS, logit, ordered logit, ANOVA and pairwise comparison
models to confirm the robustness of the results. Findings among different regression models
were mostly consistent for each variable, so I report ANOVA results. The primary tests in this
study are whether drones change risk attitudes and whether individuals perceive drones as more
successful. Drones did not affect change risk attitudes of subjects, nor did subjects appear overly
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optimistic about the likelihood of success of drones. There are also secondary results related to
replicating previous study findings from studies 1 and 2. I found many consistent results, though
there were differences.
6.4.1 Risk Attitude Score

Figure 8-Average DOSPERT Scores by Group for Study 3
The interaction between type of force and the likelihood of success was not significant in
determining overall risk attitude [F(1, 2)= .58, p>.1], nor individual groups for risk attitude.
When comparing the groups to each other, the results suggest few differences. Using pairwise
comparison, I find that differences between groups are largely insignificant, save a difference in
risk score between the drone group with a 50% likelihood of success and the soldier group with a
90% likelihood of success. Subjects in the drone group with a 50% likelihood of success had risk
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scores about 9 points higher than subjects in the soldier group with a 90% chance for success.
Subjects in the drone group with a 50% chance for success also scored about 6 points higher on
the scale than subjects in the soldier group with a 30% chance for success. The lack of other
significant results points to a possibility these results may be a spurious coincidence due to the
random sample involved in the study, though it could also suggest that because the scenario
mentions drones, there may be a willingness to take a risk with a lower likelihood of success
because of the perceived risklessness of drones. Further study will help determine if this result is
consistent or spurious.
When breaking the overall risk score into different types of risks, mentioning drones only
affected one type of risk: health risk. Again, subjects in the drone group with a 50% likelihood of
success scored about 3.5 points higher than subjects in the soldier group with a 90% chance for
success on the health risk scale (b=3.59, p<.001). Subjects in the drone group with a 30% chance
for success also scored slightly higher than the soldier group with a 90% chance for success
(p<.05). However, this may not indicate anything, since subjects in the soldier group with a 50%
chance of success group scored higher than subjects in the soldier group with a 90% chance of
success group. This could show that individuals who are more willing to take health risks don’t
care as much about the chance for success, or it could again be a spurious result.
6.4.2 Perceived Success
Similar to the previous experiments, the interaction of type of force and likelihood of
success again is not significant [F(1,2)= .40, p>.1]. Post-estimation comparison of the groups
shows there is no statistical difference between groups with similar chances for success.
However, in post-hoc analysis, like study 2, subjects in the drone groups mentioned the
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likelihood of success less than subjects in the soldier group in the risk follow-up question (b=.38, p<.05), but not the support follow-up.
6.4.3 Replication Results

Figure 9-Average Support for the Use of Force and Risk Perception for Study 3
In addition to the primary variables of interest, I reran regressions from study 2 to check
previous results. Many results follow the previous study, but there are differences. Figure 9
shows a comparison of risk perception and support for military force. Like study 2, this shows
that drones consistently have lower perceived risk and higher support for the use of force. In the
scenarios where the likelihood of success was either 50% or 90%, subjects in the drone groups
had higher levels of support and lower levels of risk. In the groups with a 30% likelihood of
success, neither group showed higher support for military force than they perceived the risk of
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the military operation, but subjects in the drone group with the 30% likelihood of success
supported the use of force at higher levels and saw less risk associated with the use of force than
subjects in the soldier group.
6.4.3.1 Risk Perception
Risk perception was the same as in the previous study. The interaction of type of force
and likelihood of success was not significant [F(1,2)=1.29, p>.1]. Comparing the drone and
soldier groups across similar likelihoods of success, subject in the drone groups always saw the
use of force as less risky than using soldiers (drone-90% vs. soldier-90%-b=-.55, p<.0001;
drone-50% vs. soldier-50%-b=-.43, p<.05; drone-30% vs. soldier-30%-b= -.29, p<.01). Subjects
in the drone group with a 50% chance for success also perceived less risk than subjects in the
soldier group with a 90% chance for success (b=.27, p<.05), and there was no statistical
difference in risk perception between subjects presented information about a drone operation
with a 30% chance for success and subjects presented information about a soldier operation with
a 90% chance for success.
For follow up questions, I did the same post-hoc analysis mentioned in both study 1 and
study 2, grouping subject answers into the same categories as the previous studies: no American
casualties, too many American casualties, excess damage (civilian casualties, escalation, etc.),
likelihood of success, general risk, isolation, and exceptionalism (America has the most powerful
military). Like the previous studies, if subjects mentioned multiple concerns, I took the first thing
they mentioned as their greatest concern. The only time subjects’ first answer was not recorded
was if it was something about general risk (“war is risky”). At that point, I took their second
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response instead (“war is risky and there will be too much destruction” would be coded as
collateral damage rather than general risk).
Nearly one third (30%) of subjects presented information about drones said the operation was not
risky because there was no risk to Americans. Another quarter (22%) said that they thought the
mission was risky because of the possibility of collateral damage. I ran logit analysis on a
collateral damage dummy variable like study 2 and found that individuals in the drone groups
mentioned this as a concern more than subjects in the soldier groups (b=.43, p<.1).

Figure 10-Pairwise Comparisons of Risk Perception for Study 3
6.4.3.2 Support for Military Force
Similar to the second study, the interaction between drones and type of force was
insignificant [F(1, 2)=.32, p>.1]. In terms of post estimation comparisons, there was still no
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statistical difference between the drone group with a 50% chance for success and soldier group
with a 90% chance for success. There was a noticeable difference between the drone and soldier
groups with a 50% chance for success: subjects supported the use of force more when provided
information about drones (b=.37, p<.05), the only group where there was a difference in support
across types of force with the same chance for success.

Figure 11-Pairwise Comparisons for Support for the Use of Force for Study 3

I also ran post-hoc analyses on the support follow up question (“please tell me why you
do/do not support the use of force). I coded the responses in the same manner as the previous two
studies: because there would not be American casualties , there would be too many American
casualties, there would be excess damage (in the form of civilian casualties, escalating a conflict,
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increasing the number of terrorists, etc.), the likelihood of success, general disapproval, general
approval, isolationism (“we should worry about our own country”), assisting an ally (“Yemen
asked for our help”), and security (“we must destroy terrorism”). I also coded answers based on
the procedure I used in the previous studies. If there was explicit mention of one of these
reasons, I would code it accordingly (something like “Our security is the most important thing”).
If there were multiple reasons given, I assumed that the first thing that a subject mentioned was
the most important in their mind, coded it as such. If someone gave an answer about a general
approval/disapproval but then gave a more specific reason, I coded the specific reason. If a
subject said, “all war is risky and there could be a lot of American deaths,” I coded the response
as too many American casualties.
Almost 10% of subjects provided information about drones said they supported using
drones because soldiers were not at risk. This difference is statistically significant level (b=3.23,
p<.01). A smaller percentage of individuals (7%) provided information about drones more
frequently cited concerns over the possibility of collateral damage than individuals provided
information about soldiers. Still mentioning drones led to a statistical difference between groups
on this variable (b=.65, p<.1). There was no statistical difference between types of force and any
other response.

6.5

Discussion

The results of this experiment find that the reason individuals fall prey to the moral
hazard problem is still unidentified. Results from this study suggest that drones do not change
underlying risk tendencies. When considering overall risk aversion, drones do not appear to
make people risk acceptant. Yet the sample, while convenient, is not representative. Because of
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this, I could be oversampling individuals in ways that could adversely affect the results. The lack
of a representative sample could be why some of the results showed significance while others
that would be expected to show significance did not. This is not to say that this result is wrong;
rather, it is inconclusive. Further study will determine the real effect of the type of force on risk
attitude, but initial results suggest that drones affecting risk attitudes is not the cause of the moral
hazard problem seen here, suggesting hypothesis 6 is incorrect.
Perhaps the DOSPERT scale is not the best measurement of risk attitudes towards using
force. Previous studies suggested that the DOSPERT scale captured at least some of the data I
sought to capture, but across three experiments, it was not consistent, suggesting that it may not
be the best measurement for this topic. I chose the DOSPERT scale because it is one of the most
comprehensive risk attitude scales available, but it still does not measure the risk attitudes this
study looks at.
Schneider and MacDonald’s (2016) finding that individuals perceive drones with an optimism
bias is also missing. Subjects did not perceive drones to be more successful than ground forces,
though those provided information about drones appeared more cavalier about the likelihood of
success in some of their follow-up responses. These results suggest that individuals in the study
are being manipulated by the experimental manipulation, mostly in an expected fashion.
Changing information about the likelihood of success does change subject perceptions of the
likelihood of success, confirming the work by Eichenberg (2005) and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
(2009). The results provide evidence that hypothesis 5 is incorrect. However, similar to study 2,
subjects in the drone groups mentioned concerns about the likelihood of success less than
subjects in the soldier groups when asked to explain their rationale for perceived riskiness of the
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military operation. As stated in the previous chapter, perhaps this is indicative that subjects do
not necessarily think drones are more likely to successfully complete a mission, but that they are
less likely to worry about this when considering how much they support using force. Despite not
identifying the mechanism that is causing moral hazard, the results have potentially reduced the
number of possible causes for future testing.
Besides the main variables of interest, this study provided replication data for study 2,
strengthening many of the findings. The fact that the drone group with a 50% likelihood of
success appeared less risky than the soldier group with a 90% likelihood of success and the lack
of difference in risk perception with the drone group with a 30% chance for success and the
soldier group with a 90% chance for success gives more credence to the idea that drones lower
the perception of risk compared to conventional types of force.
Support for military force was also similar, though across equal chance for success, only
one scenario was significant in this study. The drone group with a 50% likelihood for success
had more support than the soldier group at a significant level; the other two comparisons (30%
vs. 30% and 90% vs 90%) were not statistically distinguishable. This diverges from the previous
study in which the drone variable consistently outscored the soldier variable. However, this may
be due to the different subject pools. As stated previously, the pool was not representative;
Mechanical Turk is not representative (Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema 2012, Paolacci and
Chandler 2014). This subject pool appears to have been more strongly influenced by the
likelihood of success variable than the previous group when considering support for the use of
force.
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Subjects in the drone group were more concerned about excess damage than subjects in
the soldier group when asked follow-up questions for both risk perception and support. This is
the third time in three studies where I found this to be the case. However, like the other studies,
the number of individuals expressing these opinions was low, and mentioning concern about
collateral damage to the risk follow-up study did not necessarily transfer into a decrease of
support. Still, because this appears to be a common theme in all three studies, it is worth
pursuing further in future research.
These results, like study 2, point to the possibility of moral hazard. Since subjects given
information about drones saw less risk, less frequently mentioned concerns over the likelihood of
success in the risk follow-up question, and supports force more, it is possible that moral hazard is
an issue here. Yet, the results were not as strong as study 2. The likelihood of success was a
stronger intervening variable in this study than study 2, suggesting further replication may be
useful.
The replication results strengthen the argument that policymakers could use drones to
garner more support for military operations. These results suggest that leaders could have more
room to intervene with military forces if they use drones where it is feasible to do so. This serves
two purposes. First, it limits the threat to one’s own forces, meaning that individuals who oppose
war because of the possibility for casualties have fewer arguments against such military
operations. Second, if the operation is not immediately successful, the public also has less to
complain about because there are fewer risks involved in using drones.
Still, it may be useful to consider other factors as well. Subjects in this study mentioned
concerns about the likelihood of success more than the previous experiment, and subjects also
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expressed concerns about collateral damage. It may be useful for policymakers to understand
which frame will be most beneficial for them in order to get the most support. This points to the
possibility that moral hazard is possible, but that other factors could mitigate some of these
effect. However, as stated previously, the effect of these other variables appears minimal. Even
with these other concerns, when the likelihood of success is low, shifting emphasis away from
success towards the low risk involved in a military operation could persuade individuals to
support the operation more than emphasizing another variable.

6.6

Gaps and Further Study

There are two gaps that highlight some issues with this study. These results suggest that
the narrative provided did not make subjects change their minds, but psychology suggests that
framing matters. As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed in their classic experiment, changing
the script may change the way people approach their decisions on using military force. Kreps and
Wallace (2016) showed this in their study. Subjects were more attuned to some arguments than
others based on who provided the information and what they said. A follow-up experiment could
look at ways in which different framing of the same information influences risk attitudes, similar
to Kreps and Wallace (2016).
Additionally, the DOSPERT scale may not be able to measure risk attitudes about military
force as accurately as other scales. The DOSPERT scale in previous studies showed some
relationship between risk attitudes and risk perceptions, but this was less pronounced in study 3.
The DOSPERT scale is used to measure general risk attitudes, but it is not clear how these attitudes
relate to support for military force. There is some link, but it was not necessarily consistent across
all three studies. Creating another scale specifically for military support for the use of force may
provide more benefit than the DOSPERT scale for this type of experiment.
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6.7

Conclusion

Study 3 suggests that public may not become more risk acceptant when using drones, nor
were subjects perceiving drones as more likely to succeed. Subjects in this study appeared to be
more affected by the likelihood of success variable than the drone variable, suggesting that
drones influence individual decisions but may not negate other factors. Still, these results appear
to confirm many of the results from the previous studies about risk perception and support for the
use of force with drones.
These results, combined with the results of studies 1 and 2, suggest that understanding the
consequences of using drones could be pivotal to maintaining stability in international politics.
Drones lower risk and increase support, but these studies show that the effects are not unlimited.
The next chapter will discuss the importance of the results of this study, as well as the other
studies, in the context of policy implications.
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CHAPTER 7.

HOW DOES BEING “PRONE TO DRONE” AFFECT
POLICY?

The results of the experiments suggest that drones lower the perceived risk of engaging in
a conflict. Across three experiments, subjects saw the use of drones as less risky compared to
other types of force. Subjects who perceived a lower amount of risk also showed higher numbers
for support, suggesting a relationship between risk and support for military force. Further, the
results show that moral hazard is a plausible concern: subjects thought that drone use was less
risky and they were less likely to mention concerns about the likelihood of success in studies 2
and 3, and they supported the use of force at higher levels, suggesting that the lower risk led to
an increased willingness to use force.
These results have practical implications for policymakers. Drone use has both positive
and negative implications. If the public constrains military operations because they are wary of
incurring large costs, but drones reduce these costs, what is left constraining policymakers? This
could allow leaders to use military force in more situations. In some cases, this could be
beneficial for preventing humanitarian crises. In other cases, authoritarian leaders could use
drones to maintain a tight hold on their people, meaning drones could create just as many
problems as they solve.
What is the solution? If people prefer drones because they see drones as riskless, the
easiest solution is to increase the risk associated with using drones. This can be done with both
institutional and social constraints. Using binding agreements or new behaviors to create
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consequences for bad behavior could decrease indiscriminate use of drones, allowing
policymakers to mitigate potentially harmful effects of drones in the international system.
This is a particularly important time for these discussions as both state and non-state
actors acquire and use drones. States are developing technology to enhance drone capabilities
and allow drones to operate in denied airspace, increasing the drone threat significantly. At the
same time, non-state actors are figuring out how to use commercial drones to achieve their goals
as well. Drones give every actor an ability to exert more influence while incurring fewer costs
for doing so.
The experiments also highlight new research questions that deserve further attention. For
example, why did subjects exposed to the drone stimuli concern themselves with collateral
damage more than subjects given information about using soldiers? If drones make it easier to
use military force, does that mean they also make it easier to withdraw from protracted conflicts?
These questions require further study.
This chapter discusses the implications of this research project and where to go from
here. Part one will summarize the findings of the experiments and discuss how these results put
previous studies in context. Part two will discuss the results in terms of drone research. Part three
will discuss policy implications and recommendations. Part four will discuss next generation
technology and how this technology will change things moving forward. Part five will discuss
some future research projects based on the results from these studies. I conclude with some final
thoughts on drones and how technology can influence international relations.
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7.1

Experimental Findings

7.1.1 Study 1
Study 1 showed that subjects prefer certain types of military operations and that drones
can increase support for some operations more than others. Subjects presented information about
drones saw their use as less risky and supported the use of force at higher levels. Some subjects
connected their rationale to the explicit mention of drones because they perceived drones to
lower risks associated with the use of force. Yet, not all subjects felt this way. A small number of
subjects expressed concerns about collateral damage when presented information about drones,
suggesting drones reduced some risks associated with using force, but that subjects simply
shifted concerns to another type of risk in the form of too much destruction or civilian casualties.
Still, the majority of individuals did not have these concerns, suggesting the risklessness of
drones makes it easier to support conflict.
7.1.2 Study 2
In study 2, subjects presented information about drones showed higher support and lower
perceived risk for a military operation than subjects presented information about soldiers. This
again demonstrates the type of force is important when determining support for military
operations. Like the previous study, some subjects had reservations about drones because they
worried about the possibility of civilian casualties.
Study 2 introduced the likelihood of success into considerations for support for military
force. Subjects reacted as expected to the differing likelihoods of success: as success went up,
support increased and risk perception decreased, but the results were different for those given
information about drones. For risk perception, the drone groups, even with lower chances for
success, were indistinguishable from the soldier group with the highest chance of success.
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Subjects in the drone group with either a 50% chance of success or 30% chance of success were
indistinguishable from subjects in the soldier group with a 90% chance for success. Across a
similar likelihood of success, subjects given information about drones always saw the military
operation as less risky than subjects given information about soldiers.
Across similar chances for success, subjects exposed to the drone stimulus always
supported the use of force more than subjects exposed to the soldier stimulus. Subjects in the
drone group with a 30% chance for success supported the use of force less than subjects in the
soldier group with a 90% likelihood of success, though it was only marginally significant;
subjects in the drone group with a 50% likelihood of success were indistinguishable from the
soldier group with 90% chance for success in their support for the use of force.
Study 2, like study 1, had some subjects who expressed concerns about variables other
than traditional cost like American casualties, like collateral damage. However, this study also
showed that subjects may care less about success if a military operation is not as risky. In the
follow up questions for risk perception and support, subjects given information on drones
mentioned the likelihood of success less than subjects given information about soldiers,
providing additional evidence for this possibility. What this may suggest is that some people will
simply shift cost concerns for conflict, but drones also reduce some of the major concerns
involved in conflict, like whether or not the likelihood of success matters since risk is perceived
as so low. This suggests that moral hazard may occur with drones. Subjects saw less risk and
were less concerned with the likelihood of success when given information about drones, and
also supported the use of force more, even as the likelihood of success declined. This did not
occur when subjects received information about ground forces.
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7.1.3 Study 3
Using feedback from studies 1 and 2, I created study 3. The goal of study 3 was to
determine why subjects gave the responses they did. Do drones make individuals more risk
acceptant? Do they create a false optimism? Is there another reason? Study 3 replicated study 2
with few changes: the risk attitude (DOSPERT) scale moved from pre-stimulus to post-stimulus
and also I focused more on if the type of force affected the perceived likelihood of success. The
goal of this experiment was to evaluate if drones makes subjects more risk acceptant or whether
drones create a false sense of optimism because individuals could perceive drones as a panacea.
Subjects provided information about drones did not have a higher overall risk acceptance
after exposure to the scenario, nor did they experience higher risk acceptance in the more
specific categories of risk. In addition, study 3 confirmed previous unreported results that the
type of force did not affect the perception of the likelihood of success, but the likelihood of
success presented in the scenario did. The same results from follow up questions suggested the
opposite: subjects in the drone groups concerned themselves with the likelihood of success of the
operation less than subjects in the soldier groups when asked to explain their feelings in follow
up responses to the risk perception question. What this may show is that subjects are not overly
optimistic, but that they are less likely to worry about the possibility of success when using
drones.
The study was also used to replicate study 2 models. The results from the experiment are
consistent with the previous two studies. Once again, subjects perceived less risk involved with
drones and supported drones more than soldiers. With risk perception, the findings were
stronger. Across all comparable likelihoods of success, drones were consistently perceived as
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less risky. In addition, subjects in the drone group with a 50% likelihood of success saw military
force as less risky than subjects in the soldier group with a 90% likelihood of success. Again,
there was no statistical difference between the perception of risk for subjects in the drone group
with a 30% likelihood of success and the soldier group with a 90% likelihood of success. This
again suggests that the moral hazard problem could be occurring.
However, this did not necessarily translate into a higher level of support. The muted
results show the limits of mentioning drones. Like the previous studies, some subjects concerned
themselves with factors beyond the possibility of American casualties. The likelihood of success
had more of an impact in this study than the previous study. Between groups with the same
chance of success, there was no difference between the drone stimulus and soldier stimulus
except in the groups where there was a 50-50 chance for success. The concerns from the
previous studies were also consistent: a small number of subjects exposed to the drone stimulus
were more concerned with collateral damage than subjects in the soldier group.

7.2

General Discussion

The most important conclusion from the research is that people perceive drones as less
risky than other types of military force. Researchers assumed this was true, but to this point no
study attempted to make this explicit connection (Shelby 2017). Drones lower the perceived risk
to an acceptable level to make individuals more supportive of military force. The public could
support more military operations that in they may not have supported in the past. Since drones do
not have that associated risk, the public is more supportive of, or at least indifferent to, military
force if Americans do not die. These findings highlight the causal mechanism behind Horowitz’s
(2016) study: because drones limit soldier exposure to danger, they appear less risky and receive
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more support than using soldiers. This also helps to decipher the importance of using drones in
Walsh and Schulzke’s (2015) project using principle policy objectives. The authors did not
measure risk, but using my study of principle policy objectives shows that individuals perceive
drones as the least risky option, followed by manned aircraft, and soldiers. With similar results,
one could infer that the risk perception in the authors’ study may have followed the same
trajectory as I found, meaning that principle policy objectives are a good way to measure risk,
but drones can mitigate some concerns associated with less preferable principle policy
objectives.
Another finding highlighted from the follow-up unprompted responses showed that the
likelihood of success was not the primary concern for individuals in the drone group. This lack
of concern may due to the lower risk associated with drones: because there is less risk involved
with drones, people do not care as much if drones fail. This finding provides context to Kreps
and Wallace’s (2016) study on arguments that influence support for drones. The efficacy
argument was not an effective tool to dissuade individuals from supporting drone strikes because
the risk is lower. Perhaps efficacy did not resonate because individuals who prefer drones are
less concerned with failure.
Because drones have less risk associated to attacking forces with their use, there could be
a moral hazard problem. Kaag and Kreps (2014) and Singer (2009) posit that the lower risk
profile of drones could make them more appealing to the public, even in situations where the
public would traditionally prefer to stay out of conflict. However, these experiements did not
determine how drones create moral hazard. Drones do not make individuals more willing to
accept risk, nor do they have an optimism bias associated with their use, suggesting something
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else makes individuals fall prey to the moral hazard. Perhaps it is just that drones are “riskless”
and that is enough for individuals to be persuaded about using force.
While moral hazard may occur, it appears there could be a limit to how much support the
public is willing to give. Both the principle policy objective and the likelihood of success came
up in follow-up, unprompted responses. Some individuals thought that using drones was
acceptable and thus expressed an opinion that suggested they were only supporting the use of
force because they were given information about drones. Other subjects suggested that drone use
was unacceptable for the same reason, arguing that drones created more risks and costs than they
were worth. These subjects expressed more concern about excess damage than some of the drone
literature would suggest (Singer 2009). This is an interesting finding considering there was no
mention of the potential for civilian casualties or excessive damage in the scenarios.
The idea that individuals may concern themselves with risks other than those
conventionally considered in conflict may be best summarized by the work of ethicists who write
on the importance of future drone use. Some argue that drones, with their ability to reduce risks
to soldiers that use them while maintaining precision capability, could make a smaller imprint on
society while maintaining military operations to ensure security, meaning leaders should use
drones more than other types of force (Gross 2014, Sparrow 2013). However, this does not mean
that actors should use drones without considering the consequences of their use. Rather,
researchers suggest that actors should take extra precautions when considering the use of force
by ensuring the least amount of damage (True 2015). Because states (or actors) can use military
force without concern for their own forces, they must concern themselves with mitigating

139
damage (Beier 2003, Kahn 2002). This ensures that the best possible post-operation outcome
will occur, even if a military must use force (Emmerson 2013, Issacharoff and Pildes 2015).
Subjects may have thought, consciously or unconsciously, about the use of force in a
similar manner. The first concern is to mitigate the risks associated with their own military
forces. Since the risks in terms of Americans dying is non-existent, they can then turn their
attention to other risks (Druck 2012). The follow-up responses suggested this. Many individuals
worried about collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties, U.S. “image” abroad, or the
possibility that drone strikes could facilitate terrorist recruitment.
This is in line with the findings by Davis et al (2014), Sayler (2014), and Stohl, Brooks,
and Abizaid (2015) that concluded that drones, in their current state, are not revolutionary
because the costs shift from concerns over soldiers to concern over other types of destruction.
These findings also strengthen Walsh (2015) who found that when subjects did not have to
concern themselves with American casualties were more affected by the possibility of civilian
casualties in a drone operation. Kreps (2014) found similar results that individuals expressed
greater concern when exposed to international humanitarian law (civilian casualties) arguments
about drone operations. This is all despite the fact that drone use can lower civilian casualty rates
more than other forms of military force.53 The results are also in line with Kreps and Wallace
(2016) who found that even when subjects do not concern themselves with the civilian casualty
argument (one that many subjects in my study mentioned), individuals mentioned that using
drones created problems other than explicit destruction such as norm and institutional violation.
Kreps and Wallace’s experiment only used scenarios with drones and not other types of force,
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but coupled with the results of this experiment, they suggest that some individuals might shift the
risks of military force to more intangible concerns.
These results should be caveated however. This analysis is the result of open-ended
follow-up responses that provide limited information, and the majority of subjects exposed to the
drone stimulus did not throw out collateral damage as a primary concern. The primary goal of
this project was to show that drones reduce the perceived risk surrounding the use of force. The
follow-up responses sought to elicit understanding of why individuals felt the way they did, not
necessarily show that drone use may be limited by other types of risks and costs associated with
using force. Nevertheless, the results are interesting and merit further study. This will be
discussed further below.

7.3

Implications for Policymakers

With these considerations in mind, I now turn to what these results could mean for
policymakers. Based on these results, discussing drones could increase support for a
policymaker’s decision to use military force. In certain cases, using drones could help
policymakers sell a military operation to the public. In other cases, using drones may not be of
much value. Drones are not a panacea for all world crises. Overuse or improper use reduces their
effectiveness as a way to garner public support. People like drones because they are low-cost. If
the cost of using drones increases, they lose their appeal and policymakers lose their ability to
leverage drones to institute their policies.
7.3.1 What Do the Experiments Tell Policymakers?
I begin with what these results tell policymakers about the benefits of using drones. First,
referencing drones may help garner support for a costly military operation. Policymakers could
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rely on the qualities of drones that make them more politically tenable: the lower cost associated
with their use. By emphasizing the low risk to Americans, policymakers could tip the scales in
favor of supporting the use of military force, or at least make individuals less likely to oppose its
use.
President Obama employed this strategy and highlighted the lower risk to American
soldiers when using drones when discussing military operations. He emphasized the role of risk
in a 2013 speech at National Defense University on the use of drones,
“Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their
territory, the primary alternative to targeted lethal action would be the use of
conventional military options. As I’ve already said, even small special operations carry
enormous risks. The results would be more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more
confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such
raids that could easily escalate into new wars.” (Obama 2013a)
Because counterinsurgency operations are costly, it makes sense to use drones to replace soldiers
where applicable, and polling numbers suggest that the public largely favors this strategy (Plaw,
Fricker, and Colon 2016, Pew Research Center 2015).
This means that leaders could use drones to intervene in places where the United States
would otherwise not intervene (Oren 2014, Singer 2015). Because drones have less risk involved
in their use, the United States could use drones to provide military assistance to prevent or
mitigate a genocide or to oust a dictatorial leader. The public may not back a full-blown
invasion, but the lack of “boots on the ground” may sway the public to support a conflict they
would not normally support.
However, it is prudent to mention the double-edged nature of the risklessness of drones.
As stated above, drones could allow the United States to intervene in humanitarian crises more
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frequently because they are less risky, but authoritarian leaders could just as easily employ
drones to maintain power over their civilian populations (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016).
Dictators could see drones as completely riskless and use them accordingly. Rather than rely on
keeping a group of elites happy, dictators could further consolidate power in the hands of a
smaller contingent of elites and rely on drones to maintain their hold on a state.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has been known to drop chemical weapons on his own
people (Goldman 2017); if he could use drones with chemical weapons, it is possible he could
attempt to use them to maintain a hold on the people of Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan was recently granted more power in the government and is using his power to crack
down on opposition groups he deems as extremists, including the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)
(Farooq 2017). In July 2017, Turkey utilized its own drone to conduct a strike that killed five
members of the PKK (Sarjibrahimoglu 2017), and is now touting their use as effective
counterterrorism tools (Daily Sabah 2017). Drones allow Erdogan to more easily target
opposition than he could have in the past, suggesting this is not a problem of if or when, but of
how much authoritarians are willing to use drones.
Additionally, the risklessness of drones means that most, if not all actors will seek to use
drones. According to the New America Foundation (Bergen et al 2017), 89 states have drones as
of early 2017. Fewer states have armed drones, but the numbers are higher than expected.
Twenty-eight state actors have armed drones, two-thirds of which acquired them since
2013. While the United States is far and away the most frequent user of drone strikes, other
countries will likely use them more frequently in the future. Of the 28 countries that have
combat-capable drones, nine countries have engaged in strikes (Bergen et al 2017).
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The semi-anonymity of using drones also creates problems. The United States maintains
access control on its drones, but other countries like Israel and China do not. Israel currently
controls the largest share of drone exports at 41% and China continues to sell platforms in the
Middle East and Africa, even selling some weaponized platforms (Bergen et al 2017). If country
X bought its drones from China, it may be difficult to determine if China carried out a strike or
country X did. This could encourage leaders to be “prone to drone”; if a military can use a drone
to reduce risk to soldiers and also carry out a task without attribution, they may be more willing
to carry out indiscriminate acts of violence. This could prove especially problematic with hobbygrade drones. The Iraqi Federal Police are use the same drones as the Islamic State of Iraq and
Ash Sham (ISIS) and are employing the same tactics (Sullivan 2017). While there are ways to
differentiate Iraqi Federal Police drones from ISIS drones, ISIS could easily modify their drones
to look the same, making it difficult to separate friend from foe.
The issue of terrorists using drones is another cause for concern. Some groups like
Hizbollah have access to state-level technology via Iran, but others use commercially available
technology (Bergen et al 2017). In terms of the commercially available drones, ISIS appears to
take the most advantage of these platforms. Videos released on social media by ISIS show the
group dropping bombs from drones on oppositions forces.54 The bombs do not appear to be
accurate nor particularly destructive, but drones allow ISIS to engage in operations without
putting their fighters at risk. If terrorist groups could imitate these tactics within the United
States, it would create mass panic and cause havoc for emergency responders (Hennigan 2017).
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This is such a large concern, that the U.S. military is giving researchers a $700 million boost to
fund counter-drone systems (Schmitt 2017).
7.3.2 What Don’t the Experiments Tell Policymakers?
I now turn to what these results do not suggest to policymakers. Most importantly, drones
are not a panacea for security issues. As Stohl, Brooks, and Abizaid (2015) and Miller (2012)
discuss, drones are a good tactical weapon, but they are not strategic weapons. Using drones
limits risks that pilots could incur, but it also limits how the United States can respond to security
threats. Drones cannot win the “hearts and minds” of a people; all they can do is kill (Blair
2011). The satirical news site, the Onion describes the absurdity of utilizing drones for noncombat roles with its description of the “Griever” drone,
“the Griever’s highly advanced onboard computing systems allow it to declare tender
reassurances with pinpoint accuracy, having proven capable of isolating a sobbing widow
within a crowd of sympathizers and unleashing a barrage of comforting words to the
appropriate residence, hospital, or mosque during her time of need.” 55
While a leader could intervene in a conflict using drones, they will be hard pressed to accomplish
significant goals without winning public support. Even if their intentions are good, refusing to
put troops on the ground potentially further destabilizes a region experiencing instability
(Hudson, Owens, and Flannes 2011).
Combining this information with cost-benefit analysis suggests that individuals would
initially support the use of force, but if the conflict continued for a long period of time, the public
would likely disapprove of the conflict. If the public eventually disapproves of the conflict, the
same characteristics of drones that made intervention less risky also makes it easier to disengage.
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While their experiment did not mention drones, Miller and Barber (2016) showed that subjects in
an experiment were likely to continue investing in a failing conflict if they were told there were
soldiers fighting in-country, but if subjects read that the United States only provided financial
backing, they were more likely to support withdrawal. If drones are perceived as resources akin
to financial backing, the public could prefer to end a military operation midstream if they
disapprove of the way the United States handles the situation. This highlights the idea that the
public could be just as unwilling to support drones for a long-term conflict for similar reasons
that they do not want to put soldiers in a conflict zone.
Second, drones have largely seen combat only against terrorists in an area that is hostile
to ground troops. Since terrorists mostly do not have the ability to shoot drones out of the sky,
drones operate largely unimpeded in the air. This has led to people overestimating the
capabilities of current drone technology (Schneider and MacDonald 2016). Drones, in their
current state, developed as a counterterrorism tool and likely could not operate in the same
manner in territory with anti-air defenses (Braun 2015, Davis et al 2014). Combat capable drones
are easily detectable and ill-equipped to handle anti-air defenses. Part of the persistence
capability that allows drones to stalk terrorist groups also makes them vulnerable to anti-aircraft
defenses. Most current drones are not made to be stealthy or to outrun defenses, meaning they
are detectable using radar. Drones like the Predator evolved for persistent flight, not high-speed
evasion. Drones may have a few missiles to protect themselves, but these missiles are not made
to address the air defense threat. Researchers are currently looking for ways to address these
deficiencies (Georgia Tech Research Institute 2017), but as of this dissertation, no such
capabilities exist.
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An example of this lack of capability occurred in the early days of military operations in
Afghanistan. In 2002, a Predator drone was conducting routine surveillance when the Taliban
government (still in power) detected it using radar and sent up a plane to intercept the drone. It
took the plane a few fly-bys to locate the drone, but it was eventually found and shot down
(Whittle 2014). This event showed leaders that drones have a long way to go before they are
useful in a hostile airspace. Even though no Americans died it is important to highlight the fact
that in this situation the drone cost the United States more than any benefit it provided. If the
United States continued to operate in this airspace and continued to lose drones, it would likely
reflect poorly on those in charge because the public would question why so many drones were
failing to complete their mission. Just because drones have fewer risks does not mean they are
riskless (Davis et al 2014). Miller and Barber (2016) showed that individuals prefer to avoid
sending resources to a combat zone if they fail to make the security situation better. The United
States would lose a few million dollars every time a drone went down, and they may not even
accomplish their objective. The United States public would likely stop supporting drone use
where they keep getting shot down without accomplishing their objective.
This highlights the fact that drones do not neutralize the effects of all costs involved in
military operations. Across all three studies, subjects given information about drones expressed
concern for civilian casualties more than subjects provided information about soldiers. Walsh
(2015) and Kreps and Wallace (2016) also showed that other factors can influence individual
decisions to support, suggesting drone use does not comepletely negate other factors. Since
drones do not negate these risks completely, there are fewer risks using drones, but the public
still perceives some risk. Civilian casualties, excess destruction, escalation, or even damaging a
state’s “image” could have negative impacts on the United States’ ability to exert influence in the
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international system. Therefore, there may be significant advantages in gaining insight into how
to minimize these other costs of military operations by ensuring precision and adhering to
international law.
Drones could also create an international incident if two actors perceive drone use
differently. One example of how drone use could cause an incident to escalate is on HBO’s show
about a foreign policy situation in which the United States attempts to intervene after a military
coup in Pakistan called The Brink. In one episode, two inept U.S. pilots shoot down an Indian
drone by mistake in Pakistani airspace, causing an international incident. India believes Pakistan
shot down their drone, and threatens military retaliation during a period of intense standoff
where Pakistan is considering nuclear war. The United States eventually admits fault to deescalate the situation, but it highlights one problem with perceptions: while some actors may not
view the destruction of a drone as a hostile action, others do. In contested areas of the world,
such as the Kashmir region between India and Pakistan, it is possible that an actor views
shooting down a drone as a hostile act of war (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016).
This is not just a comedic skit on a TV show. Japan and China have been fighting over
small Islands in the South China Sea known as the Senkaku or Daiyou Islands. Both states have
sent aircraft over the islands to lay territorial claim. China sends drones to conduct surveillance
over the islands. Japan responds by sending manned fighters to intercept the drones, threatening
to shoot them down. While the situation de-escalates without incident, China has in the past
threatened Japan by stating that it would consider any shoot down of its drones as an act of war
(BBC 2013). The security situation in East Asia has always been tense, and use of drones could

148
escalate tensions in the region if there is a disconnect in how two actors view their drones (Boyle
2014).
Perceptions about drones are both useful and dangerous. They can be politically
beneficial for policymakers to gain support for a military operation for which they may not
otherwise have public support, but those perceptions could also backfire when considering how
other actors use drones. Now that smaller actors have access to drones, they are more of a threat
that deserves more attention. In addition, drones are not useful in places where there are active
air defenses, meaning their use, at least currently, remains efficacious only in counterterrorism
scenarios. Finally, perceptions about drones could vary wildly. If two actors have differing
opinions about the importance of their drones, there could be an international incident because of
the different ways individuals perceive the importance of their drone platforms. Thus, while
drones may appear riskless, there are still many ways in which drones could be considered risky
despite their characteristics that makes them more appealing to the public. These are just some of
the issues that arise from a perception of riskless technology. In the next section, I discuss how to
possibly mitigate the perceived risklessness to maintain international stability despite increased
drone use.

7.4

Policy Opportunities

New technology in warfare has always sought to create an advantage in fighting. From
the spear to the gun to the plane, increasing the distance between a military force and its
opponents always increases military capability. Drones are no different in this respect. The
difference lies in the significant drop in risk when using force. As stated in chapter 2, drones
allow smaller actors a larger voice in the international system. Whether that actor is a weaker
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state like North Korea (Mizokami 2016a, 2016c) or a non-state actor with global aspirations like
ISIS (Bergen et al 2017), drones can send a powerful message to actors like the United States.
Even if drones do not drastically increase the amount of danger for Americans, the threat of
attacks from drones could have far-reaching implications for the United States (Horowitz, Kreps,
and Fuhrmann 2016).
With this in mind, how does one reduce the threat of a riskless weapon? The answer is
simple: increase the cost of using such a weapon. If drones are appealing because they reduce
risk, increasing risk would likely mitigate their use (Davis et al 2014, Stohl, Brooks, and Abizaid
2015). This idea of increasing the risk is not new. China’s strategy for addressing a nuclear threat
uses this concept. China has a second-strike policy with nuclear warheads. Their goal is to make
another state’s potential use of a nuclear warhead so costly that other states will not consider a
nuclear strike. Because China essentially guarantees that a state will incur a massive cost, states
see a nuclear option against China as very risky (Fravel and Medeiros 2010).
The United States has a similar policy for cyber-attacks against the homeland. In 2012,
while speaking at a conference on cyber security, Harold Koh, then legal adviser for the State
Department, presented his case, arguing that,
“A State’s national right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, may
be triggered by computer network activities that amount to an armed attack or imminent
threat thereof. As the United States affirmed in its 2011 International Strategy for
Cyberspace, “when warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in
cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country.” (Borgen 2012).
Cyber security is a realm where actors may perceive the use of force as less risky than other
types of military action, but by affirming that the military views a conventional military response
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an acceptable response to a cyber-attack, the United States has signaled that an unconventional
attack could be costly (Nakashima 2012).
The same principle could apply for drones by creating formal institutions or creating new
norms surrounding military force and drones. In terms of institutional restrictions, there is one
primary argument that scholars suggest for the United States: increase the amount of public
information about that the public has about an issue (Odugbemi and Lee 2011, Peruzzotti 2011).
In other words, scholars suggest transparency in the drone program (Zenko and Kreps 2014).
Drones may have fewer costs, but there are still costs (Davis et al 2014, Stohler, Brooks, and
Abizaid 2014). Ensuring the public has this knowledge is critical if the public must make
informed decision. Multiple scholars such as Warrior (2015), Benjamin (2013), and Kaag and
Kreps (2014) have suggested increased transparency for drones as a means to constrain leaders
from using drones indiscriminately. Plaw, Fricker, and Colon (2016) summarize the reasoning
behind providing information on drones to the public,
“Americans need to be better informed about this program.…the important arguments in
this debate are not easily assembled or, in some cases, understood. They relate to
different areas of policy and are discussed and debated in different public and private
forums. They appear in popular and scholarly literature, court cases and legal opinions,
news reports, and documentaries, among others. In some cases the language and concepts
used can be technical, as in legal briefs, or scholarly articles on the ethics of autonomous
weapon systems. Given the covert nature of most operations, public information is very
limited. By consequence, assessment must rely on partial information and a degree of
speculation, and it is not always obvious what is or is not plausible given what is known.
Given these difficulties, it is perhaps not surprising that so many Americans report that
they are not well informed about the drone program. Yet given the stakes of what is being
done, and for Americans what is being done in their name, it is crucial that the public be
informed. This is especially true in a liberal democracy like the United States where the
fundamental basis for political legitimacy is popular consent. The people cannot be said
to consent to a policy of which they are ignorant.” (2).
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If the public is poorly informed on drone strikes, the United States could fall into a state of
cavalier behavior with drones, but if they are informed, they can constrain policymakers from
indiscriminately using drones (Peruzotti 2011).
The studies in this dissertation appear to provide evidence for this. The information, or
lack thereof, presented in the scenarios influenced how subjects decided to support or oppose the
use of force. If subjects received information that the likelihood of success was high, they
supported the use of force at higher levels than subjects told that the likelihood of success was
low. The absence of information also affected the way subjects responded. I did not mention the
possibility of civilian casualties in any study, yet some subjects mentioned the concern over
civilian casualties as one reason they did not support the use of force. If subjects received this
information, they would have had a fuller picture of the situation and would have had more
information from which to draw before choosing to support or oppose the use of force. Kreps
and Wallace’s (2016) study showed similar effects. By manipulating what information they
provided subjects in their study, they were able to create arguments that were more or less
effective for changing opinions.
Transparency also assists in signaling to enemy actors that the United States could
respond to a drone attack with military force, assuming there is a policy that states this. If the
public receives specific information on when the United States uses drones or considers their use
against the United States as an act of aggression, then leaders may have to address the event
(Tomz 2007). If other states know that the United States will react a certain way and that leaders
will likely have to respond to an attack from a drone, then it may act as a deterrent against an
adversary considering a drone strike in the United States.
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Still, transparency has limits. The drone program is covert, and the United States does not
release much information about the program due to security concerns. This does not mean that
the United States cannot disclose certain aspects of their drone policy. The public does not need
to know specifics about individual operations, but it would be useful to discuss the procedures
that drone pilots follow to conduct a drone strike (Byman 2013). President Obama, in an effort to
be more transparent about U.S. drone policy, released some information relating to how the
United States determines they can use drones for a kinetic strike. According to what is publicly
available about U.S. drone strike policy, drones must ensure 1) they are targeting the right
individual, 2) capture is not a viable option, and 3) that civilian casualties are minimal (DeYoung
2016, Obama 2013b).
The United States cannot divulge everything about the drone program, but increasing the
amount of publicly available information about the program will better inform them about
whether they should support drone use. One way to ensure this transparency, scholars argue, is to
ensure that the military decides when to engage in kinetic strikes with drones (Holewinski 2015,
Warrior 2015, True 2015, Zenko 2013). The military has oversight not only from the Executive
Branch, but also from the Legislative Branch. Because of this, scholars argue that Congress can
serve as an extra check on drone use and ensure that the United States does not increasingly
engage in risky conflict or military operations. This information will help the public determine
whether drone strikes are in line with their personal values and whether they should support a
leader who advocates for these strikes.
In addition to formal institutions, the United States could also unilaterally abide by
certain procedures when engaging an actor with drones in order to establish a new norm that
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limits drone use. This has occurred repeatedly in the international system and can be a powerful
mechanism to affect change. Mitchell (2002) showed that liberal norms can diffuse to all states
in the international system, including to non-democratic regimes by showing that all states have
increasingly sought third-party arbitration for a dispute rather than use military force. These
liberal norms were not universally accepted, but if the number of actors that follow these norms
increases, it becomes harder to be an outlier.
Raymond et al (2014) call this normative innovation. The authors describe normative
innovation as a way to change a behavior on a specific issue through changing the norms
surrounding it. Since combat capabilities of drones are relatively new, there are opportunities to
create new norms. Any states beginning to weaponize drones will look to how other states have
used them (Zenko and Kreps 2014). As the leader in combat uses of drones, the United States is
in a unique situation where they can establish informal ways drone use is allowable because of
their influence in the international system.
Once actors internalize these norms, it becomes more difficult to go against the grain. If
an actor uses drones in ways that are out of sync with the rest of the world, the United States
(and other actors) could utilize “naming and shaming” to reign in renegade actors’ use of drones
(Htun and Weldon 2012). While this action intends to embarrass a state, it could lead to real
institutional consequences, such as sanctions, official condemnation, or even humanitarian
intervention.
Two U.S. Presidents have established precedent for drone use. President Bush began a
drone policy during the nascent stage of combat capable drones. The United States went through
different stages of drone use and learned there are different ways, some better than others, to use
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drones. Through trial and error, the United States discovered a workable policy for drone use.
President Obama expanded this policy and made it a central tenet of his foreign policy strategy,
but he wanted to ensure there were regulations on using force. He created some transparency
with the drone program. While the transparency policy is institutional, the act of creating it is
normative. Through this behavior, the United States could shape global drone policy (Zenko
2013).
Evidence suggests this a useful path forward. Other actors have followed U.S. behaviors
with drones. British Parliament began to more fully investigate drone strike policy in 2015
(United Kingdom Parliament 2016). China has since 2013 contemplated their use of drones to
carry out strikes and have considered U.S. policy as precedent in their decision to use drones
(Burgers and Romaniuk 2016, Perlez 2013). The more this norm gets internalized, the more
difficult it becomes for other actors to go against this norm without repercussions (Elster 1989,
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). As more states use drone strikes to achieve military goals, they
will grapple with policies surrounding their use both domestically and abroad. If the United
States continues to establish clear standards for drone use, it will make it more difficult for other
states to act in ways that diverge from the already established norms.
To reiterate, the idea is to increase the consequences of using drones so there is
accountability (Stohl, Brooks, and Abizaid 2015). The primary advantage of public opinion in
democratic societies is its ability to hold leaders accountable (Baum 2004, Odugbemi and Lee
2011, Peruzzotti 2011). The public must have as much information on a topic as possible to
make educated decisions about whom they support (Taber and Young 2011). Increasing
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transparency and creating additional oversight, according to scholars, could help create this
accountability and could deter policymakers from making quick decisions about using drones.
To summarize, accountability increases the risk involved with using drones. Drones have
fewer risks involved in their use, but by increasing accountability, leaders must carefully choose
how they use drones. If leaders disregard these risks, it could cost them, so they may think twice
about using drones in a way that goes against established norms and institutions.

7.5

Looking Ahead: The Next Generation of Drones and Their Implications

These issues are important to address while there is only a perception of risklessness.
Post-2001, the United States modified drones to fight a specific mission: counterterrorism
(Whittle 2014). They are not as capable in state vs. state conflicts with their current capabilities
(Schneider and MacDonald 2016, Davis et al 2014), but in the coming decades, drones will
likely become more riskless. These second-generation drones will likely mitigate the factors that
inhibit current generation drones from being more useful for state-level conflicts. For example,
putting further distance between one’s troops and the enemy is the primary advantage of using
drones. A few years ago, the United States and Great Britain had a monopoly on high-tech drone
systems that allowed soldiers to control drones from half a world away by using satellites to
extend the control signal for the drone. Other states could allow standoff for their drone pilots,
but they were still within a few hundred miles. Now, states like China can control drones via
satellite (Lin and Singer 2017, Maughan 2015), and they are exporting their technology to other
states that will level the international playing field by giving less powerful states more capability
to challenge traditional powers (Bergen et al 2017).
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Researchers are also starting to construct drones with technology to help them operate in
denied airspace. If the problem is being detected or shot down, the solutions are to reduce
visibility or evade enemy defenses. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles, the designation given to
second-generation drones, will have these characteristics. Researchers are developing drones that
operate at hypersonic speeds, maintain a low radar profile (stealth), or operate autonomously to
defeat anti-air defensive measures (Brannen 2014, Dahm 2015). Most of the major powers of the
world are developing this technology including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia,
China, India, and the European Union (Biddle 2012, Lin and Singer 2017, Jha 2015 Reed 2013,
Saurav 2015, Tarantola 2013).
These considerations are important when thinking about how second-generation drones
will change warfare. If drones can use stealth technology to fly undetected in enemy airspace,
then drones get closer to riskless warfare, as many people already see them in counterterrorism
missions (Braun 2015, Dahm 2015, Kaag and Kreps 2014). Drones are currently limited to
counterterrorism campaigns and likely will remain as such in the foreseeable future, but it is
prudent to understand how leaders could perceive their capabilities once drones reach that
second generation phase.

7.6

Gaps and Future Research

This dissertation answered some questions about the link between drones and risk, but the
results of the studies also created additional questions. These questions look at how drones can
change the way the public thinks about force. First, subject concern over collateral damage raises
some questions. Although none of the experiments mentioned collateral damage, subjects
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exposed to the drone stimulus more often showed concern for collateral damage than subjects
exposed to the soldier stimuli. This was consistent across three studies.
Because of this consistency, a new study could look at collateral damage, in the form of
civilian casualties, more closely. Both Kreps (2014) and Walsh (2015) have found that concern
over civilian casualties reduces support for the use of force, but Kreps’s study did not vary the
type of force, Walsh’s study did not separate the explicit potential for American casualties from
the possibility of civilian casualties, and neither measured risk perceptions about the use of force.
To address these issues, one could run an experiment modeled on Walsh’s experiment, but could
correct some of the shortcomings by not explicitly mentioning American deaths and controlling
for success and civilian casualties. This also presents a follow-up question for Kreps and Wallace
(2016): do drones themselves influence the efficacy of the excess destruction argument? The
authors did not compare different types of force, so they could not determine if individuals are
more receptive to concerns of civilian casualties and excess destruction with drones compared to
other types of force, but this is an interesting question that would require further research.
A second study could look at how support for drone use changes when those controlling
the drones are not exempt from the effects of fighting. As the Washington Post reports, drone
pilots flying missions stare at computer screens for up to 12 hours per day. They collect valuable
intelligence information, but they also must sometimes be passive witnesses to horrible atrocities
such as beheadings and rape (Jaffe 2017). In addition, drone pilots must endure the aftermath of
the strikes they initiate. This affects pilots’ mental health. Studies of drone pilots found the pilots
experience higher rates of burnout, post-traumatic stress, and clinical distress than manned
aircraft pilots (Medea 2013, Ortega Jr. 2013, Tvaryanas et al 2006). Drone pilots can experience
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serious distress that can lead them to quit or engage in self-destructive behavior (McCaskill
2015). If this information was well-known by the public, it could persuade individuals that
believe drones are riskless that drone use has consequences. If there are consequences for the
drone pilots, the public may be more concerned about using drones with more frequency.
Third, many authors have discussed the implications of drones for the democratic peace
(Kaag and Kreps 2014, Sauer and Schornig 2012, Singer 2009), but no one has tested its
implications in a controlled environment. My pilot study (Shelby 2013) attempted to do this by
looking at public support for military strikes (using drones or special forces) to take out a
terrorist leader in a democracy (France) or non-democracy (Russia).56 I found not only that the
regime type was insignificant, but also that subjects preferred the use of special forces in this
case rather than a drone strike. However, some variables could have affected perceptions in that
study. For example, the raid that killed Osama bin Laden was still fresh in the public’s mind.
Media outlets discussed the idea that President Obama used special forces rather than a drone
strike to make sure Osama bin Laden was dead (Gans Jr. 2012). This story was widely reported
and could have affected the way subjects in the study perceived drones. The experiment also
looked more at one specific incident in which the goal was to take out a high-ranking terrorist
leader in a high-stakes operation rather than engage in multiple strikes, which may have made a
difference as well.
Still, researchers should not overlook the importance of studying democratic peace.
Democratic peace theory suggests that democracies do not engage other democracies because

56

I chose these countries because of their similar military and economic strength, because they were in the same region
of the world, and because Americans’ favorability of these countries showed the closest amount of support for the two
countries (Shelby 2013).
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they know that military action is too costly to provide much benefit unless necessary. In essence,
the main driver of DPT is risk (Gartzke 2007, Kant 1983, Doyle 1997, Russett 1993) and drones
reduce this risk (Kaag and Kreps 2014, Sauer and Schornig 2012, Singer 2009), so how do
drones affect individual willingness of individuals in democracies to attack other democracies
with drones?
Another aspect of the pilot study made it different than this study: the implicit mention of
unilateral action against an actor in another sovereign nation. In the pilot study, I did not mention
that France nor Russia knew the operation was taking place. Many individuals in the study raised
this concern in their follow-up answers about sovereignty and unilateral action and chose not to
support the use of force. Based on the conclusions of Page and Bouton (2006), this would make
sense: spreading the cost to other actors would make things the use of force more palatable
because the risks associated with using force a spread out among partners.
The experiments in this dissertation all controlled for multilateral cooperation, but what
happens if the scenario is a unilateral U.S. military operation instead? The scenarios in these
studies controlled for this issue by describing Yemen as requesting help. The experiments
showed evidence of a possible moral hazard when the U.S. ally was on board with the military
action. The scenarios describe Yemen as a complicit partner in the operation placates concerns
about how Yemen would react to U.S. intervention without the consent of the Yemeni
government, something that was a major concern in my pilot study (Shelby 2013). To test
whether individuals think that drones are riskless, each study could be run again without
mentioning that Yemen is an ally and that they were requesting assistance. If individuals were
not concerned with the risks of military force when using drones, they should show similar levels
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of support for military force whether the United States engages in unilateral or multilateral
action.
Finally, how do individuals perceive commitment in long-term conflicts using drones?
Subjects may be more willing to get involved in conflicts using drones because they perceive the
level of risk involved to be minimal, but if the risk increases somehow, they may be wary of
continued support. The longer a conflict continues, the more difficult it becomes to justify
continuing the conflict since the risk of receiving fewer benefits increases over time. Once that
point has passed, the public may prefer staying out other states’ affairs, or withdrawing
completely if there is already a presence in-country. There is research to suggest that the public
may think in this way. Miller and Barber (2016) asked subjects about a hypothetical “failing”
military operations. Subjects were either told the United States invested soldiers on the ground or
just financial backing. Subjects preferred to cut their losses and withdraw from a military
operation if they were part of the group that mentioned that the United states only invested
money. While this experiment did not look at how using drones or soldiers would make people
consider continuing their support for military force, it showed that individuals whose only had to
concern themselves with non-human resources preferred withdrawal rather than continued
support for a failing conflict.
The results suggest that individuals were more willing to withdraw from a conflict in
which they did not feel invested. If true, this presents an interesting problem for drones. Results
from my studies suggest that drones are preferable because there is a lower investment in a
conflict. While this allows individuals the ability to engage in conflict they may otherwise avoid,
does it also mean that the public is more willing to cut its losses in a drone campaign because the

161
investment keeping the military tied to an operation is low? If the United States does not have to
invest much in a conflict when using drones, what is keeping them attached to see the whole
military operation through? The public may be more “prone to drone,” but are they also “prone
to drone and then go home?”

7.7

Final Thoughts

The original research question in this dissertation was, “How could drones influence
perceptions about military force?” The answer is that drones appear to make individuals more
“prone to drone” because people perceive drones as less risky than using soldiers, but that does
not mean there are no risks involved in using them. People can also be more concerned with nontraditional concerns about conflict.
This problem will not go away. The technology surrounding drones is improving all the
time and allowing the population at least the ability to use complex machines without issue.
These findings illustrate some of the challenges that the 21st century presents with emerging
technology. This research provides information on how a technology perceived as less risky
could change perceptions about when to use military force. Actors will have the same issues with
unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned maritime vehicles, but this risklessness problem may
also present itself in new technologies that have not yet been conceived or are in nascent stages
of development. For example, there is concern over the possibility that an actor could create a
biological weapon that only targets specific individuals but not others, in a discriminatory
manner using gene editing. Artificial intelligence enhances an actor’s ability to carry out tasks
and make decisions; it could also someday operate machinery without human input, giving us the
ability to create robot soldiers that can make their own decisions (Clapper 2016).

162
Understanding how drones create a riskless warfare perception will help researchers
understand how technology changes perceptions of warfare and how policymakers could
mitigate new challenges arising from perceived riskless warfare. The potential issues
surrounding drones provide justification for policymakers to consider ways to mitigate these
issues before they become a major problem. Creating institutional and normative constraints
could assist in mitigation by making it more difficult for leaders both domestically and
internationally to use drones indiscriminately, and ultimately, make the international system
more stable. These issues will only increase as technology improves. Understanding its
implications now could save the international system in the long run.
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APPENDIX A-DOMAIN-SPECIFIC RISK ATTITUDE (DOSPERT) SCALE

Domain Specific Risk Response (Blais and Weber 2006)-comprehensive risk scale (may be
in a random order)
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the
described activity or behavior if you were to ﬁnd yourself in that situation. Provide a rating from
Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely, using the following scale:

1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. (S)
2. Going camping in the wilderness. (R)
3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (F)
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F)
5. Drinking heavily at a social function. (H/S)
6. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. (E)
7. Disagreeing with an authority ﬁgure on a major issue. (S)
8. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. (F)
9. Having an affair with a married man/woman. (E)
10. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. (E)
11. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. (R)
12. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F)
13. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring. (R)
14. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (F)
15. Engaging in unprotected sex. (H/S)
16. Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else. (E)
17. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S)
18. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (F)
19. Taking a skydiving class. (R)
20. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S)
21. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one. (S)
22. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. (S)
23. Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S)
24. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. (R)
25. Piloting a small plane. (R)
26. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town. (H/S)
27. Moving to a city far away from your extended family. (S)
28. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. (S)
29. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand. (E)
30. Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200. (E)
Note. E = Ethical, F = Financial, H/S = Health/Safety, R = Recreational, and S = Social
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APPENDIX B-PRE-STIMULUS QUESTIONS

Pre-stimulus questions (these questions will be in a random order)
Demographic Questions
What is your gender? (Walsh and Schulzke 2015)
Male
Female
Prefer not to answer
In what year were you born? (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; Walsh and Schulzke 2015)
(open-ended)
What is the last grade or degree that you completed in school? (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
2009)
0 None, or grade 1-8
1 High school incomplete (grades 9-11)
2 High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate)
3 Associate’s Degree; Business, technical, or vocational school AFTER high school
4 Some college, no 4-year degree
5 College graduate (B.S., B.A. or other 4-year degree)
6 Post-graduate or professional schooling or degree after college (e.g., Master's degree, Pd.D.; law
or medical school)
What racial or ethnic category best describes you? (Walsh and Schulzke 2015)
1 White/Caucasian
2 African American
3 Hispanic
4 Asian
5 Native American
6 Pacific Islander
8 Other or multiple categories
How would you describe your views on political matters? (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009)
1 Very liberal
2 Somewhat liberal
3 Moderate
4 Somewhat conservative
5 Very conservative
6 Other-SPECIFY
8 Don’t know
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Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as being closer to the Democratic Party or the
Republican Party? (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009)
1 Strongly Republican
2 Leaning Republican
3 Independent
4 Leaning Democrat
5 Strongly Democrat
6 Other-SPECIFY
7 No preference
8 Don’t know
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APPENDIX C- POST-STIMULUS QUESTIONS

Post-Stimulus Questions
(ANES/Walsh and Schulzke 2015)
Yes, I would support this attack plan.
No, I would not support this attack plan.
How strongly do you support or oppose this plan? (American National Election Survey)
Strongly support
Somewhat support
Neither support nor oppose
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
Please explain why you feel this way in one or two sentences. (Shelby 2013)
How likely is it that the attack plan will succeed? (Walsh and Schulzke 2015)
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Somewhat unlikely
Very unlikely
What is your best guess of the number of American soldiers that would be killed or injured
if the attack were carried out? (Walsh and Schulzke 2015)
None (1)
Between 1 and 10 soldiers (2)
Between 11 and 100 soldiers (3)
More than 100 soldiers (4)
Please tell me how risky you think this attack plan is. (Charness, Gneezy, and Imas 2013)
Very risky
Somewhat risky
Not very risky
Not at all risky
Please explain why you think this attack plan is or is not risky. (Shelby 2013)
The United States faces many challenges today, at home as well as overseas. Among these
challenges, how important do you think it is to address the problems discussed in the news
story you read earlier? (Walsh and Schulzke 2015)
Very important (1)
Somewhat important (2)
Neither important nor unimportant (3)
Somewhat unimportant (4)
Not very important (5)
Please answer this questions with the word yellow. What color does not appear on the
Russian flag? (all studies)
Orange
Green
Purple
Yellow
Black
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APPENDIX D-STUDY 1 SCENARIOS

Appendix D-Study 1 Scenarios
General scenario template
The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military operations in the
country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The government of Yemen
requested US assistance after (anti-US terrorist organizations/rebel groups) established bases
in the North of the country. American intelligence agencies have identified the location of the
terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States plans to strike these bases with (missiles fired from
drone/bombs dropped from airplanes/ground forces) to kill (terrorist/rebel) leaders and
cripple their operations.
Actual manipulations
Weapon Type: Drone
PPO: Terrorism
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established
bases in the North of the country. American intelligence agencies have identified the location of
the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States plans to strike these bases with missiles fired from
drone aircraft to kill terrorist leaders and cripple their operations.
Weapon Type: Manned Aircraft
PPO: Terrorism
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established
bases in the North of the country. American intelligence agencies have identified the location of
the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States plans to strike these bases with bombs dropped
from airplanes to kill terrorist leaders and cripple their operations.
Weapon Type: Soldier
PPO: Terrorism
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established
bases in the North of the country. American intelligence agencies have identified the location of
the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States plans to strike these bases with ground forces to
kill terrorist leaders and cripple their operations.
Weapon Type: Drone
PPO: IPC
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after rebel groups established bases in the North
of the country. American intelligence agencies have identified the location of the rebel bases in

168
Yemen. The United States plans to strike these bases with missiles fired from drone aircraft to kill
rebel leaders and cripple their operations.
Weapon Type: Manned Aircraft
PPO: IPC
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after rebel groups established bases in the North
of the country. American intelligence agencies have identified the location of the rebel bases in
Yemen. The United States plans to strike these bases with bombs dropped from airplanes to kill
rebel leaders and cripple their operations.
Weapon Type: Soldier
PPO: IPC
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after rebel groups established bases in the North
of the country. American intelligence agencies have identified the location of the rebel bases in
Yemen. The United States plans to strike these bases with ground forces to kill rebel leaders and
cripple their operations.
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APPENDIX E- STUDY 1-SPECIFIC MANIPULATION CHECKS

The goal of the military operation was to _________.
Assist the Yemeni government in fighting a rebel group
Reduce the capabilities of Yemeni terrorist groups to carry out attacks against the US
What type of force did the President deploy in the article you read?
Boots on the ground
Piloted Aircraft
Drones
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APPENDIX F-ADDITIONAL REGRESSION MODELS FOR STUDY 1

Number of obs = 433 R-squared = 0.0649
Root MSE
= .775853 Adj R-squared = 0.0584
Source Partial SS df
MS
F Prob > F
-----------+---------------------------------------------------Model 17.9215166 3 5.97383888
9.92 0.0000
drone 16.2799447 1 16.2799447
27.05 0.0000
ppo .96833442 1 .96833442
1.61 0.2054
drone#ppo .108506448 1 .108506448
0.18 0.6714
Residual 258.235527 429 .601947616
-----------+---------------------------------------------------Total 276.157044 432 .639252416
Table 6- ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and PPO on Perceived Riskiness for Study 1
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Number of obs = 434 R-squared = 0.0406
Root MSE
= 1.18979 Adj R-squared = 0.0339
Source Partial SS df
MS
F Prob > F
-----------+---------------------------------------------------Model 25.7724126 3 8.59080421
6.07 0.0005
drone 11.3168501 1 11.3168501
7.99 0.0049
ppo 16.2596023 1 16.2596023
11.49 0.0008
drone#ppo 2.85859958 1 2.85859958
2.02 0.1560
Residual 608.70685 430 1.41559733
-----------+---------------------------------------------------Total 634.479263 433 1.46531008
Table 7- ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and PPO on Support for the Use of Force for
Study 1
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APPENDIX G- STUDY 2 AND STUDY 3 SCENARIOS

Generic Scenario
The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military operations in the
country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The government of Yemen
requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established bases in the North of
the country and began targeting (civilian populations/government facilities). American
intelligence agencies have identified the location of the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States
plans to strike these bases with (missiles fired from drone/bombs dropped from
airplanes/ground forces) to kill terrorist leaders cripple their operations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff has analyzed this plan. They estimate that there is a
(90%/50%/30%)chance that this attack will successfully degrade al Qaeda’s capabilities to
continue operations against the United States.
Weapon Type: Drone strike
Success: 90%
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established
bases in the North of the country and began targeting civilian tourist populations. American
intelligence agencies have identified the location of the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States
plans to strike these bases with missiles fired from drone aircraft to kill terrorist leaders and cripple
their operations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff has analyzed this plan. They estimate that there is a 90% chance that this
attack will successfully degrade al Qaeda’s capabilities to continue operations against the United
States.
Weapon Type: Drone strike
Success: 50%
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established
bases in the North of the country and began targeting civilian tourist populations. American
intelligence agencies have identified the location of the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States
plans to strike these bases with missiles fired from drone aircraft to kill terrorist leaders and cripple
their operations.
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff has analyzed this plan. They estimate that there is a 50% chance that this
attack will successfully degrade al Qaeda’s capabilities to continue operations against the United
States.
Weapon Type: Drone strike
Success: 30%
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established
bases in the North of the country and began targeting civilian tourist populations. American
intelligence agencies have identified the location of the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States
plans to strike these bases with missiles fired from drone aircraft to kill terrorist leaders and cripple
their operations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff has analyzed this plan. They estimate that there is a 30% chance that this
attack will successfully degrade al Qaeda’s capabilities to continue operations against the United
States.
Weapon Type: Ground troops
Success: 90%
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established
bases in the North of the country and began targeting civilian tourist populations. American
intelligence agencies have identified the location of the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States
plans to strike these bases with ground forces to kill terrorist leaders and cripple their operations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff has analyzed this plan. They estimate that there is a 90% chance that this
attack will successfully degrade al Qaeda’s capabilities to continue operations against the United
States.
Weapon Type: Ground troops
Success: 50%
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established
bases in the North of the country and began targeting civilian tourist populations. American
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intelligence agencies have identified the location of the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States
plans to strike these bases with ground forces to kill terrorist leaders and cripple their operations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff has analyzed this plan. They estimate that there is a 50% chance that this
attack will successfully degrade al Qaeda’s capabilities to continue operations against the United
States.
Weapon Type: Ground troops
Success: 30%
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)--- The president of the United States announced intentions to carry out military
operations in the country of Yemen, an ally of the United States, in the Middle East. The
government of Yemen requested US assistance after anti-US terrorist organizations established
bases in the North of the country and began targeting civilian tourist populations. American
intelligence agencies have identified the location of the terrorist bases in Yemen. The United States
plans to strike these bases with ground forces to kill terrorist leaders and cripple their operations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff has analyzed this plan. They estimate that there is a 30% chance that this
attack will successfully degrade al Qaeda’s capabilities to continue operations against the United
States.
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APPENDIX H-STUDY 2 STUDY 3-SPECIFIC MANIPULATION CHECK
QUESTION

What type of force did the President deploy in the article you read?
Boots on the ground
Drones
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APPENDIX I-ADDITIONAL REGRESSION MODELS FOR STUDY 2

Number of obs = 538 R-squared = 0.0902
Root MSE
= .759739 Adj R-squared = 0.0817
Source Partial SS df
MS
F Prob > F
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Model 30.4517212 5 6.09034424
10.55 0.0000
drone 12.1941393 1 12.1941393
21.13 0.0000
%success 17.2466876 2 8.62334382
14.94 0.0000
drone#%success 1.09680341 2 .548401705
0.95 0.3874
Residual 307.072442 532 .577203839
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Total 337.524164 537 .628536617
Table 8- ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and Likelihood of Success Effect on
Perceived Riskiness for Study 2
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Number of obs = 538 R-squared = 0.0998
Root MSE
= 1.25198 Adj R-squared = 0.0913
Source Partial SS df
MS
F Prob > F
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Model 92.4380202 5 18.487604
11.79 0.0000
drone 27.7188634 1 27.7188634
17.68 0.0000
%success 64.6880239 2 32.3440119
20.63 0.0000
Drone*%success .774301892 2 .387150946
0.25 0.7812
Residual 833.881682 532 1.56744677
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Total 926.319703 537 1.72499014
Table 9- ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and Likelihood of Success on Support for the
Use of Force for Study 2
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Number of obs = 538 R-squared = 0.0046
Root MSE
= 1.02718 Adj R-squared = -0.0047
Source Partial SS df
MS
F Prob > F
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Model 2.61670791 5 .523341582
0.50 0.7793
drone .231292569 1 .231292569
0.22 0.6398
%success 1.78124656 2 .890623279
0.84 0.4305
drone#%success .666438847 2 .333219424
0.32 0.7293
Residual 561.316378 532 1.05510597
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Total 563.933086 537 1.05015472
Table 10-ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and Likelihood of Success on Perceived
Success for a Hypothetical Scenario for Study 2
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Drone
group
Constant
Pseudo R2

Model 1
.75***
(.22)
1.75***
(.17)
.02

(***p<.001)
Table 11- Likelihood of Thinking Military Operation is Risky because It Could Cause Collateral
Damage

180

Drone
Constant
Pseudo R2

Model 1
.93**
(.35)
3.03***
(.28)
.03

(**p<.01, ***p<.001)
Table 12-Logit Analysis of Likelihood Subject Showed Concern about Collateral Damage When
Asked Why They Supported the Military Operation
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APPENDIX J-ADDITIONAL REGRESSION MODELS FOR STUDY 3

.
Number of obs = 543 R-squared = 0.0140
Root MSE
= 23.2165 Adj R-squared = 0.0048
Source Partial SS df
MS
F Prob > F
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Model 4114.57932 5 822.915863
1.53 0.1796
drone 1776.56523 1 1776.56523
3.30 0.0700
%success 1961.33167 2 980.665834
1.82 0.1631
drone#%success 162.445501 2 81.2227504
0.15 0.8602
Residual 289447.148 537 539.007725
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Total 293561.727 542 541.626803
Table 13-ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and Likelihood of success on Overall Risk
Attitudes for Study 3
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Table 14- ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and Likelihood of Success on Perceived
Likelihood of Success for Study 3

Number of obs = 544 R-squared = 0.3544
Root MSE
= .758716 Adj R-squared = 0.3484
Source Partial SS df
MS
F Prob > F
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Model 170.019239 5 34.0038477
59.07 0.0000
drone 1.4023273 1 1.4023273
2.44 0.1192
%success 167.483675 2 83.7418375 145.47 0.0000
drone#%success .459970649 2 .229985325
0.40 0.6708
Residual 309.699511 538 .575649649
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Total 479.71875 543 .883459945
Table 15- ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and Likelihood of Success on Perceived
Likelihood of Success for Study 3
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Number of obs = 544 R-squared = 0.1196
Root MSE
= .763368 Adj R-squared = 0.1114
Source Partial SS df
MS
F Prob > F
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Model 42.6012007 5 8.52024015
14.62 0.0000
drone 23.9662895 1 23.9662895
41.13 0.0000
%success 16.6382246 2 8.3191123
14.28 0.0000
drone#%success 1.50430188 2 .752150941
1.29 0.2759
Residual 313.509093 538 .582730657
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Total 356.110294 543 .655820063

Table 16-ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and Likelihood of Success on Perceived
Riskiness in Study 3
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Drone
(.22)
Constant

Model 1
.43*
-1.71***

(*p<.1, ***p<.001)
Table 17-Post-Hoc Logit Analysis of the Effect of Drones on Whether Subjects Mention
Concern about Collateral Damage When Asked Why They Did or Did Not Think the
Hypothetical Scenario Was Risky
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Number of obs = 544 R-squared = 0.1059
Root MSE
= 1.26458 Adj R-squared = 0.0976
Source Partial SS df
MS
F Prob > F
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Model 101.880415 5 20.376083
12.74 0.0000
drone 8.4181379 1 8.4181379
5.26 0.0222
%success 90.4242096 2 45.2121048
28.27 0.0000
drone#%success 1.02925797 2 .514628983
0.32 0.7250
Residual 860.354879 538 1.59917264
------------------+---------------------------------------------------Total 962.235294 543 1.77207236
Table 18-ANOVA Analysis of the Effect of Drones and Likelihood of Success on Support for
the Use of Force for Study 3

186

Table 19-Post-Hoc Logit Analysis of the Effect of Drones on Whether Subjects Mention
Concern about Collateral Damage When Asked Why They Did or Did Not Support the Use of
Force for Study 3

Drone
Constant
R2

.65*
(.39)
-3.17***
(.31)
.01
(*p<.1, ***p<.001)

Table 20-Post-Hoc Logit Analysis of the Effect of Drones on Whether Subjects Mention
Concern about Collateral Damage When Asked Why They Did or Did Not Support the Use of
Force for Study 3

187

Model 1

Drone

-.38*
(.18)

Constant
R2

-.52***
(.12)
.01

(*p<.05, ***p<.001)

Table 21-Post-Hoc Logit Analysis of the Effect of Drones Subjects’ Concern about the
Likelihood of Success When Asked Why They Did or Did Not Think the Hypothetical Scenario
Was Risky for Study 3

188

Model 1

Drone

-3.23**
(.18)

Constant
R2

-.52***
(.12)
.13

(**p<.05, ***p<.001)
Table 22-Post-hoc Logit Analysis of Whether Subjects Explicitly Supported the Use of Force
because Drones Were Used.
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